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Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment
Bruce A. Green*
Charles Bell, Donald Paradis, and Shirley Tyler were tried in different
states for murder. Each was convicted and sentenced to death. Charles Bell
was represented at trial by a recent law school graduate who had never
before tried a criminal case to completion.1 Donald Paradis's lawyer had
passed the bar exam six months earlier, had never previously represented
a criminal accused, and had not elected courses in criminal law, criminal
procedure, or trial advocacy while in law school.2 Shirley Tyler's trial lawyer
was also a member of the bar for only a few months. He had defended one
previous assault case and one previous robbery case, each lasting half a
day.3 Each condemned prisoner later asserted that he or she had been
denied the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal accused "to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence ' 4 on the ground that the defense
attorney had rendered ineffective legal assistance. In asserting this claim,
each undertook the difficult burden of demonstrating the likelihood that he
or she had received a sentence of death only because of the attorney's
unreasonably poor performance.
Not surprisingly, none of the three death-row defendants claimed to
have been deprived of "counsel" altogether, since courts unwaveringly
adhere to the view that "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment includes any
duly licensed attorney. This Article argues, however, that a narrower
construction of the constitutional term is warranted: "counsel" should
include only those attorneys who are qualified to render legal assistance to a
person accused of a crime. By that standard, these three defendants, and
many others who similarly have been tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death with an unqualified attorney by their side, have been deprived of
their right to "counsel."
*Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. 1978, Princeton University;
J.D. 1981, Columbia University.
I am grateful for the research assistance provided by Dina DeGiorgio, Francine Goodman,
Yasho Lahiri, and Marybeth Whitehouse as fellows of the Stein Institute on Law and Ethics.
In addition, I am grateful to Vivian Berger, Richard Bernstein, Victor Brudney, Daniel Capra,
Deborah Denno, Martin Flaherty, James Kainen, Henry McGee, Russell Pearce, James
Robertson, Kate Stith, and Ronald Tabak for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
1. Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992).
3. Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743-44 (11th Cir. 1985).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment ensures that "[i]n all criminal proceedings, the
accused shall.., have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."5 But who
is "counsel"? To the limited extent that courts have addressed this basic
question about the scope of the constitutional right, they have invariably
defined "counsel" with reference to state processes for licensing attorneys.
With modest exceptions, courts have held that those who are licensed to
practice law qualify as "counsel" and those who are unlicensed do not.6 The
right of access to counsel, therefore, is satisfied when a defendant receives
legal assistance from a member of the bar, however ill-trained or inexpe-
rienced that lawyer may be. Conversely, a criminal accused seeking to
exercise the qualified constitutional right to "counsel of choice' 7 may
choose only from among licensed practitioners, however well-suited unli-
censed individuals may be to provide a criminal defense.
The assumption underlying the prevailing definition of "counsel" is
that individuals who satisfy the requirements for obtaining a license to
practice law, and only those individuals, are qualified to provide a criminal
defense. This premise is half true. Those who are unlicensed to practice law
are genefaily not qualified to provide a competent criminal defense. This
premise, however, is also half fiction. Like nonlawyers, most licensed
practitioners are also unqualified to provide a competent criminal defense,
because candidates for admission to the bar are never required to acquire
or demonstrate the skills and legal knowledge generally recognized as
necessary to represent competently a criminal defendant. Moreover, in
mostjurisdictions, upon admission a lawyer needs no additional training or
experience before assuming responsibility for a criminal defense.
For the most part, it does little harm for courts to indulge in the fiction
that a lawyer's license denotes competence to practice in virtually all areas,
including criminal cases. Most criminal defendants do not arbitrarily obtain
counsel from the general pool of licensed practitioners, but retain or are
appointed experienced members of the criminal defense bar to represent
them. In those cases in which criminal defendants receive substandard
assistance from ill-trained, inexperienced, or otherwise unqualified lawyers,
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel sometimes
affords a remedy.
For capital defendants, however, indulging the fiction of universal
attorney competence may have lethal consequences. In many jurisdictions,
criminal defendants charged with capital offenses typically obtain trial
counsel from a less qualified pool than criminal defendants in noncapital
cases.8 At the same time, capital cases are far more complex than noncapital
criminal cases, so that the level of skill required to provide a competent
defense in a death penalty case is higher. And at the sentencing stage, when
5. Id.
6. See infra Part I(B).
7. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV(A).
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the quality of lawyering does make a difference, the difference is more than
a matter of degree. It is a difference'between a sentence of imprisonment
and a sentence of death.
This Article argues for a narrower definition of "counsel" that
encompasses only those licensed attorneys with the requisite skill and
knowledge to wage an adequate criminal defense. A less inclusive definition
would reduce the incidence of death sentences imposed only because of the
unsuitability of defense counsel.9 At the outset, however, candor compels
an acknowledgement of what is obvious-that this proposed redefinition of"counsel" is unlikely to win favor soon in theSupreme Court or in any other
court in which capital cases are decided. Nevertheless, this Article serves, at
the very least, as a critique of the current system of criminal justice, and
particularly of capital justice, in this country. In addition, it provides
support for the adoption of qualification standards for criminal defense
attorneys by means other than constitutional adjudication. Establishing a
qualified criminal defense bar through court rules or statutes is, at once, the
most likely prospect for criminal justice reform in the short term and, in the
9. There is nothing novel about the idea that capital defendants ought to have lawyers
whose training and experience make them especially qualified to try criminal cases. Henry
Monaghan made this point, albeit in passing, more than a quarter-century ago in the context
of an article arguing in favor of using law students to fulfill the mandate of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Henry P. Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers,
45 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 446-61 (1965) (While society cannot afford to interpret the right to
counsel to require affording experienced counsel to all criminal defendants, "where the stakes
are higher, where the penalties which can be imposed are more severe, perhaps we can now
afford the luxury of demanding an additional safeguard-the presence of experienced counsel
at the very outset."). Since then, opponents of the death penalty have cited the inexperience
of lawyers for capital defendants as one of several reasons why the quality of representation for
capital defendants is generally poorer than for other defendants. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright,
Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inade-
quate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 679, 680 (1990) ("Poor
people accused of capital crimes are frequently represented by inadequately compensated,
inexperienced, and incompetent court-appointed attorneys."); Ronald J. Tabak, Gideon v.
Wainwright in Death Penalty Cases, 10 Pace L. Rev. 407, 408-09 (1990).
This Article departs from previous commentary in arguing that a right to a qualified lawyer
is rooted in the very meaning of the term "counsel." Until now, commentary on the quality of
representation in capital cases has focused on how the right to "effective assistance of counsel"
applies to such cases. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1983); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 461 (1987); Helen Gredd,
Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544 (1983). Some early commentators argued that a right to
an experienced lawyer should arise out of the right to effective assistance of counsel, see, e.g.,
Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 289, 307 (1965); Nancy C. Lenvin, Note, The
Right to Counsel and the Neophyte Lawyer, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 378 (1970), but courts have
rejected that argument because claimed denials of that right are now evaluated on the basis of
an ex post inquiry into the quality of the defense lawyer's performance. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In contrast, this Artide argues that only qualified attorneys
can be considered "counsel" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment-an interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment right that calls for an ex ante inquiry into the defense lawyer's
knowledge and experience.
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long term, it is an essential precursor to the courts' eventual decision to
recognize that the Sixth Amendment provides the right to a qualified
lawyer.
This Article begins in Part I by briefly discussing contemporary
Supreme Court decisions which provide necessary background to an
exploration of the meaning of "counsel." It then goes on to describe
lower-court decisions which define "counsel" to include all duly licensed
attorneys based in part on the assumption that duly licensed attorneys are
generally qualified to represent criminal defendants. Part II critiques those
decisions in light of the historical underpinnings of the right to counsel and
the purposes served by the right. It accepts that the term "counsel" should
exclude individuals who are untrained in the law, but argues that the term
should encompass only those attorneys possessing the skill, knowledge, and
character needed to provide a competent criminal defense. It argues,
moreover, that neither an originalist nor a functional interpretation justi-
fies relying on bar admissions processes to guarantee a lawyer's possession
of the requisite attributes.
Part III acknowledges that defining "counsel" to include duly licensed
attorneys might be acceptable if judicial decisions were correct in their
premise that contemporary licensing processes assure that qualified attor-
neys defend criminal cases. It demonstrates, however, that this premise is
false. In criminal cases, and particularly in capital cases, a license is far from
a guarantee that a lawyer is capable of providing adequate representation.
Part IV explains why the prevailing legal fiction has lethal conse-
quences. In many jurisdictions, practices governing the provision of coun-
sel to capital defendants seem to ensure that capital defendants are more
likely than the general run of criminal defendants to be denied qualified
counsel. Reported decisions and anecdotal studies of capital cases support
this intuition. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to "effective assistance
of counsel"' 0 provides inadequate relief for many of those defendants who
are sentenced to death at the hands of unqualified lawyers. That right
allows a convicted defendant to challenge only the trial lawyer's perfor-
mance, not his qualifications. Under the present standard for reviewing a
claimed denial of the right to effective representation, a defendant can win
relief only upon showing both that his trial lawyer performed unreasonably
and that counsel's errors probably affected the outcome of the trial.
10. Although the Sixth Amendment speaks only of "the Assistance of Counsel," the
provision has been read to include the right to "effective" assistance of counsel, that is, a right
to minimally competent legal assistance. References to an "effective appointment of counsel"
or "effective assistance of counsel" in the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence appeared as early as
1932, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), and continued throughout the Court's
decisions concerning the right to counsel under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955). See generally Bruce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of
the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1053, 1057 & n.30 (1980). In McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), the Court acknowledged a Sixth Amendment
"right to effective assistance of counsel," by which it meant a right to competent assistance. But
it was not until 1984, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that the Court
announced the contemporary standard for evaluating claims that an attorney's inadequate
performance amounted to a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel. See infra Part
IV(C).
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Finally, Part V describes what redefining "counsel" would mean for
the criminal justice system. To be regarded as "counsel" for constitutional
purposes, a member of the bar should possess the skill and knowledge
understood within the profession as prerequisites to defending criminal
cases adequately. The right to "counsel," meaning a qualified advocate,
would not supplant the presently recognized right to effective assistance of
counsel, but would supplement it. Criminal defendants would be entitled,
at the threshold, to a qualified attorney. In individual cases in which a
seemingly capable lawyer provided substandard representation, a convicted
defendant could claim that he was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel.
Because most lawyers do not possess the requisite skill and knowledge
to be qualified to defend a criminal case, some mechanism to train and
certify those lawyers must be established. Courts are undoubtedly capable
of establishing such a mechanism. The judiciary is, after all, responsible for
the existing licensing process, and some courts already have established
processes either for certifying criminal lawyers as specialists or for deter-
mining which lawyers are qualified to serve by assignment in criminal cases.
Moreover, legislatures are equally capable of devising a process for upgrad-
ing the quality of criminal defense lawyers. Congress, for one, recently
considered legislation designed in part to improve the quality of defense
lawyers in death penalty cases."
This Article recognizes that, at least in the foreseeable future, courts
are unlikely to reinterpret the Sixth Amendment to require a complete
overhaul of the process for providing legal assistance to criminal defen-
dants. Until a significant number of jurisdictions, by court rule or statute,
have established processes for certifying criminal defense lawyers or have
set minimum qualifications for assigned counsel in criminal cases, courts
cannot be expected to recognize a constitutional right to qualified counsel
in all criminal cases. This Article concludes, however, that at the very least,
qualified attorneys should now be made available in capital cases, where it
is especially inappropriate to invoke the fiction that a license to practice law
guarantees one's fitness to practice, and where the invocation of that fiction
has the most harsh and undeserved consequences.
11. See S. 618, 101 Cong., 1st Sess. § 2261 (1991) (Violent Crime Control Act of 1991,
proposed by Sen. Biden on Mar. 12, 1991).
The American Bar Association (ABA) has been a leading proponent of legislative reform
designed to secure competent attorneys for capital defendants. Its recent reports identify the
unavailability of competent attorneys as one of the principal failings of death penaltyproceedings in most states and recommend legislation to address this problem. See American
Bar Ass'n Crim. Just. Section, Report to the House of Delegates (1989) [hereinafter ABA
Report], reprinted in Toward a MoreJust and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases 1, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Toward a MoreJust and Effective System] and in 40 Am. U. L.
Rev. 9, 9 (1990); American Bar Ass'n Crim. Just. Section, Report Supporting Aierican Bar
Association Recommendations on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Toward a More
Just and Effective System, supra, at 6-17 and in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 13, 14-27 (1990); American
Bar Ass'n Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Background Report on Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus Issues [hereinafter ABA Background Report], reprinted in Toward a MoreJust
and Effective System, supra, at 41, 49-76 and in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 53, 62-92 (1990); see also
American Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (1988).
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I. How COURTS DEFINE "COUNSEL"
A. The Right to Counsel and Supreme Court Interpretations
In England prior to the American Revolution as well as for some time
thereafter, a defendant accused of a felony or capital offense generally was
not permitted to appear through counsel.12 Some American colonies
initially applied this rule,'3 but all abandoned it by the mid-eighteenth
century.' 4 Colonial legislatures recognized that legal assistance was neces-
sary to protect against the conviction of innocent defendants who were
ignorant of the law.' 5 Indeed, in some colonies by the time of the
Revolution, a defendant charged with a capital crime who could not afford
an attorney was entitled by law to have one assigned to him or her.' 6
The principal purpose of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal
accused "to have the assistance of counsel for his defence" was to forbid
laws, like those in England, which required criminal defendants to repre-
12. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 355 ("It is the settled
rule at common law that no counsel be allowed a prisoner upon his trial, upon the general
issue in any capital crime, unless some point of law shall arise proper to be debated."); 1
Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America 42 & n.115 (1965)
(quoting 3 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 137) ("Where any person is indicted of
treason or felony and pleadeth to the treason or felony, not guilty... it is holden that the party
in that case shall not have councelL."). The common law rule was modified in England in 1695
to permit representation of counsel in treason cases, 7 Will. 3, ch. 3, § 1 (1695) (Eng.), but was
not entirely abandoned until 1836, when a statute was enacted to provide: "all persons tried
for felonies shall be admitted ... to make full answer and defence ... by counsel learned in
the law, or by attorney in courts where attorneys practice as counsel." 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 144,
§ 1 (1836) (Eng.).
13. Professor Chroust cites an aberrational case in East New Jersey in 1692 in which the
accused was denied the opportunity to be assisted by counsel. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 42
n.115.
14. Id. at 43-44.
15. For example, a provision adopted in South Carolina in 1731 stated:
And whereas many innocent persons under criminal prosecutions, may suffer for
want of knowledge in the laws, how to make a just defence: And whereas the judges
and justices in the several courts here, who ought to assist the prisoners in matters of
law, cannot be presumed to have so great knowledge and experience as the great
judges and sages of the law sitting in his Majesty's court at Westminster, for which
reasons persons under criminal persecutions ought to have proper assistance, and all
just and equal means allowed them to defend their innocenses .... [e]very person so
accused and indicted, arraigned or tryed... shall be received and admitted to make
his or their full defence by counsel learned in the law ....
Id. (quoting Public Laws of S.C., 1682-1792, Act 552, § 41, August 20, 1731).
16. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 44. For example, a 1718 Pennsylvania law provided "that
upon all Trials of ... capital cases. . . learned counsel [be] assigned to the prisoners." Id. at
43 (quoting 1 Laws of Pa. (1700-81), Act of May 31, 1718, ch. 217, § 4 (Dallas ed.)). South
Carolina's 1731 provision similarly allowed that if the prisoner or prisoners lack counsel, the"court shall and is hereby authorized and required, immediately upon his or their request, to
assign to such person or persons, such and so many council not exceeding two, as the person
or persons shall desire .... ." 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 43-44 (quoting Public Laws of S.C.,
1682-1792, Act 552, § 41, August 20, 1731). And, in 1734, a law was enacted in Virginia to
provide that "in all trials for capital cases the prisoner, upon his petition to the court, shall be
allowed counsel." 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting 4 Hening, The Statutes-at-Large,
Being a Collection of the Laws of Virginia, 1619-1792, at 404 (1823)).
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sent themselves.' 7 Although the constitutional provision was not initially
read to guarantee the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants, it did
protect the right of those who could procure counsel to have an attorney.'8
Moreover, as originally understood, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed "the
assistance of counsel of [the accused's] own selection."'19 Thus, courts could
not dictate who would be retained by the accused. The Supreme Court's
modern-day decisions have built upon both of these original themes: access
to counsel and choice of counsel.
Recognizing the importance of legal assistance for unsophisticated
defendants, the Court held in 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst20 that indigent felony
defendants in federal courts were entitled to the appointment of an
attorney if they were unable to retain one.2' Moreover, the Court decided,
those defendants who could afford to retain counsel, but nonetheless
appeared in court unrepresented, had to be adequately apprised of their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and could not be tried without repre-
sentation unless they voluntarily and knowingly relinquished that right.22
For a quarter-century, however, the Court declined to extend the Sixth
Amendment right to indigent felony defendants in state court proceedings.
Instead, the Court held that the Due Process Clause entitled an indigent
defendant to appointed counsel only when, in light of such factors as the
seriousness and complexity of the allegations and the defendant's lack of
sophistication, compelling the defendant to represent himself would be
fundamentally unfair.23 Underlying this ad hoc standard was a fiction that
criminal defendants, although untrained in the law, were nevertheless
competent in most cases to defend themselves at the level necessary to avoid
the conviction of an innocent person who is accused of a crime.24 In
death-penalty cases, where the stakes were highest, the Court recognized
this fiction for what it was. In every capital case that came before it, the
17. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the
Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. Miami
L. Rev. 765, 786-89 (1989).,
18. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 663 (1948); Alexander Holzoff, The Right of
Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1944).
19. Anderson v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 29 (1898); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53,
60-65, (1932) ("mhe right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."); William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel
in American Courts 21 (1955); 1 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise in the Constitutional
Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 696-
708 (8th ed. 1927); Winick, supra note 17, at 786-99 (tracing historical origins of right to
counsel of choice).
20. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. Id. at 467-69.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443,446 (1962); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437,441 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672,683-84 (1948); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942). See generally Green, supra note 10, at 1054-55 (discussing right to counsel under
Due Process Clause).
24. See Yale Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 220-30,
254-60 (1962); Yale Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright A Quarter Century Later, 10 Pace L, Rev.
343, 347-52 (1990).
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Court held that the indigent defendant should have been provided
counsel. 25 However, largely out of concern that some states would encoun-
ter administrative or financial difficulties in providing lawyers to all
indigent felony defendants, the Court delayed extending Zerbst to indigent
defendants in state court proceedings who were not facing the death
penalty.26
Finally, thirty years ago, in Gideon v. Wainwright,27 the Court held that
all felony defendants in state court must be provided access to counsel. The
constitutional guarantee was further extended several years later when the
Court concluded in Argersinger v. Hamlin28 that indigent misdemeanor
defendants could not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless they,
too, had been afforded access to counsel. As the Court's decisions recog-
nize, the criminal defendant's right of access to counsel is essential to
25. In its earliest decision, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), decided several years
before Betts, the Court acknowledged that counsel would be essential to enable virtually any
innocent defendant to prevail in criminal proceedings:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.
Id. at 69. Nevertheless, in determining that due process required the appointment of counsel
in Powell, the Court pointedly limited its ruling to the extreme facts of the case before it:
mhe necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court
to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would be so in
other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine.
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where
the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law ....
Id. at 71.
In decisions subsequent to Betts, the Court came to acknowledge that capital charges were
enough in themselves to require the appointment of counsel, wholly apart from whether
special circumstances incapacitated defendants from mounting defenses on their own. See
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) ("When one pleads to a capital charge.without
benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted."); see also Bute v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948) ("if these charges had been capital charges, the court would
have been required, both by the state statute and by the decisions of this Court interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment, to take some such steps [to appoint counsel]").
26. Practical concerns were subsequently revived in connection with the extension of
Gideon to misdemeanor defendants. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 60-62 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring in result).
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. 407 U.S. 25 (1972); see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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promote the reliability of the criminal process, 29 the availability of other
constitutional and procedural protections afforded criminal defendants,30
and relative equality between the opposing sides of a criminal controversy
and among different classes of criminal defendants. 3'
The right of access to counsel recognized in Zerbst and Gideon is
absolute, save for those cases in which a defendant who understands the
right decides voluntarily and expressly to relinquish it.32 Thus, a criminal
conviction must be overturned if the defendant was deprived of counsel,
even if the proof against the defendant was overwhelming and the presence
of counsel was unlikely to have affected the outcome of the case. As the
Court stated a half-century ago: "The right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. 33 In the
intervening years, the Court has unwaveringly adhered to this view,3 4
which has essentially two premises. First, the types of harm that are likely
to result from the absence of counsel will not often be reflected in the trial
record and will not easily be susceptible to proof, yet they are pervasive.3 5
Therefore, regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case in the
absence of counsel, one can rarely say with absolute assurance that counsel
would not have made a difference. Second, and more importantly, the
guarantee of dounsel is so fundamental to fair process that a trial without
that right would be wholly undeserving of public respect, regardless of
whether, with or without counsel, the defendant invariably would be
convicted.3 6
Consistent with the earliest understanding of the right to counsel,
contemporary Supreme Court decisions recognize that the Sixth Amend-
ment protects not only access to counsel, but also a defendant's right to
select counsel, at least in those cases where the defendant does not require
a court-appointed representative. The right to choose counsel promotes the
fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings by enabling an accused to
select the available representative in whom he or she places greatest
confidence and who he or she believes to be best suited to defend the
29. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984) ("[IMhe 'very premise'that underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment" is that 'partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the
innocent go free."') (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
30. See, e.g., Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31.
31. See Green, supra note 10, at 1056.
32. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
33. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
34. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976) (reversing conviction where court refused to let counsel confer overnight with
accused); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (citing the right to counsel as a
paradigm of those "constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error").
35. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1978).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) ("The presumption thatcounsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is
denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.").
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particular case. This aspect of the right to counsel also respects the
individual defendant's interest, as a matter of personal autonomy, in
making critical decisions concerning the course of the criminal defense.3 7
Unlike the right of access to counsel, the right to counsel of choice is
not absolute. At times, a court may curtail a criminal defendant's efforts to
select a particular representative. For example, to ensure the orderly
disposition of cases, a trial court may schedule a criminal trial to occur on
a date that is inconvenient to the attorney initially selected by the defen-
dant, thereby imposing an indirect restriction on the accused's ability to
appear with counsel of preference.33 Moreover, in order to promote other
institutional interests, a court may disqualify a particular attorney from
representing a criminal accused. In particular, the Court has recognized a
trial judge's discretion to disqualify defense counsel when there is a serious
risk that the attorney has a conflict of interest.3 9
Whether a particular individual qualifies as "counsel" under the Sixth
Amendment may arise in the context of either of the above-described
bodies of doctrine-that dealing with access to counsel or that dealing with
choice of counsel. For example, an indigent defendant may oppose the
appointment of a particular representative on the ground that the individ-
ual does not qualify as "counsel" or, similarly, a convicted defendant may
claim deprivation of his or her Sixth Amendment right because the
individual who represented the defendant did not qualify as "counsel." On
other occasions, the prosecution, in moving to disqualify a particular
individual from defending the accused, may make the argument that the
would-be defender does not qualify as "counsel." Each of these claims calls
for a determination of the meaning of the constitutional term.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the meaning of"counsel," and its opinions interpreting other elements of the Sixth
Amendment right provide only limited guidance. The Court's decisions
seem to assume that anyone who is an attorney meets the definition of"counsel" and anyone who is not an attorney does not. Thus, in its opinions,
the Court has used the terms "attorney" and "lawyer" interchangeably with
37. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); id. at 166 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("An obviously critical aspect of making a defense is choosing a person to serve as
an assistant and representative."); Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court
Sees Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1233-38
(1989).
38. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); United States v. Delia, 925 F.2d 574, 575
(2d Cir. 1991) (in Chambers opinion of Newman, J.) ("The right to counsel of choice does not
include a lawyer whose other commitments preclude compliance with a court's reasonable
scheduling of its cases."); United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 342-44 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 109 (1989); cf Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,621-22 (1989)
(assets needed to compensate retained counsel in a criminal case were not exempt from the
application of the federal drug forfeiture statute).
39. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161-62. For commentary on Wheat, see Green, supra note 37
(criticizing Wheat on the grounds that it gave inadequate weight to the defendantes interest in
autonomy and the integrity of the attorney-dient relationship, while exaggerating the
importance of the countervailing judicial interests); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in
Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 797-81 (1989).
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the term "counsel" when referring to the constitutional guarantee.40 In
only one case, United States v. Cronic,41 did the Court have an opportunity
explicitly to consider whether all attorneys should be deemed "counsel."
However, the Court failed to acknowledge, much less decide, whether its
usual understanding of the term was overinclusive.
The defendant in Cronic had been represented at a trial on mail fraud
charges by a young lawyer with a real estate practice who had never
previously tried a case before a jury and who had only twenty-five days to
prepare the case for trial.42 On review of the ensuing conviction, the court
of appeals concluded that Cronic had been denied the right to "assistance
of counsel," not because trial counsel had committed any identifiable errors
or omissions at trial, but because the lawyer's late entry into the case,
combined with his inexperience and other factors, warranted an inference
that the lawyer's representation had been inadequate.43 In rejecting this
analysis, the Supreme Court assumed that the trial attorney in Cronic was"counsel," and focused on whether Cronic had received the effective"assistance" of counsel, an inquiry calling for an after-the-fact review of the
trial attorney's conduct of the trial, rather than a before-the-fact inquiry
into the attorney's general qualifications. The Court determined that,
except in the unusual case "in which the surrounding circumstances make
it unlikely that the defendant could have received the effective assistance of
counsel," a defendant must point to specific errors made by trial counsel in
order to prevail on a claim that he had been denied that right.44 Finding
that the circumstances surrounding Cronic's representation did not make it
such an unusual case, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration
under the general standard.45
The Court in Cronic might have considered whether the guarantee of"counsel" is fulfilled by an individual who, although licensed to practice
law, has never tried a case before a jury and.apparently has no familiarity
with the criminal trial process. That the Court failed to do so is not
surprising, since Cronic's challenge to his conviction had never been
framed in this way and, thus, the question had not been considered by the
courts below. Justice Stevens's opinion leaves little room for doubt, how-
ever, that the Court considered Cronic's trial lawyer to be sufficiently
40. See, e.g., Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 ("we presume that the lawyer is competent to provide
the guiding hand that the defendant needs"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) (the
accused is guaranteed "a fair trial and a competent attorney"); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (the accused is entitled to "a reasonably competent attorney").
41. 466 U.S. 647 (1984).
42. Id. at 649.
43. Id. at 650, 652 (citing Cronic v. United States, 675 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1982)).
44. Id. at 666.
45. Id. at 666-67. On remand, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Cronic had been denied
effective representation because of the trial lawyer's failure to interpose a "good faith" defense
to the mail fraud charges. United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1404 (10th Cir. 1988).
Cronic was convicted again after a retrial, but the conviction was reversed and the charges
dismissed upon the Tenth Circuit's finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1990).
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qualified to wage a criminal defense to a mail fraud prosecution, notwith-
standing his inexperience. The opinion notes:
Every experienced criminal defense attorney once tried his first
criminal case. Moreover, a lawyer's experience with real estate
transactions might be more useful in preparing to try a criminal
case involving financial transactions than would prior experience
in handling, for example, armed robbery prosecutions.4 6
Thus, in the Court's view, while it might be prudent for trial courts "to take
greater precautions to ensure that counsel in serious criminal cases are
qualified," the inexperience of Cronic's counsel did not justify a presump-
tion that his performance at trial was ineffective.47
Undoubtedly, the Cronic Court exaggerated the possible utility of a
real estate practice to the trial of a criminal fraud case, perhaps deliberately
so. Without question, it would be far easier for a lawyer practiced in
defending charges of violent crimes to master the financial transactions at
issue in a mail fraud prosecution than it would be for someone skilled in
financial transactions to learn criminal law and procedure and develop trial
skills on the spot. Yet, as a practical matter, it would be difficult for some
jurisdictions to comply with the mandates of Gideon and Argersinger if all
criminal defendants were entitled not just to a lawyer, but to a "qualified"
lawyer. A defendant would likely be far better served by having a lawyer,
however unfamiliar he or she may be with criminal practice, than with no
lawyer at all. While the Court's comments do not necessarily compel the
conclusion that anyone who holds a license to practice law will be presumed
qualified to defend against criminal charges, lower courts have reasonably
read them for the proposition that inexperience alone does not disqualify a
lawyer from serving as "counsel" in a criminal proceeding. 48
Against this background of Supreme Court decisions, which give only
indirect guidance as to the meaning of "counsel," state courts and lower
federal courts have had relatively free rein to define the term. As described
in the following subpart, they have generally endorsed the common
understanding of the term-that "counsel" means "lawyer." In exceptional
cases, however, courts have been compelled to opt for a definition that is
46. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665.
47. Id. at 665 & n.38.
48. See, e.g., Burden v. Zant, 903 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 862 (1991); Beasley v. Holland, 649 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); see also
United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1986) ("An attorney can render effective
assistance of counsel even if he has had no prior experience in criminal advocacy."); United
States v. Badolato, 701 F.2d 915, 926 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant's complaint that trial
attorney "lacked sufficient experience in federal criminal trials alone is unrelated to the
question whether [he] received reasonably effective assistance of counsel."); cf. Achtien v.
Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941) ("There is a rather well-defined recollection on the
part of the court, backed by our observations, that all lawyers must have their first cases, that
in said first case diligence and anxious effort are often quite the equivalent of experience.").
But see United States v. Merritt, 528 F.2d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 1976) (counsel's inexperience,
together with other factors, including that he failed the bar examination three times and that
his performance called into question his professional judgment and skill, warranted conclusion
that he failed to meet the minimum constitutional standard).
[1993]
LETHAL FICTION: THE MEANING OF COUNSEL
more inclusive or less inclusive. An analysis of those cases reveals the
inadequacy of both the common understanding and the courts' efforts at a
more nuanced definition.
B. How Lower Courts Define "Counsel"
Discussions about the meaning of "counsel" have centered to a large
extent on how the framers of the Sixth Amendment would have originally
understood the term. No one has been able to point to any discussion or
debate about the meaning of "counsel" during the period when the Bill o.f
Rights was drafted and ratified. As a result, courts, commentators, and
litigants have looked to laws and practices governing the representation of
parties to judicial proceedings during the colonial, revolutionary, and
post-revolutionary period for insight into the framers' original understand-
ing.
Considerable disagreement surrounds the interpretation of early legal
practices. The most inclusive definition put forward is that "counsel" means
anyone who is chosen to represent the accused. Criminal defendants have
made this argument most often in seeking to be defended by a nonlawyer.49
On occasion, the question of whether a lay person qualifies as "counsel" has
also arisen in cases in which, after trial, the convicted defendant learned
49. See, e.g., United States v. Turnbull, 888 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 465-66 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Mindy D. Block, Note, The Criminal
Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Lay Representation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 460, 461 n.8
(1985) (citing cases).
Besides arguing that "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment includes lay representatives,
defendants have relied on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), in support of their
claimed right under the Sixth Amendment to be represented at a criminal trial by a nonlawyer.
In Faretta, the Court held that an individual has a constitutional right to waive the right to
appear through counsel and to represent himself at trial. Some have argued that the right of
self-representation should include as a corollary the right to be represented by a nonlawyer.
See, e.g., Block, supra, at 466-77. Courts have been unimpressed with this argument, however.
For example, the Third Circuit in Wilhelm noted that the Faretta decision found a right of
self-representation to be "rooted in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, which personally
guarantees the defendant the rights to be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation'
and to be 'confronted with the witnesses against him."' 570 F.2d at 466 (quoting Faretta, 422
U.S. at 819-20). It found that "[t]here is no comparable Sixth Amendment source of a right to
delegate the power of self-representation to lay persons who do not qualify to render the
assistance of counsel." Wilhelm, F.2d at 466; accord United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1202
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963 (1976); Skuse v. State, 714 P.2d 368, 369-70 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1986); State v. Peterson, 266 N.W.2d 103, 105-06 (S.D. 1978); see also Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 & n.3 (1988) ("Regardless of his persuasive powers, an
advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in
court.... Our holding in Faretta... that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right
to represent himself if he voluntarily elects to do so, does not encompass the right to choose any
advocate if the defendant wishes to be represented by counsel.") (emphasis in original).
Moreover, some defendants have relied unsuccessfully upon other constitutional provisions
as a purported source of a right to be represented by a lay person. For example, the defendant
in Turnbull argued that, in light of.his religious aversion to lawyers, his right to free exercise
of religion entitled him to the appointment of a nonlawyer to defend him at a trial for failure
to pay income taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that even if the
appointment of a lawyer interfered with a tenet central to the accused's religious practice, that
interference was warranted by the state's paramount "interest in a fair and orderly trial."
Turnbull, 888 F.2d at 638-40.
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that the person who represented him or her was not in fact a lawyer. 50
Two originalist arguments have been advanced in favor of defining"counsel" broadly to include lay representatives. The first is that lay
representation was a common practice in many colonies, and that the
framers would therefore have "thought of 'counsel' as including lay
persons."5' The second rests on Congress's adoption of the Judiciary Act of
178952 contemporaneously with its proposal of the Bill of Rights.55 Section
35 of the Judiciary Act provided for parties to be represented personally in
federal court proceedings "or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys
at law" as the rules of court permitted. 54 Some litigants have asserted that
the term "attorneys at law" in the Judiciary Act referred to the attorneys
who were licensed or otherwise authorized by the courts to practice law, and
that "counsel" referred to any other individual whose assistance could be
procured.5 5 Moreover, they have argued, the drafters of the Sixth Amend-
ment must have had the same understanding when they employed the term"counsel."
Courts have uniformly rejected the argument that "counsel" may
include nonlawyers who are entirely lacking in legal training.56 Although
courts have not settled on a single alternative approach, all have defined"counsel" with reference to the contemporary process for licensing attor-
neys. Currently, that process, although nominally under judicial control, is
generally delegated within each state to licensing authorities. 57 The process
typically involves several steps. Applicants must first graduate from law
school,58 then pass a bar examination, 59 and then satisfy authorities that
50. See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Felder, 391
N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1979).
51. See Block, supra note 49, at 464-65.
52. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
53. As the Third Circuit noted in United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461,465 n.2 (3d Cir.
1978), theJudiciary Act was signed into law by President Washington one day before Congress
proposed the Bill of Rights to the states.
54. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(1982)).
55. See, e.g., Block, supra note 49, at 463.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Turnbull, 888 F.2d 636, 638-40 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendant
not entitled to representation by a nonlawyer who shared "his religious belief that the
teachings of Jesus require him to avoid associating with lawyers"); United States v. Wilhelm,
570 F.2d 461,465 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1978) (federal courts of appeals "have uniformly rejected the
contention that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be represented by a friend
who is neither a law school graduate nor a member of the bar.") (citing cases); State v.
Spurgeon, 265 N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1978).
57. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 850 (1986) ("The rules [governing
admission to the bar], although nominally made by courts, are in fact almost everywhere
generated by committees of lawyers operating in close alignment with bar associations."). For
a description of how admissions standards have evolved in one state over the past 150 years,
see Stephen K. Huber & James E. Myers, Admission to the Practice of Law in Texas: An
Analytical History, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 485 (1978).
58.
In the vast majority of states, a bar applicant must graduate from a law school that
was accredited by the American Bar Association. In a few, graduates of particular
non-accredited law schools are also eligible for admission to the bar. In addition, in
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they possess requisite traits of character.60 After meeting those require-
ments, applicants must pay a licensing fee and take a prescribed oath,
whereupon they will be added to the list of attorneys and permitted to
practice law, subject to discipline for conduct reflecting adversely on their
fitness. From case to case, courts take differing views about which aspects of
this process are essential to qualify an individual as "counsel."
A common approach, put succinctly by one court, is that: "'Counsel'
means 'attorney.' ' '61 Under this interpretation, the defining characteristic
of "counsel" is that one's name has been placed on the roll of individuals
licensed to practice law. This interpretation has been adopted both in
decisions rejecting a criminal defendant's asserted right to select a nonlaw-
yer as counsel and in cases overturning convictions when it was revealed
after trial that the defendant was assisted by a nonlawyer.
Courts equating "counsel" with "attorney" have rejected the argument
that the framers must have meant to endorse the practice of lay represen-
some states, applicants for admission may serve an apprenticeship as an alternative to
graduating from law school.
American Bar Ass'n Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Narrowing the Gap, Legal
Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum 273 n.1 (1992)
[hereinafter MacCrate Report].
59.
The traditional bar examination is an entirely closed-book test combining multiple
choice and essay questions. Although the examination is intended to test a variety of
skills, including the ability to carry out certain types of legal analysis and to
communicate effectively, it puts a premium on the knowledge of legal rules drawn
from a broad variety of subjects.
Id. at 277; see David M. White, The Definition of Legal Competence: Will the Circle Be
Unbroken?, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 641 (1978).
The State of Wisconsin provides a 'diploma privilege' for graduates of law schools
within the state; thus, graduates of University of Wisconsin School of Law and
Marquette University School of Law may forego the bar examination. In addition,
many states waive the bar examination for attorneys who have practiced in another
jurisdiction for a specified number of years.
MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 273 n.2.
60.
In most jurisdictions, the process by which admitting authorities assess the
character of applicants to the bar involves a review by a committee of volunteer
lawyers of a candidate's response to a questionnaire seeking information about prior
arrests, convictions, civil judgments and similar problems. Few candidates are
rejected in the absence of a public record of misconduct. Thus, the process is
intended simply to weed out the exceedingly small number of candidates whose past
misconduct is viewed as a portent of future wrongdoing.
MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 283; see Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 491 (1985); David L. Rosenhan, Moral Character, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 925 (1974).
61. United States v. Turnbull, 888 F.2d 636, 638 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Lopez-Torres v.
United States, 700 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D.P.R. 1988) ("[T]he sixth amendment guarantee of
counsel signifies representation by an attorney admitted to practice law."); People v. Felder,
391 N.E.2d 1274, 1276-77 (N.Y. 1979) ("Counsel, as the word is used in the Sixth
Amendment, can mean nothing less than a licensed attorney at law.").
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tation that was common during the colonial period. 62 For example, in
United States v. Wilhelm, 63 the Third Circuit noted that, while some colonies
permitted the right to plead by a friend, most often a trained advocate
represented the accused in criminal cases, both in English and colonial
courts. Moreover, the court reasoned, there was no suggestion in the
ratifying debates that the framers of the Bill of Rights meant to depart from
this practice.64 Likewise, these courts have rejected the argument made by
advocates of lay representation premised on section 35 of the Judiciary
Act.65 For example, in a frequently cited Second Circuit decision, United
States v. Solina,66 Judge Friendly opined that the alternative use of the terms"counsel" and "attorneys at law" in the 1789 statute reflected its drafters'
awareness of the bifurcated nature of the legal profession in England,
where "counsel" (also known as "barristers") were permitted to appear as
advocates in all court proceedings, while "attorneys" (known today as"solicitors"), principally acted as legal advisors outside court. Congress
intended to make it clear in the Judiciary Act "that members of both
branches were accorded the right to appear in federal courts,"67 but not
that individuals who were unlicensed to practice law should be permitted to
represent others in federal court.68 Under this interpretation, the term
62. See, e.g., Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 474 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
Felder, 391 N.E.2d at 1276-77; accord Sheldon Krantz, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The
Mandate of Argersinger v. Hamlin 269-70 (1976) ("Of course, states are free to determine who
may or may not be an attorney at law. Anyone so certified would meet the threshold
qualification of 'counsel' in the Sixth Amendment. This result is mandated by the historical
development of the legal profession.").
63. 570 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 465; accord Turner, 407 F. Supp. at 472-74:
For centuries prior to the enactment of the Sixth Amendment, the English forerun-
ner of the American lawyer was called or invited to practice for a Court only after the
Court had satisfied itself that a person was fit to practice by virtue of his character
andlor training. On the American side of the ocean, this practice continued
throughout the colonial, revolutionary and post-revolutionary era of our history.
Although standards of admission were not all uniform and were not always very
stringent, the tradition of admission upon qualification continued to exist from even
the earliest times of the American legal experience. The Court cannot find even a
suggestion in the history of the Common Law after its primeval inception or in the
history of the American lawyer that the word "counsel," as used in the Sixth
Amendment, was meant to include a layman off the street without qualification as to
either training or character.
See also People v. Cox, 146 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. 1957); Higgins v. Parker, 191 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1945).
65. See, e.g., Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668,669 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Solina, 709
F.2d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1978).
66. 709 F.2d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1983).
67. Id.
68. Id. Judge Friendly bolstered his view of Congress's original understanding by
reference to another contemporaneous statute, Act of April 30, 1790, § 29, 1 Stat. 112 (1790),
which provided:
[E]very person so accused and indicted for [treason or other capital offences] shall
also be allowed and admitted to make his full defence by counsel learned in the law.
In Judge Friendly's view, Congress's use of the phrase "counsel learned in the law lays to rest
any speculation that the phrase 'the assistance of counsel' in the Sixth Amendment was meant
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"counsel" excludes nonlawyers, even those who have received legal training
but have not been admitted to practice because they have not passed the bar
examination or met the standards of character required for admission to
the bar. Accordingly, the court in Solina held that a defendant was
automatically entitled to reversal of his conviction when it turned out that
his trial representative, a law school graduate, had never passed the bar
examination or been licensed to practice law.6 9
A different definition of "counsel" was put forward by Judge Easter-
brook in Reese v. Peters70 when he stated: 'Counsel' to which the [S]ixth
[A]mendment refers is a professional advocate who meets the standards set
by the court."'71 In this view, the defining characteristic of "counsel" is not
the possession of a license to practice law, but the satisfaction of those
licensing requirements that bear on an applicant's fitness to practice-
graduation from law school, passing a bar examination, and satisfying a
review of one's character. Under this interpretation, an individual who is
not authorized to practice law will nevertheless qualify as "counsel" if
unlicensed solely because of failure to satisfy licensing requirements
thought to be unrelated to one's fitness to render legal assistance. Thus,
courts have widely held that a defendant is not deprived of "counsel" when
represented by someone who is unlicensed only because of failure to be"sworn in" or failure to pay bar dues.72
to signify anything less than representation by a licensed practitioner." Solina, 709 F.2d at 167.
69. Solina, 709 F.2d at 168-69 (defendant denied right to counsel when he was represented
at trial by an unlicensed individual who had graduated from law school and had handled an
extensive number of arbitrations over the course of more than fifteen years, but had failed to
pass the bar examination and had never previously represented anyone in judicial proceed-
ings); accord Huckelbury v. State, 337 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant denied
right to counsel when he had been represented at guilty plea proceedings by a law school
graduate who had passed the bar examination but had been denied admission to practice
following a determination by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners that he had withheld
information from his bar application, altered academic transcripts, and testified falsely before
the Board); see also People v. Cox, 146 N.E.2d 19 (Il1. 1957); People v. Schlaiss, 528 N.E.2d
334, 336 (I1. App. Ct. 1988) (law student "cannot be considered 'counsel' for constitutional
purposes" when he represented the defendant without written consent as required by court
rules); People v. Felder, 391 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Leslie, 586 N.Y.S.2d 197
(Sup. Ct. 1992); Baker v. State, 130 P. 820 (Okla. 1912).
70. 926 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 669.
72. See, e.g., Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991) (suspension for failure to pay bar
dues); Beto v. Barfield, 391 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1968) (suspension for failure to pay bar dues);
Lopez-Torres v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D.P.R. 1988) (suspension for failure to
submit notarial records); People v. Medler, 223 Cal. Rptr. 401, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1982) (failure to take the oath), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1218 (1983); People v. Brigham, 600 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1992) (suspension for failure to pay bar
dues); People v. Cornwall, 277 N.E.2d 766 (I1. App. Ct. 1971) (failure to seek admission pro
hac vice); Johnson v. State, 590 P.2d 1082 (Kan. 1979) (suspension for failure to pay bar dues);
People v. Kieser, 591 N.E.2d 1174 (N.Y. 1988) (suspension for failure to pay bar dues); Ex
parte Engle, 418 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (failure to be formally admitted prior to
commencement of trial); Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)
(suspension for failure to pay bar dues). But see People v. Brigham, 567 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (right to counsel violated where trial attorney had been suspended for failure to pay
registration fees).
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Conversely, under this approach, possession of a license is not neces-
sarily enough in itself to make one "counsel." Thus, in United States v.
Novak,73 the Second Circuit held that an individual who fraudulently
obtained a license to practice law was not "counsel" under the Sixth
Amendment.74 The defendant in Novak was represented at trial by Joel
Steinberg several years before Steinberg's own highly publicized arrest and
conviction on child abuse charges. Following Steinberg's arrest, an inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding his admission to practice law revealed
that he had made misrepresentations to the Board of Law Examiners in
order to obtain dispensation from taking the bar examination.75 Even
though Steinberg possessed a license to practice law, the Second Circuit
found that he was not "counsel" as required by the Constitution because he
did not in fact qualify for the license, having obtained it by means of "a
fraud that both prevented the state from assessing his legal ability and
revealed a want of moral character. '76
73. 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990).
74. Id. at 890; accord People v. Chin Mon Foo, 545 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("the
term ['counsel'] does not include one who has procured the privilege of practicing law by fraud
upon the licensing authorities in the first instance").
A Pennsylvania appellate court reached an opposite conclusion in Commonwealth v. Vance,
546 A.2d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). Following the defendant's guilty plea and sentencing on
murder charges in that case, he learned about disciplinary proceedings against his defense
lawyer that ultimately resulted in the revocation of the lawyer's license. It turned out that
Potak, Vance's lawyer, had come to Pennsylvania after relinquishing his license to practice law
in California in the wake of disciplinary proceedings based on various allegations of
misconduct. To gain admission to the Pennsylvania bar some years later, Potak made false
statements in his application. Because of the false statements and a finding that Potak "was not
of good character," he was disbarred several months after Vance's conviction. On appeal from
that conviction, the state court found that because Potak was a member of the Pennsylvania bar
at the time of the criminal proceedings, his representation satisfied the right to counsel. The
appellate court did not pause over the fact that, but for his false statements, Potak in all
likelihood would not have been admitted to practice law in Pennsylvarnia. See also People v.
Williams, 530 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
75. Novak, 903 F.2d at 885. A Vietnam-era provision of state law excused veterans from
taking the bar examination if "their course of law school study was interrupted by active service
in the armed forces." Steinberg procured a certificate of dispensation on the basis of this
provision, but had not been entitled to one, because his law studies had not in fact been
interrupted by military service. Rather, after attending law school for two years, Steinberg was
dismissed for poor scholarship, and did not enter the military until a year later. Id.
76, Id. at 890. Relying on Solina, the court in Novak found that the defendant was
automatically entitled to reversal of his conviction, without inquiry into the quality of
representation he received. Novak, 903 F.2d at 890. At the same time, however, the court
suggested that the quality of Steinberg's representation might have been impaired in unseen
ways by his concern over having deceived licensing authorities more than a decade earlier. It
explained:
The eventual investigation into Steinberg's licensure was a response to his outrageous
conduct. In this instance, that conduct was directed toward his family; but such an
investigation could as easily have been triggered by a vigorous legal defense that
irritated the prosecutor. The government states that it had routinely inquired before
Novak's trial as to whether Steinberg had been admitted to practice. But the fact that
a superficial routine check may be unrevealing is irrelevant. There remained the
underlying risk that a vigorous defense could have led to a deeper probe and a
discovery that Steinberg had not been "duly" admitted.
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The view that "counsel" means someone who meets the licensing
standards relating to fitness and character, like the view that "counsel"
means a licensed attorney, has been justified by reference to legal practices
prevailing when the Sixth Amendment was ratified. In Reese, Judge
Easterbrook explained:
"Counsel" in 1791 meant a person deemed by the court to act as
another's legal representative and inscribed on the list of attor-
neys. See § 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. There were no bar
exams, no unified bars, no annual dues, no formal qualifications.
Although there were a handful of law schools, none was accred-
ited by the ABA (there was no ABA), and few students completed
the program. John Marshall dropped out of law school after a few
months of study . . . . Would-be lawyers earned the right to
practice through apprenticeship, appearing in court under the
tutelage of a practitioner until they satisfied the presiding judge
that they could handle cases independently. Part of the tradition
survives in the practice of admission pro hac vice. Courts grant
motions allowing representation by persons who do not belong to
their bars. Usually the person admitted pro hac vice belongs to some
bar, but it may be the bar of a distant state or a foreign nation. The
enduring practice of admission pro hac vice demonstrates that
there is no one-to-one correspondence between "Counsel" and
membership in the local bar.77
Under this conception, according to Judge Easterbrook, an individual's
status as counsel turns not on whether that person is licensed, but on"whether the court has satisfied itself of the advocate's competence and
authorized him to practice law. '78 The definition takes in "persons who
satisfied the court of their legal skills but later ran afoul of some technical
rule" such as the requirement of paying bar dues, noncompliance with
which does not cast doubt on one's possession of the requisite fitness and
character to practice law.79 However, Judge Easterbrook's definition ex-
The court's suggestion that Steinberg may have been influenced by fear of discovery to
defend his client less than vigorously seems rather far-fetched for several reasons. So much
time had passed since his admission to the bar, that if he ever thought of the deception at all,
it must have been with confidence that he would never be discovered. Moreover, he must have
realized that the amount of investigation required to discover his deception would be far more
than a prosecutor would ever conduct simply for the purpose of determining the bonafides of
a vigorous advocate. Finally, the prosecutor would be more likely to inquire into Steinberg's
credentials if Steinberg provided an inadequate defenie than if he provided a vigorous one.
Therefore, in the unlikely event that he was concerned about being unmasked, Steinberg
would have been motivated to provide vigorous representation, not a substandard defense.
77. Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668, 668-70 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 670.
79. Id. In Judge Easterbrook's view, this is merely a "technical" rule because it does not
reflect on a lawyer's competence or character:
Lawyers who do not pay their dues violate a legal norm, but not one established for
the protection of clients; suspensions used to wring money from lawyers' pockets do
not stem from any doubt about their ability to furnish zealous and effective assistance.
Id; accordJones v. Maryland, 616 A.2d 422 (Md. 1992) (defense attorney's "default in payment
of the requisite assessment and resulting decertification differs from a disciplinary suspension
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cludes "[m]ontebanks, as in Solina, and persons who obtain credentials by
fraud, as in United States v. Novak,"80 as well as former attorneys who were
disbarred or surrendered their license for reasons reflecting on their fitness
to practice law.8 '
or disbarment; it has no connection with the lawyer's character, intellectual acuity, or
dedication to the client's interests").
There is a superficial anomaly created byJudge Easterbrook's approach. If a lawyer who has
been suspended for failing to pay bar dues is "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment, it would
seem to follow that a defendant's right to counsel of choice extends to a lawyer suspended for
that reason. "Counsel" is, after all, a concrete term, like others in the Sixth Amendment, such
as 'jury," "district," and "witnesses." "Counsel" must refer to a discrete group of individuals
from among the general populace. Those individuals who are "counsel" ought to be the same,
whether one is considering counsel-of-choice claims or right-of-access claims under the Sixth
Amendment. Yet courts undoubtedly would refuse to allow a defendant to choose to retain a
suspended lawyer, even though they might hold, postconviction, that representation by that
same lawyer satisfied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
This anomaly might be explained on the ground that the right to counsel of choice is a
qualified one, and that the judicial interest in enforcing the "technical" legal requirements for
admission to the bar outweigh a defendant's interest in counsel of choice. Therefore, even if
individuals who are unlicensed for "technical" reasons are "counsel" for constitutional
purposes, a trial court would be justified in refusing to allow a defendant to select as counsel
someone who lacks a license to practice law. See, e.g., Panzardi-Alvarez v. United States, 879
F.2d 975, 980-81 (lst Cir. 1989) (although defendant's application to be represented by
attorney licensed in another jurisdiction implicates the right to counsel of choice, that right is
limited when it would interfere "with the ethical and orderly administration of justice";
therefore, in ruling on the application for admission pro hac vice, a court may "consider the
effect of the attorney's past actions (especially past ethical violations) on the administration of
justice within the court").
This explanation may not be wholly satisfactory, however. To say that a suspended attorney
is "counsel" but may never be retained to defend a criminal accused, because the state's
administrative interests invariably outweigh the defendant's interest in choice of counsel,
seems little different from saying that a suspended attorney is not "counsel" at all for Sixth
Amendment purposes. The difference, simply semantic, is not necessarily supported by
decisions such as Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), holding that the right to counsel
is a qualified right. Those decisions have determined that, in individual cases, such as when an
attorney has a conflict of interest, the attorney may not be selected to defend a particular
criminal accused. Those decisions do not suggest that, although an individual may be"counsel," the choice of that attorney may be denied categorically to every defendant in every
case because of that attorney's status, as is the case for suspended attorneys.
80. 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990).
81. See People v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992) (defendant denied right to counsel
under state constitution when he was represented by a former attorney who had resigned from
the state bar following a conviction for selling cocaine); People v. Hinkley, 238 Cal. Rptr. 272
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant denied right to counsel when he had been represented at trial
by an attorney under suspension for reasons reflecting on his competency); State v. Kasuboski,
275 N.W.2d 101, 106-08 (Wis. 1978) (disbarred attorney is not "counsel"; therefore,
defendants had no right to retain disbarred attorney to represent them at trial). But see State
v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 513-14 (Minn. 1991) (no denial of counsel where defendant was
represented at trial by an attorney who was suspended for misconduct relating to his fitness to
practice law, for which he was eventually disbarred).
In Johnson, the court elaborated on this principle. Prior to the defendant's trial, the trial
attorney in that case had been suspended by operation of law upon his conviction for selling
cocaine and had thereupon resigned from the state bar. The court found that because of his
resignation, the lawyer could not serve as "counsel" under the state constitution, but that he
otherwise could have served, because the statutory suspension would not have denoted that he
was unfit to represent the accused. It reasoned that an attorney suspended because he lacked
professional competence or because he lacked the requisite moral character to practice law
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A third judicial gloss on the term "counsel," not accepted by many
other courts, was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Whitesel,8 2
which found the distinguishing characteristic of "counsel" to be one's
possession of learning in the law, and recognized that the licensing process
is not the exclusive means of demonstrating one's learning. This reading
was based on a different view of the drafters' understanding than that taken
by other courts. In the Whitesel court's view, "it seems probable that the
proposers of the Sixth Amendment did not mean to limit representation
exclusively to 'attorneys at law.'"83 Therefore, a nonlawyer would qualify as"counsel" if he were "sufficiently learned in the law to be able adequately to
represent his client in court. '8 4 The appellate court gave no indication of
how "learned in the law" a nonlawyer must be to serve as "counsel"; nor did
it explain what would substitute for the licensing process as a method of
determining that a nonlawyer was sufficiently familiar with the law. The
court did reject, however, the accused's claim that the district court should
have permitted an accountant to defend him on tax fraud charges, since
there had been no showing that the accountant had any legal training
whatsoever.8 5
Although the courts thus glean somewhat different lessons from early
American legal practice, and the precise contours of their definitions of"counsel" therefore vary, they concur to a large extent both on whom the
term "counsel" excludes and on whom it includes. On one hand, "counsel"
excludes untrained lay representatives; on the other hand, it includes duly
licensed attorneys-those attorneys who have satisfied the licensing re-
quirements. Courts disagree only in how they regard individuals who have
received legal training but who are not duly licensed. Courts defining"counsel" to mean "attorney" would include licensed practitioners within
the ambit of the term, even if they have not satisfied the licensing
requirements of fitness and character. Courts understanding "counsel" to
mean "a professional advocate who meets the standards set by the court"
would exclude attorneys who obtained their licenses by wrongfully circum-
venting requirements relating to character and fitness, but include practi-
tioners who, although unlicensed, have satisfied those requirements. And,
the Whitesel court would include individuals who are neither licensed nor in
could not qualify as "counsel." However, it found, not all criminal convictions reflect that the
attorney "is of such character that he or she cannot, as a matter of law, be trusted to provide
competent legal services."Johnson, 822 P.2d at 1321. While criminal conduct "reflect[ing] on
the individual's honesty and veracity" would establish the attorney's unfitness, other criminal
conduct would not. Because the statute required the attorney's suspension as an interim
measure upon conviction of a felony, without regard to whether the crime related to the
attorney's fitness to practice, the suspension did not necessarily disqualify him from serving as
"counsel." Id. at 1322. The court's premise, that the commission of a felony does not
necessarily demonstrate one's unfitness for the practice of law, underscores the judiciary's
unwillingness to take character standards seriously. See supra note 79.
82. 543 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 1179.
84. Id. at 1180; accord United States v. Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
85. Whitesel, 543 F.2d at 1180.
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compliance with substantive licensing standards but who are nevertheless"sufficiently learned in the law to be able adequately to represent [a
criminal accused] in court."
The judicial interpretations of "counsel" seem to share a single
presumption: that if an individual is "counsel," he is qualified to defend a
criminal case. For some courts, the possession of a license itself apparently
justifies a presumption that an individual is qualified. As one court
explained:
Admission to the bar allows us to assume that counsel has the
training, knowledge, and ability to represent a client who has
chosen him. Continued licensure normally gives a reliable signal
to the public that the licensee is what he purports to be-an
attorney qualified to advise and represent a client.8 6
A comparable assumption is implicit in the distinction made between
substantive and technical defects in licensure in decisions such as Reese. For
courts which discount the significance of being placed on the rolls of
attorneys, it is presumably the satisfaction of licensing requirements
relating to character and fitness that ensures an attorney's ability to advise
and represent the defendant.
Remarkably, however, the courts defining "counsel" make no attempt
to justify the assumption that duly licensed attorneys are qualified. They
neither explain what an attorney must know and be able to do in order to
represent a criminal defendant competently, nor explain how the licensing
process ensures an attorney's possession of the requisite knowledge and
ability. They neither demand that the licensing standards are exacting
enough to ensure that attorneys are in fact qualified, nor review the
licensing process to satisfy themselves that the requisite standards are
mairtained. In essence, courts interpreting "counsel" allow licensing au-
thorities standardless discretion to establish processes for allocating law
licenses and then presume that those processes, whatever they may entail,
guarantee that all practitioners will be capable of adequately representing
criminal defendants upon receipt of a license.
Of equal note, if the courts' premise is, in fact, that defense lawyers
must be qualified in order to serve as "counsel," then the case law that has
developed upon this premise contains a significant anomaly: attorneys who
cease to meet the standards set for licensure may nevertheless serve as
86. United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 698 (9th Cir. 1986); accord Achtien v. Dowd,
117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941):
It would seem tolerably clear, that an accused is entitled, if he desires counsel, not
only to be represented by one admitted to the bar, but to be represented by
competent counsel,-by a capable practitioner.
The fact that one is admitted to practice law in the state where the crime was
committed is not, of itself, sufficient if incompetency be charged and proven.
Doubtless admission to practice, and the presence of counsel's name on the roll of
attorneys in the court where the accused is to be tried, create a presumption of
competency. The presumption, however, is rebuttable, not conclusive.
See also People v. Leslie, 586 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("Only a person educated,
tested, and duly admitted to practice as an attorney may be presumed to have provided
(competent representation]").
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"counsel" as long as they retain a license. While courts are willing to assume
that those who meet the standards of character and fitness set by licensing
authorities are qualified to defend criminal cases, they refuse to assume that
licensed attorneys who fail to meet those standards are not qualified. Two
recent decisions illustrate this anomaly.
The first decision, Bellamy v. Cogdell,87 involved a lawyer who was
unqualified in part because he was mentally impaired. At the time of the
defendant's trial on murder charges, the defense attorney was suffering
from polyneuroathy, a neurological problem whose symptoms included "an
inability to concentrate."88 The attorney was the subject of disciplinary
proceedings that had been adjourned because of his illness, and which later
resulted in his suspension.8 9 After the suspension, of course, the attorney
could no longer serve as "counsel." Moreover, at the time of the trial, the
attorney suffered from the same deficiencies of character and mental ability
that eventually warranted his suspension. Nevertheless, in a closely divided
en banc decision, the Second Circuit concluded that the defendant's
attorney, still licensed at the time of trial, qualified as "counsel" under the
Sixth Amendment. 90
87. 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
88. Id. at 904 .
89. Unknown to defendant Bellamy at the time of trial, Guran, the 70-year-old trial
attorney, was the subject of disciplinary proceedings based on his alleged conversion of client
funds and negligence in handling a real estate transaction. Id. at 303-04. Three months before
Bellamy's criminal trial commenced, Guran had obtained an adjournment of the disciplinary
proceedings based on his lawyer's representation that Guran was "not mentally capable of
preparing for the hearing" and on his treating physician's accompanying note to the same
effect. Id. at 303. Moreover, Guran had forestalled the disciplinary committee's efforts to
suspend him indefinitely by representing that his assistance was needed on the Bellamy trial
and by promising-as it turned out, falsely-that he would-secure a competent co-counsel for
Bellamy. Id. at 307.
90. In his majority opinion in Bellamy, Judge Altimari took the view that, as long as Guran
was duly licensed and admitted to the bar at the time of trial his representation satisfied the
'Jurisdictional" requirement that the accused receive the assistance of "counsel." Id. at 306.
Moreover, he rejected Bellamy's argument that a per se rule of ineffective assistance should be
invoked. Particularly in light of the trial judge's "favorable observations of Guran's mental
acuity and physical [condition] during the trial," he found such a rule inappropriate. Id. In the
absence of a showing that trial counsel either had an actual conflict of interest or committed
identifiable mistakes that prejudiced the defendant, he concluded, the right to counsel should
be satisfied. Id. at 307.
The court's approach was consistent with the weight of prior authority. Although occasion-
ally acknowledging that an attorney's mental impairment may compromise his trial represen-
tation in ways that are unprovable, most courts have nevertheless declined to adopt a rule that
a conviction should automatically be reversed when defense counsel was mentally impaired.
See, e.g., Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1987) ("mental illness is too varied in its
symptoms and effects to justify a per se reversal rule without evidence that the attorney's
performance fell below the constitutional norm"); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515,
521 (5th Cir. 1978); Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F. Supp. 788, 792-93 (W.D. Mo. 1990), affid, 935
F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1991); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1986),
affd, 813 F.2d 409 (1lth Cir. 1987); United States exrel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 441 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971). But see Javor
v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) ("when an attorney sleeps through a
substantial portion of the trial, such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate
showing of prejudice is necessary").
455
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The second decision, United States v. Mouzin,9 1 involved a defense
lawyer who lacked the requisite character to practice before the court. Prior
to the defendant's trial, the defense attorney had been disbarred from
practicing before the federal court of appeals for failing to comply with
various court rules and engaging in conduct "unbecoming a member of the
bar."92 A local rule required his immediate disbarment in the district court
as well, but that court delayed entering an order of disbarment until
Mouzin's trial could be completed. After trial, when Mouzin first learned
about the lawyer's disciplinary problems, he argued that the trial attorney
was not "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment, but a divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit disagreed, based on the view that "the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel means assistance by an attorney who has been found
qualified to represent a client as evidenced by admission to the bar."93 Once
found qualified, an attorney is presumed to remain qualified until he or she
loses the license to practice law,94 and the presumption holds even in the
In a dissenting opinion joined by five of the other thirteen active judges of the circuit, Judge
Feinberg argued that, like the defendants in Solina and Novak, Bellamy had been denied the
right to counsel. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 309 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). He reasoned:
[W]e have previously applied a per se rule where a lawyer is not licensed (Solina) and
where a lawyer obtains a license through misrepresentation (Novak). In this case, a
lawyer, who had admitted that he did not have the mental capacity to defend himself,
avoided immediate suspension and thereby retained his authority to defend someone
else only by a promise to the Appellate Division that ultimately went unfulfilled. Had
there been no such misrepresentation, Guran's suspension would have taken place
before Bellamy's trial and Guran could not have defended him.
Id. at 313. (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Moreover, he took the view that, insofar as Guran's mind
was not impaired, Guran would have been inhibited from mounting a vigorous defense "by a
reluctance to have the judge or the prosecutor find out that he was trying the case alone in
violation of his promise to the Appellate Division to act only to assist another attorney, a
promise given to forestall a suspension order." Id.
91. 785 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986).
92. Id. at 694. According to the court, the attorney had missed deadlines in pending
appeals, failed to prosecute an appeal, and paid a court reporter with an insufficient check. Id.
93. Id. at 696 (citing United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Therefore, the court held, to secure reversal of a criminal conviction, the defendant must show
that his defense was prejudiced by the defense lawyers' specific errors or omissions. Id; accord
Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (discussed supra note 74);
McDougall v. Rice, 685 F. Supp. 532, 539 (W.D.NC. 1988); cf. United States ex re. Ortiz v.
Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 1976) ("the subsequent disbarment of the counsel for
reasons having nothing to do with the instant case was irrelevant to his performance at
petitioner's trial"); United States v. Messer, 647 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D. Mont. 1986) ("an
attorney's (subsequent] suspension or disbarment does not, without more, arise to the
constitutional significance of ineffective assistance of counsel"); Hernandez v. Wainwright,
634 F. Supp. 241,246 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (court may not conclude that trial lawyer's performance
was deficient based exclusively on lawyer's subsequent disbarment for unrelated conduct).
94. Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 698.
In State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1991), the Minnesota Supreme Court went even
farther, finding that an attorney qualifies as "counsel" even after he has been suspended or
disbarred "for substantive reasons, i.e., reasons bearing on counsel's character or competence."
Id. at 513. In reaching this determination, the court mistakenly relied in part on decisions such
as Mouzin and Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632 (Pa. 1988), which were dearly
distinguishable because they involved an attorney who was licensed at the time of trial. At the
time of the criminal trial in Mouzin, for example, the attorney had been disbarred by the
appellate court but was still licensed to practice before the trial court before which he
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face of evidence that the attorney no longer satisfies the standards of fitness
or character established by the court. Thus, as the majority saw it,91 a
licensed attorney is presumed to be qualified even if, prior to trial, the
attorney has "revealed incompetence or untrustworthiness or turpitude
such as to deserve no client's confidence."96
represented the accused. Likewise, in Vance, the attorney was licensed during the criminal trial
but, as the Minnesota court recognized, his license was revoked after the representation.
Unlike the decision in Smith, the decisions in Mouzin and Vance can be explained by the view
that a duly licensed attorney remains "counsel" unless and until his license is suspended or
revoked because of his unfitness. See also United States v. Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 567-68 (10th
Cir. 1992) (no denial of counsel when defendant's attorney had been disbarred in the federal
district but was still admitted to practice in state court); United States v. Hoffman, 733 F.2d
596, 598-601 (9th Cir. 1984) (no denial of counsel when defendant's attorney was disbarred
mid-trial in the state in which he was licensed, but was admitted to practice in federal court
until the trial concluded).
In large measure the Smith court was concededly influenced by a reluctance to overturn the
conviction of an individual whose guilt seemed to have been fairly established at trial:
On the one hand, the integrity of the criminal justice system is at stake. It seems
incongruous to entrust a person's liberty to counsel in whom the court has formally
declared its lack of trust. On the other hand, there is a reluctance to set aside a
criminal conviction where guilt has been fairly established by the evidence in
proceedings conducted with reasonable competence by counsel.
476 N.W.2d at 514. This reluctance is undoubtedly shared by all courts in cases in which the
question of whether an individual qualified as "counsel" is raised after conviction, but most
courts have been unwilling to articulate this concern, recognizing that it has little if any
relevance, as an interpretive matter, to the question of who is "counsel."
Because it regarded the suspended defense lawyer as "counsel," the Smith court reviewed the
defendant's claim under the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which
requires the defendant to prove that the outcome of the trial was adversely affected by the
mistakes of a lawyer who "failed to meet the standard of a reasonably competent defense
attorney." 476 N.W.2d at 514 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Under the Strickland
standard, a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the defense attorney's
conduct reflected a reasonable tactical choice among available alternatives. See infra note 282
and accompanying text. Whether or not this presumption is justified as a general matter, it
certainly seems unwarranted in a case like Smith, in which, in advance of trial, the trial attorney
has been ruled to be unfit to practice law and therefore unworthy of retaining his license.
95. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ferguson took the view that the trial attorney's failure
to disclose his disbarment to Mouzin created an egregious conflict of interest warranting
automatic reversal of the conviction:
This situation presents the worst sort of conflict of interest; attorney deception and
self-interest surely destroy the fiduciary relationship with the client . . . .When
attorney misconduct is so severe as to offend one's sense ofjustice or is so contrary to
the notion of ethical behavior as to completely undermine the trust relationship,
reversal of a conviction should be automatic.
Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 703-04 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 698. The view that an attorney who is demonstrably unfit qualifies as "counsel"
until he is suspended or disbarred for that reason, is implicit in some of the decisions holding
that "counsel" includes attorneys whose licenses have been suspended for "technical" reasons.
While in some cases, the trial lawyers may have been unaware of their suspension, in most the
lawyers knew that they were unauthorized to practice law, if only temporarily. While the
grounds of suspension may not have reflected on these attorneys' fitness and character to
practice, their character was certainly called into question by their conduct in engaging in a law
practice when they were unauthorized to do so-conduct which is unethical and, in some
jurisdictions, illegal. Presumably, in these cases the attorneys were motivated by pecuniary gain
to defy the rule against practicing law without a license. One might therefore be concerned
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As these decisions illustrate, courts see the law license, once properly
obtained, not simply as a "signal" that attorneys are qualified competently
to represent a criminal accused, but as a surrogate for being qualified. In
essence, courts have elevated the assumption that duly licensed attorneys
are qualified into a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption. Attorneys, once
duly admitted to practice law, are included as "counsel" even if, at the time
of a criminal trial, they no longer meet the standards of fitness and
character set by the courts.
The judicial decisions obviously leave much unsaid. While it is
generally clear that the courts understand the term "counsel" to exclude
untrained lay representatives and to include duly licensed attorneys, it is
not clear why they do so. Courts fail to explain precisely why duly licensed
attorneys should be presumed to be capable of defending a criminal
accused, much less why the presumption should be conclusive. Broadly
speaking, two possible justifications might be advanced. First, one might
take the view that, in light of the origins and purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, duly licensed attorneys should qualify as"counsel" regardless of what the licensing process entails and regardless of
whether those attorneys possess the attributes that the licensing process
purports to require. Alternatively, one might take the view that defining"counsel" to include any duly licensed attorney is a reasonable, bright-line
rule inasmuch as the contemporary licensing process gives assurance that
most, if not all, duly licensed practitioners are in fact competent to
represent criminal defendants.
The next two Parts of this Article explore these two possible justifica-
tions for the prevailing judicial approaches and demonstrate why each one
fails. Part II argues that it is inappropriate to include duly licensed
attorneys as "counsel" without regard to the content of the licensing
standards for two reasons: first, the historical background to the Sixth
Amendment does not support a conclusion that the framers meant for
satisfaction of licensing requirements to stand as conclusive proof of
that, in the course of the representation, they might place their personal interests ahead of
other rules of professional responsibility, including the requirement that they zealously
represent their client. See People v. Medler, 223 Cal. Rptr. 401, 408-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(White, P.J., dissenting) ("I find it unthinkable that a reasonably competent attorney acting as
a diligent advocate would willfully undertake to assist a criminal defense knowing that such
representation subjected him or her to prosecution and conviction of a misdemeanor."); see
also People v. Brewer, 279 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Mich. 1979) ("the failure of an attorney to remit
his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently interested in
the practice of law to adequately defend his client's interest"). Courts have generally failed to
address this concern, however. For example, in. United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42 (D.
Mass. 1992), the defendant learned after trial that his attorney had been suspended from his
state bar for failing to pay bar dues in 1981 and had subsequently engaged in the unethical
practice of law for the next eleven years, facilitated in part by the use of a false identification
number on court documents. In rejecting the defendant's claim of denial of counsel, the
district judge found that the attorney's conduct did "not raise serious questions about his
competence to practice," id. at 46 (emphasis in original), apparently viewing competence to be
a matter exclusively of litigation ability, and not of character. See also Commonwealth v.
Thibeault, 556 N.E.2d 403, 405-07 (Mass. 1990) (where attorney represented criminal
defendant even though he knew he had been suspended for failure to register, the attorney"should suffer condign discipline for his violation of the suspension order," but the defendant
should not be granted a new trial).
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qualification to serve as "counsel"; and, second, the purposes of the right to
counsel are not served by defining "counsel" solely with reference to the
requirements for licensing attorneys. Part III argues that reliance on the
contemporary licensing process in particular is inappropriate because the
legal profession's fitness and character requirements do not in fact ensure,
and, indeed, are not intended to ensure, that a candidate is capable of
defending criminal cases.
II. WHY "COUNSEL" SHOULD MEAN "QUALIFIED" PRACTITIONER
A. The Lessons of History
Courts have construed the term "counsel" largely on the basis of how
they perceived the framers originally understood it, as inferred from
contemporaneous usage and legal practice. As discussed in the previous
subpart, courts have derived two principal lessons from history. First,"counsel" excludes untrained advocates. Second, "counsel" includes all duly
licensed practitioners, without regard to whether they are in fact qualified
to practice law in general or to defend criminal cases in particular. On the
second point, the readily available history is far less conclusive than the
courts would believe. A strong case may be made that, as a matter of
"original intent," unqualified attorneys should not be included as
"counsel."97
1. The Exclusion of Lay Advocates
The courts seem to be right that the framers did not intend "counsel"
to include untrained lay representatives, but not necessarily for the reasons
courts have given. The arguments typically advanced on both sides of the
question, based on contemporaneous usage and practice, seem unpersua-
sive. The stronger argument, overlooked by courts and commentators, is
that the framers did not mean to forbid laws, like those adopted in some
colonies for the protection of parties to litigation, which limited courtroom
representation to licensed advocates.
a. Contemporaneous Usage.
Little insight can be gleaned from contemporaneous usage of the term"counsel." The term was employed in a variety of ways in colonial and
post-revolutionary statutes. In a 1785 Massachusetts statute providing for
97. This section should not be read to make the strong claim that a reading of the
contemporaneous history of the Sixth Amendment compels the conclusion that "counsel"
means a qualified attorney. Such a claim would be inappropriate. There is a dearth of
significant historical research into the "original intent" of the drafters of the Sixth Amendment
based on the historical record that remains. Cf Gaspare J. Saladino, The Bill of Rights: A
Bibliographic Essay, in Contexts of the Bill of Rights 93 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B.
Bernstein eds., 1990). Most importantly, the framers' original understanding provides an
incomplete answer to how the Right to Counsel Clause should be interpreted today. See infra
note 138. The principal point of this section is simply that the readily available historical
record supports a claim that "counsel" means qualified advocate and that there is nothing in
the record to sufficiently overcome such a claim.
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the right to "counsel," the term seems to have meant any advocate selected
by a party, whether or not licensed to practice before the courts.98 In other
contexts, the term was used to refer to licensed advocates. 99 Looking at the
Sixth Amendment in isolation, one cannot say which of those possible
meanings was intended.
Moreover, contrary to the assumption of both courts and litigants, it is
doubtful that much guidance can be derived from how the word "counsel"
was used in the Judiciary Act, notwithstanding that the statute was adopted
at alniost the same time as the Sixth Amendment. Drawing guidance from
the Judiciary Act is unhelpful for two reasons: first, it is unclear what"counsel" meant in the statute; and second, there is no reason to believe the
term was used the same way in both contexts.
Judge Friendly was almost certainly wrong to conclude that the terms"counsel" and "attorney" as employed in the Judiciary Act referred to the
two classes of practitioners (corresponding to barristers and solicitors today)
who were licensed under Great Britain's bifurcated system. The drafters of
the Judiciary Act had little reason to refer to the two "branches" of British
practitioners. The colonies had overwhelmingly rejected the English prac-
tice of dividing up practitioners based on the courts before which they
could appear.100 In some colonies, each court admitted attorneys to practice
exclusively before it; 101 in other colonies, a court of general jurisdiction
admitted attorneys to practice in courts throughout the colony. 0 2 Nor was
Great Britain's bifurcated system adopted for federal courts after the
Revolution. Moreover, the drafters of the Act had no reason to refer to
those individuals practicing law in the United States who had previously
been licensed as attorneys or barristers in England, since, after the
98. In Massachusetts, for example, courtroom representation had to be opened to
nonattorneys before the Revolution because many attorneys sympathetic to the crown had
returned to the mother country or ceased practicing; thus, a 1785 enactment, apparently
designed to allow access to representatives other than attorneys, provided that parties could
plead "by the assistance of such counsel as they see fit to engage." I Chroust, supra note 12,
at 89 (quoting Laws and Resolves of Massachusetts ch. 23 (1785)).
99. For example, a 1745 Virginia statute referred to "council, learned in the law, and
attorneys, practicing in the [General Court]." I Chroust, supra note 12, at 275 (quoting 5
Hening, supra note 16, at 275).
100. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at xvii. Some colonies and states had a "graded" system,
which required attorneys to possess greater expertise or experience before practicing before
the higher courts. See, e.g., W. Raymond Blackard, Requirements for Admission to the Bar in
Revolutionary America, 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 116, 119-20, 122 (1938) (discussing graded bars in
post-revolutionary Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York); 1 Chroust, supra note 12,
at 87, 274 (discussing graded bars in Massachusetts and Virginia). Sometimes, different titles
were used to denote the different grades of attorneys. For example, in Massachusetts, a
distinction between "barristers" and "attorneys" was adopted around 1760, with only barristers
being allowed to argue before the Superior Court. Id. at 106. A similar distinction between"attorneys" and "counsellors" was adopted in New York in 1797, and in New Jersey both
before and after the Revolution. See Blackard, supra, at 122-23. This was not the equivalent of
Great Britain's bifurcated system, however. Unlike in the colonies with a "graded" bar, in
Great Britain the two classes of practitioners had different training, underwent a different
process for admission to practice, and practiced before separate sets of courts.
101. See 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 277-78 (identifying Massachusetts, Maryland, and
New Hampshire); id. at 22 (identifying Pennsylvania).
102. Id. at 278 (identifying Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Rhode Island).
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Revolution, training for the bar in England ceased to be a viable route for
entry into the legal profession in America. 03
If the term "counsel" in the Judiciary Act did not refer to barristers, it
does not follow that "counsel" referred to lay representatives. Contempo-
raneous colonial and state licensing statutes did make distinctions between
different classes of practitioners-including distinctions between "attor-
neys" and "counsel" or "counciilors'-which either reflected how one had
gained authorization to practice 04 or denoted "professional rating, rank,
[or] distinction."105 While it is plausible that the drafters of the judiciary Act
used "counsel" to include lay representatives, 106 it is at least as likely that
they used the term to refer to a class of licensed practitioners distinct from"attorneys."
In any event, it is clear that "counsel" in the Sixth Amendment meant
something different from what it meant in the Judiciary Act. In the Act, it
may have meant lay representatives (as distinguished from licensed prac-
103. The states' departure from English legal practice after the Revolution was manifested
in a variety of ways. Several states adopted constitutional provisions "expressly stipulat[ing]
that only those parts of the common law which had been developed in America after the year
1775 or 1776, or after the adoption of the respective state constitutions, should be in force,
unless otherwise indicated." 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 62-63 (citing constitutional provisions
of Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island). Some states adopted loyalty oaths directed at denying attorneys loyal to Great Britain
the right to practice law. See, e.g., id. at 245 (citing November 20, 1781, New York statute).
104. In Southern Colonies, "counsel" or "barrister" was used to refer to lawyers who had
been 6ducated at the Inns of Court, while "attorney" was used to refer to those whose right to
practice depended on their admission to the court rolls. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at xvii n. 10.
For example, a 1732 Virginia law governing the discipline of "attorn'eys" provided that the law"shall not be construed to extend.., to any counsellor or barrister at law, whatsoever." Id. at
274 (quoting 4 Hening, supra note 16, at 362). Similarly, under a 1769 South Carolina law one
could practice before the courts only if one had been "admitted a barrister at law" by
membership in one of the Inns of Court or if one were "an attorney" who had been admitted
by the South Carolina court. Id. at 302 (quoting 4 Statutes at Large of South Carolina,
1752-1786, at 306 (Cooper ed., 1838) [hereinafter Statutes at Large of South Carolina]).
105. 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at xvii; see id. at 200 (from 1755 to 1839, New Jersey
recognized "the ancient order of serjeant-at-law").
A 1767 NewJersey licensing statute provided that an "attorney" who had practiced for three
years could obtain a license as "attorney and councillor at law" by passing "such an
Examination in open Court touching his Abilities & Knowledge in the Law as the Court shall
think proper." Id. at 201 (quoting Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of NewJersey, app.
57 (1889)).
106. Although Judge Friendly took the view in Solina, 709 F.2d at 167, that the reference
in a 1790 federal statute to "counsel learned in the law" indicates that "counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment meant attorney, see supra note 68, one could take the contrary view. It might be
argued that "counsel" as used in the Sixth Amendment is not synonymous with "counsel
learned in the law" as used in the 1790 statute providing for representation in capital cases.
Rather, the phrase "learned in the law" is a term of limitation intended to distinguish attorneys
(who were "counsel learned in the law") from lay representatives (who otherwise were included
among those who might serve as "counsel"). Just as there were two classes of judges-lay
judges and judges with legal training who were "learned in the law"-it might be argued that
there were two classes of "counsel," lay representatives and learned counsel, only the latter of
whom were permitted to serve in capital cases. The problem with this argument, however, is
that if "counsel" in 1790 had been understood to include lay representatives, it is unlikely that
Congress would have enacted a provision that, insofar as it precluded lay representation in
capital cases, was clearly unconstitutional.
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titioners), or one class of licensed practitioners (as distinguished from
another). It had neither meaning in the Sixth Amendment. It would have
been contrary to the principal aim of the Sixth Amendment to provide a
right to lay representation but not representation by a licensed practitioner,
and there is no apparent reason for Congress to have provided for a right
to representation by one class of licensed practitioners, but not another.
That being so, the contemporaneous adoption of the Judiciary Act provides
no insight whatsoever. 10 7
b. Contemporaneous legal practices.
The argument that "counsel" must include lay representatives in light
of contemporaneous legal practices is stronger than the courts have
acknowledged. The Third Circuit's view in Wilhelm that the predominant
colonial practice was for trained advocates to represent criminal defendants
fails to take account of the considerable variation in colonial practices, both
over time and from colony to colony. During the early colonial period,
courtroom advocacy was far from the exclusive province of trained profes-
sionals. On the contrary, popular mistrust of lawyers led to the enactment
of laws banning representation for hire entirely.'03 Even after all the
colonies permitted courtroom advocates to charge a fee, 10 9 advocacy was
not universally limited to trained professionals, nor could it be, given the
dearth of trained advocates in some of the colonies."t 0 Thus, a common
107. In any event, it is unlikely that the congressional drafters of the Judiciary Act took
account of the wording of the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and that the
drafters of the Sixth Amendment took account of the wording of section 35 of the Judiciary
Act. The different provisions originated in different houses of Congress-the Judiciary Act in
the Senate, and the Sixth Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, in the House of
Representatives. See Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union 317-21 (1987); see also
Richard B. Bernstein & Kim S. Rice, Are We To Be a Nation? 259 (1987). Therefore, there is
reason to believe that the representatives responsible for drafting each of these respective
provisions - preoccupied as they were with creating a new government -likely failed to pay
close attention to what their counterparts were doing.
108. See I Chroust, supra note 12, at 269, 297, 317 (citing 1645 Virginia law and 1669 South
Carolina law); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 45 (2d ed. 1985). The
colonists' mistrust of lawyers has been attributed to various sources: Puritans and Quakers
blamed lawyers in part for their sufferings under English law; lawyers were identified with the
law officers of the crown; and many who practiced as lawyers had no training or competence,
and engaged in abusive practices. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 27-28.
109. In some instances, this permission was less than wholehearted. For example, in 1725,
hostility to attorneys in Maryland led to the first of several enactments severely limiting the
amount of fees that might be charged. Five years later, in response to petitions from the bar,
Lord Baltimore disallowed these provisions. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 255-56. At various
times, other colonies adopted similar provisions. See, e.g., id. at 88 (citing 1700-01 Massachu-
setts law setting maximum attorneys' fees); id. at 139-40 (citing Rhode Island laws enacted in
1728 and 1766 to regulate attorneys' fees); id. at 269 (citing 1642 Virginia statute which
"limited attorneys' fees to a maximum of twenty pounds of tobacco in the County Court and
fifty pounds in the Quarter Court-a ridiculously small fee, indeed, in a prosperous colony");
id. at 317 (citing 1715 North Carolina statute providing for maximum fees); id. at 327 (citing
laws enacted in Georgia in 1755, 1757, and 1773 to limit attorneys' fees).
110. Often, parties were represented by agents chosen either because they had time to
appear in court or because they had some skill in writing or persuasion. Id. at 25 ("At first the
need was not so much for a skilled advocate as for someone who could attend at the courthouse
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colonial practice was to allow parties the option of appearing through lay
advocates."I
Indeed, one might argue that "counsel" must have included lay
representatives for the simple reason that, in 1791, there were not enough
attorneys to go around. The dearth of trained advocates, which had been a
problem throughout the colonial period in some regions, was particularly
serious after the Revolution, because attorneys sympathetic to Great Britain
had left the colonies."a 2 Defining "counsel" in 1791 to mean a licensed
practitioner-so that those defendants who could retain an attorney would
be protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee, while the rest could be
compelled to fend for themselves-would have rendered this right essen-
tially meaningless for defendants in many parts of the country.
The persuasive answer to this is that the framers of the Sixth
Amendment did not intend to preclude courts from closing the door to lay
representatives in those jurisdictions that did have enough lawyers to go
around. During the colonial period as well as after the Revolution, several
jurisdictions adopted laws forbidding lay representation, either for hire or
altogether, in order to protect parties from incompetent and unethical
practitioners." 3 There is no reason to believe the framers viewed these
on behalf of some litigant who was unable to spare the time away from the fields or the shop.").
In the early colonial period, few individuals made legal representation a full-time pursuit, and
there was little or no restriction on who might serve as an advocate or hold oneself out as
attorney. For example, an act adopted in Massachusetts in 1692 allowed each party in court to
appear "with the assistance of such other as he shall procure, being a person not scandalous
or otherwise offensive to the court." Id. at 85 (quoting I Acts and Resolves of the Province of
Massachusetts Bay 287 (1692-1714)); see also id. at 199 ("At first there were no requirements
of special qualifications for leave to practice law in the courts [of New Jersey].").
In response to the dearth of trained advocates, several colonies enacted laws prohibiting a
party from retaining more than two attorneys. See id. at 89 (quoting 1785 Massachusetts law);
id. at 130 (quoting 1718 New Hampshire law).
111. In some colonies, lay representation was permitted as long as the representative was
not compensated. See, e.g., 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 300 (quoting An Act for Establishing
County and Precinct Courts § 29 (1771), 7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, supra note
104, at 173). Moreover, in one colony, New Hampshire, lay representation was always the
norm. Although New Hampshire adopted provisions for licensing attorneys, it had few
trained, competent practitioners during the colonial period. Id. at 128-29.
112. See Bernstein & Rice, supra note 107, at 259 (1987) ("many of the most eminient
colonial attorneys tended to oppose the Revolution, and most were forced to flee the United
States at war's end; in addition, most prominent lawyers who supported the Revolution gave
up private practice for service in the Confederation and state governments"). In Massachu-
setts, for example, courtroom representation had to be opened to nonattorneys before the
Revolution because many attorneys sympathetic to the crown had returned to the mother
country or ceased practicing; thus, a 1785 enactment, apparently designed to allow access to
representives other than attorneys provided that parties could plead "by the assistance of such
counsel as they see fit to engage." Id. at 89 (quoting Laws and Resolves of Massachusetts ch.
23 (1785)).
113. See, e.g., id. at 197 (quoting Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the
Province of New Jersey 223 (Leaming & Spicer ed., 1758)) (1698 law enacted in East New
Jersey provided "that no Attorney or other Person be suffered to Practice or Plead for Fee or
Hire, in any Court ofJudicature, in any Suit or Cause or Process in Law whatsoever, but such
as are admitted to Practice by License of the Governor of the Province for the Time being");
id. at 253 (quoting Laws of Maryland, 1715 ch. 48, §§ 12 & 13) (1715 Maryland act provided
that "no Attorney, or other Person whatsoever, shall practice the Law in any of the Courts of
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statutes unfavorably. The framers unquestionably meant to forbid laws
compelling criminal defendants to represent themselves. That result is
achieved by construing "counsel" to include only trained advocates. There
is no evidence that, additionally, the framers were hostile to laws that
excluded unlicensed practitioners from practicing before the courts, as
would occur if "counsel" were interpreted to include lay advocates.
In this instance, the silence of the ratifying debates may be telling.114
Among those who participated in drafting, debating, and ratifying the Bill
of Rights were many beneficiaries of state licensing provisions.1 15 Many if
not most would have been sympathetic to licensing statutes designed to
limit courtroom advocacy to individuals of good character who were trained
in the law. Such statutes were apparently considered to be consistent with
state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel."16 One can
assume that if the Sixth Amendment, when it was proposed, was under-
stood to make comparable laws inapplicable in federal criminal cases, the
framers would have indicated their intention more clearly either in the
ratifying debates or in the Sixth Amendment itself, and there would have
been opposition from those who supported laws excluding nonlawyers
from representing parties to litigation. 17
One might argue, however, that interpreting "counsel" to exclude lay
representatives puts at risk the original purpose of the right to counsel-to
proscribe laws barring representation in criminal cases. If "counsel" meant"attorney," courts could use their licensing authority to do indirectly what
the Sixth Amendment proscribed them from doing directly. By adopting
impossibly difficult standards for licensure, or by applying existing stan-
dards discriminatorily," 8 courts could ensure that no "counsel" would be
this Province, without being admitted thereto by the Justices of the several Courts, who are
hereby empowered to admit and suspend them"); id. at 300 (quoting 4 Statutes at Large of
South Carolina 306) (1721 South Carolina law provided "[tihat no person whatsoever shall
practice or solicit the cause of any other person, in the said county or precinct courts, or any
other court of law and equity in this Province, unless he hath been heretofore admitted and
sworn as an attorney"); see also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
114. One must be cautious in placing much reliance on the silence of the documentary
record relating to the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights as did the Third Circuit in
Wilhelm, see supra text accompanying note 63, because the silence may be a function of the
incompleteness of the record, rather than the absence of discussion. See generally James
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 1 (1986).
115. Friedman, supra note 108, at 101.
116. Of the original thirteen states, twelve included a right to counsel in their constitution.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932).
117. Some indication that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was thought to be
consistent with licensing statutes which had the effect of excluding lay representatives from
practicing before the courts might be gleaned from the contemporaneous adoption of
licensing provisions by some of the newly established federal courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court. See 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 226-27.
118. As Professor Winick describes it, the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger, an important
aspect of the historical background to the Sixth Amendment, was a case study in the court's
discriminatory use of its authority over admission to the bar. The trial judge in the Zenger case
disbarred James Alexander and William Smith, the two New York lawyers initially retained by
Zenger, and appointed an inexperienced and less aggressive lawyer in their stead. Alexander
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available to provide representation, even for those defendants who other-
wise could afford legal assistance. 1 9 The answer to this is not that "counsel"
includes all lay representatives, but simply that the Sixth Amendment
places some constraint on the licensing process, as the Sixth Circuit
apparently concluded in Whitesel when it held that "counsel" includes
individuals who, although unlicensed, were qualified to defend a criminal
case. The Sixth Amendment might be read to forbid the implementation of
restrictive licensing standards that exclude qualified candidates, at least
insofar as criminal defendants find it impossible to procure attorneys as a
result. 120
2. The Inclusion of Unqualfied Advocates
While the courts' view about whom "counsel" excludes-untrained, lay
representatives-seems persuasive as a matter of the framers' original
understanding, it is doubtful that the same can be said of the courts' view
about whom "counsel" includes. The prevailing judicial view is that "coun-
sel" includes duly licensed attorneys, without regard to whether they are in
fact qualified to practice law in general or to defend a criminal case in
particular.12' Thus, for the courts, the crux of being "counsel" is not
necessarily being qualified, but satisfying certain licensing requirements
which are thought to warrant a presumption that one is qualified. A review
of the contemporaneous history of the Sixth Amendment indicates, how-
ever, that the courts have it backwards: the crux of being "counsel" is being
qualified to defend a criminal accused.
In the early colonial period, many clients suffered at the hands of
untrained and unethical advocates. For example, several English prisoners
who had been transported to Virginia in punishment for masquerading as
attorneys subsequently resumed their iniquitous calling upon arrival in that
colony.122 Colonial licensing statutes often cited problems such as charging
excessive fees, engaging in deleterious practices, and bringing frivolous
Hamilton stepped in on the eve of trial, however, and waged the successful defense. See
Winick, supra note 17, at 791-96.
119. Essentially the same result could be achieved through statutes, like those adopted in
some colonies, severely constricting the amount of compensation that might be received from
parties who retained counsel. See supra note 109.
Today, of course, the unavailability of legal services, to the extent it is a problem, cannot be
attributed to licensing requirements designed to keep down the number of attorneys. There
is now a lawyer for every 320 persons in the United States. See U.S. Industrial Outlook 1991,
Professional Services: Legal Services (SIC81). The distribution of lawyers varies, with the ratio
of total population to lawyers ranges from 21 to 1 in Washington, D.C., to 658 to I in North
Carolina. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 13-15.
120. In the late eighteenth century, although far less so today, it was conceivable that an
educated individual might lack a law license but nevertheless be sufficiently "learned in the
law" to practice competently in the courts. Cf Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipworth
(Aug. 3, 1771), in Thomas Jefferson 740-45 (1984) (advising that, although "a knowledge of
the minutiae of that science [of law] is not necessary for a private gentleman," an educated
gentleman's library should include Ld. Kiam's Principles of Equity, Blackstone's Commentar-
ies, and Cuningham's Law Dictionary).
121. See supra Part I(B).
122. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 277.
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lawsuits. 123
In response to the perceived abuses, several colonies passed laws
placing restrictions on who may represent parties in judicial proceedings.
These laws, designed principally for the protection of clients, provided that
only those who were knowledgeable in the law and of good character would
be admitted to practice before the courts. For example, under a 1732
Virginia statute, 124 to be licensed by the governor and Council to practice in
county courts and inferior courts, one had to present a petition "setting
forth his qualification," and be examined by persons "learned in the law"
who would report on "the fitness or unfitness of such petitioner, for office
of attorney."' 125 In 1767, New Jersey enacted laws providing that to be
admitted to practice as an attorney, one had to serve as a clerk for an
attorney for at least five years, present a certificate from the supervising
attorney "purporting... that he is properly qualified both as to Integrity
and Ability in his Profession," and pass an examination given in open
court. 126 Other colonies adopted comparable provisions. 27
After independence, states retained requirements that attorneys be
qualified by virtue of learning and character. 128 In some cases, they set
123. The preambles to colonial statutes governing the licensing of attorneys generally
recounted the abuses. For example, a 1721 South Carolina licensing provision recited: "And
whereas, divers unskilful persons do often undertake to manage and solicit business in the
courts of law and equity, to the unspeakable damage of the clients, occasioned by theignorance of such solicitors, who are in no ways qualified for that purpose, tending to the
promoting litigiousness, and encouraging of vexatious suits ..... I Chroust, supra note 12, at
300 (quoting 7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, supra note 104, at 173). Similarly, a 1745
Virginia statute decried "the great number of ignorant and unskilful attornies practicing in the
county courts [who have become] a grievance to the country, in respect of their neglect and
mismanagement of their clients causes." Id. at 275 (quoting 5 Hening, supra note 16, at 345).
Colonies enacted various other laws besides licensing provisions in response to these abuses,
including laws governing legal fees, see, e.g., id. at 199 (describing 1750 NewJersey law); id. at
88 (quoting Massachusetts law); id. at 317 (quoting 1715 North Carolina law), and laws
requiring attorneys to pay costs occasioned by their neglect. See, e.g., id. at 274, 276 (describing
laws enacted in Virginia in 1732 and 1745).
124. This was one in a series of statutes enacted in Virginia beginning in 1680 requiring
that practicing attorneys had to be licensed. Id. at 271-79.
125. Id. at 273 (quoting 4 Hening, supra note 16, at 360-61). Similarly, a 1745 statute
provided that to obtain a license to practice in the General Court, an applicant was required
to be examined by "council, learned in the law" as to one's "capacity, ability and fitness" to
practice and to submit a certificate from a county court or inferior court "of his probity,honesty, and good demeanor." Id. at 275 (quoting 5 Hening, supra note 16, at 345).
126. Id. at 201 (quoting Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, app. 57
(1889)).
127. A 1785 Massachusetts statute provided: "No person shall be admitted as Attorney of
any Court in this Commonwealth, unless he is a person of good moral character .... and hath
had opportunity to qualify himself for the office, and hath made such proficiency as will
render him useful therein." Id. at 89 (quoting Laws and Resolves of Massachusetts ch. 23
(1785)). South Carolina's 1712 law regarding the admission of attorneys provided that only
those found to "be good and virtuous, and of good fame" might be added to the rolls. Id. at
299 (quoting 2 Statutes at Large of South Carolina, supra note 104, at 401 ff., 447); see also id.
at 200 (New York adopted a statute in 1767 on which the New Jersey statute was based).
128. For example, a 1785 South Carolina law provided for the admission of applicants who
had "acquired a sufficient knowledge of the laws of this State to qualify him to practice the lawin this State," upon satisfying the judges of the court of common pleas of "his capacity, ability
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specific educational requirements for applicants or prescribed a minimal
length of clerkship in order to ensure the competence of the trial bar. 29
Indeed, during the period leading up to the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, the regulation of the legal profession in America reached a height
from which it descended steadily over the next eight decades.' 30
The qualifications set by courts throughout the colonial and and post-
revolutionary period were designed specifically to ensure an attorney's
competence to serve as trial advocate.' 31 Indeed, all that the license denoted
was a right to represent parties at judicial proceedings. Literate nonlawyers
were fully entitled to draft contracts and wills and perform other services
out of court that today are performed principally or exclusively by lawyers.
Moreover, unlike today, virtually all attorneys were courtroom
advocates.' 32 In sum, licensed practitioners in the year 1791 were individ-
and fitness" after being examined, and "produc[ing] satisfactory testimonials of his probity,
honesty and good demeanor." Id. at 267-68 (quoting 4 Statutes at Large of South Carolina,
supra note 104, at 668-69). Similarly, a 1786 Virginia statute provided that an applicant who
had not previously been licensed would be admitted to practice "as a counsel, attorney at law,
or proctor.., if, after examination, it be [the judges'] opinion, that he is duly qualified." Id.
at 261 (quoting 12 Hening, supra note 16, at 339). The adoption of these provisions coincided
with continued expressions of concern about abuses by members of the bar. See, e.g., Bernstein
& Rice, supra note 107, at 71-72 (quoting Benjamin Austin, Observations on the Pernicious
Practice of the Law by Honestus (Boston, 1819)).
129. 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 35-38.
130. See Harlan F. Stone, The Lawyer and His Neighbors, 4 Cornell L.Q. 175, 177-79
(1919). During the Revolutionary period, however, there was already a cross-current against
professional regulation. Because the Revolution had reduced the number of trained attorneys,
states were compelled to allow nonlawyers to plead in the courts, see supra note 98, and judges
had to demand less in the way of training for new applicants. See 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at
35-36; see also supra note 100.
As the new nation expanded westward, a variety of factors, not least of which being aversion
to lawyers, led to what Pound called the "deprofessionalization" of the legal profession. 2
Chroust, supra note 12, at 47 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to Modern
Times 232 (1953)). Professor Chroust recounts that "[iln many states the aversion to lawyers
went so far that almost anyone but a trained lawyer was regarded as fit to sit on the bench."
See id. at 39. Particularly in the new states, standards for admission and discipline were not
taken seriously by the courts, which themselves came to be dominated by nonlawyers. Id. at
38-39, 48-49. Professional regulation reached its nadir shortly before the Civil War, by which
point several states had adopted statutes or constitutional provisions allowing anyone of good
moral character to practice law. See id. at 158-59 (citing New Hampshire Revised Statutes,
1842, ch. 177, sec. 2; Maine, Acts and Resolves of 1843 ch. 12; Wisconsin Laws of 1849 ch.
152; Ind. Const. of 1851, art. 7, sec. 21 (1851)).
131. See, e.g., 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 234-35 (under 1721 Delaware licensing provision,
"[tihe attorneys' business was defined as follows: 'Attornies actions may be entered, and writs,
process, declarations and other pleadings; and records in all such actions and suits as they shall
respectively be concerned to prosecute or defend from time to time, may be drawn, and with
their names and proper hands signed"').
132. The career ofJohn Adams illustrates the point. As a lawyer, Adams was best known for
his constitutional theory and advocacy. See, e.g., The Briefs of the American Revolution 119-43
(John P. Reid ed., 1981); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787, at 567-69, 580-87 (1969); Martin S. Flaherty, Note, The Empire Strikes Back:
Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 Colum. L.
Rev. 593, 593 n.1 (1987). Yet Adams also served as a trial lawyer in many cases, including
criminal cases. He participated in representing Captain Thomas Preston in his defense to
murder charges arising out of the Boston Massacre. See Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a
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uals who had been found qualified to try cases by virtue of knowledge of the
law and legal practice as it existed at that time; who had been found to
possess good moral character; and who, upon demonstrating legal knowl-
edge and good character, had received permission from a court to practice
before it.
If one concludes that "counsel" in the Sixth Amendment referred to
licensed practitioners, as thus described, the question for an originalist
becomes: which characteristics of 1791 attorneys were meant to be pre-
served by the term "counsel" when applied over time? While the term is not
open-textured like many of the terms in the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth
Amendment right to "due process of law" or the Sixth Amendment right to
a "speedy" trial, its meaning is still susceptible to change over time, as
changes occur in the nature of law practice in general, or criminal advocacy
in particular, or in the manner in which attorneys are licensed and
disciplined. 33
The historical background suggests that the critical, distinguishing
feature was not the receipt of authorization to appear before the court. The
colonial licensing statutes were, after all, a reaction against the profligatedispensation of licenses. Nor was the distinguishing feature that an
individual had undertaken a particular process for obtaining the license.
The process for admission to the courts varied considerably from colony to
colony. Applicants prepared for law in a variety of ways.134 Generally,
courts did not prescribe any one route. 3 5 Likewise, the process for
ascertaining an applicant's fitness and character varied. 36 Rather, the
Nation 408 (1968). He also defended four Irish seamen on homicide charges arising out of thedeath of a British naval officer when the seamen resisted impressment. See John P. Reid, In a
Defiant Stance 102-04 (1977).
133. The framers obviously would not have intended to preserve all characteristics of 1791
attorneys. Over time, some characteristics would obviously become impossible to satisfy. Thus,they would not have required that, to be "counsel" in 1992, an individual must have beenadmitted to practice at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified, although that is what"counsel" may have meant at the time. Other characteristics would also become irrelevant.Thus, the framers would not have required that, to be "counsel," one must be trained in the
law as it existed circa 1791. And still other characteristics of "counsel" would not have beenconsidered important enough to preserve in the face of changes that would invariably take
place in legal and judicial practices, as well as in society, over time. Thus, the framers wouldnot have expected that, to be "counsel," one must train for the law as one trained in 1791 or
demonstrate one's fitness and character through precisely the same means that one demon-
strated them at the time.
134. Some engaged in self-study; others served as an assistant to the clerk of a court or as
clerk in a law office; others became a member of one of the four Inns of Court in England; and
others attended college in the colonies. See 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 30-39.
135. In Virginia, for example, members of one of the Inns of Court were automatically
admitted to practice before the courts, while others were admitted only after independentlydemonstrating their fitness to practice. Id. at 275-78. Similarly, in Maryland, a 1707 law
provided that to be admitted, an applicant either had to be a member of one of Inns of Courtor had to an pass an examination as to his professional qualifications, honesty, and good
behavior. Id. at 252.
136. In early eighteenth-century North Carolina, attorneys were licensed on the basis of "a
perfunctory examination." Id. at 317. In contrast, in Massachusetts, demanding educationalstandards adopted by the Suffolk bar, although not officially adopted by the courts, were usedas the basis for the bar's recommendations, which influenced the courts in deciding who was
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distinguishing characteristic of licensed practitioners in 1791 was that they
were qualified, by virtue of their legal knowledge and good character, to
practice competently before the courts. This is not to say that those other
characteristics were unimportant. One might very well conclude that the
framers expected an individual to be qualified, to demonstrate qualifica-
tions to the courts' satisfaction, and to receive a license, in order to be"counsel." But the most important of those characteristics, as a matter of
original intent, was that "counsel" be qualified.
The contemporary notion that a court may deem licensed practitio-
ners to be "counsel" in the face of demonstrated evidence that they are
unqualified would have been foreign to the framers. The colonial statutes
presupposed that attorneys would remain licensed only so long as they
remained qualified to practice law. In general, the courts retained respon-
sibility to determine whether attorneys had engaged in conduct that
reflected adversely on their fitness or character. Colonial laws authorized
courts to suspend attorneys from practice or to remove them from the rolls
for engaging in wrongful conduct either in their representation of clients or
outside their role as attorneys.'3 7
Moreover, in 1791, the courts before which attorneys tried cases were
the same courts that licensed and disbarred attorneys. Courts did not
delegate the functions of licensing and disciplining attorneys, as occurs
today. Therefore, the framers would not have contemplated cases, such as
qualified. Id. at 90-91, 105-06.
137. Once admitted to practice, attorneys were required to act ethically and in their clients'
interest. For example, the Virginia oath of office required attorneys to act "according to [their]
learning and discretion" and proscribed various specific conduct. Id. at 273-74 (quoting 4
Hening, supra note 16, at 361). New Hampshire and Massachusetts prescribed the same oath,
which was adopted from the attorney's oath that had been administered in England. Id. at 85,
373. Other colonies prescribed similar oaths. See, e.g., id. at 222 (attorneys in Pennsylvania
swore an oath pledging honesty, fidelity, and competence).
As these oaths reflected, attorneys committed various misconduct "upon pain of being
disabled to practice as an attorney for ever." Id. at 273-74 (quoting 4 Hening, supra note 16,
at 361). The courts' authority to remove attorneys from the rolls was also established by
statute. For example, both a 1721 Delaware law and a 1722 Pennsylvania law provided that if
attorneys "misbehave themselves" in their practice before the courts, "they shall suffer such
penalties and suspensions as attorneys at law in Great Britain are liable to in such cases". Id.
at 222, 235. A 1745 Virginia law governing attorneys licensed to appear before the General
Court established that if an attorney "shall misdemean himself, and shall act contrary to his
duty in his practice," the judges shall suspend him from his practice for a time or he shall be
"disabled for ever, from practicing as an attorney." Id. at 276 (quoting 5 Hening, supra note
16, at 347). A similar law enacted in Virginia in 1732 provided for the suspension or
disbarment of attorneys who appeared before the county courts and inferior courts. Id. at 274
(quoting 4 Hening, supra note 16, at 361).
Similar provisions were adopted after the Revolution. For example, a 1799 New Jersey law
provided that any attorney found "guilty of malpractice ... shall be put out of the roll, and
never after be permitted to act or practice.., unless he shall obtain a new license." 2 Chroust,
supra note 12, at 252 (quoting Laws of the State of New-Jersey 413-27 (1821)).
Only on rare occasions did courts exercise their authority to suspend and disbar attorneys
for acting incompetently or unethically. See, e.g., 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 157-58 (quoting
3 Hamlin & Baker, Supreme Court 156 (1959) (Paroculus Parmyter disbarred by New York
Supreme Court in 1704 for "unmannerly behaviour and Expressions" and "undue and
dishonest practices as an Attorney and Councill at Law")); see also supra note 118 (two New
York lawyers disbarred in 1735 in connection with their representation of John Peter Zenger).
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Bellamy and Mouzin, in which trial courts allowed an individual to serve as
an attorney while disciplinary proceedings were pending before a disciplin-
ary body in the same jurisdiction or after another court in the jurisdiction
has found the attorney unfit. In 1791, a court that found an attorney to be
unqualified would have been expected to suspend or disbar that attorney.
Thus, whatever else the framers expected "counsel" to be, they expected
someone who was qualified to serve as an advocate in a criminal proceed-
ing.
B. A Functional Interpretation of "Counsel"
For more than a half-century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Right to Counsel Clause to provide procedural protections which serve the
purposes of the constitutional guarantee while going well beyond what the
drafters ever contemplated. 138 Consequently, even more important than
the question of the framers' understanding is the question of which
definition of "counsel" most fully accords with the purposes of the Right to
Counsel Clause as understood today. Viewed in that light, the prevailing
judicial approaches are far preferable to the interpretation, urged by some,
that "counsel" includes lay representatives. Of the various approaches
taken by courts, the best is probably judge Easterbrook's definition in Reese.
However, none of the judicial constructions serves the purposes of the
constitutional guarantee as well as the view that "counsel" means a qualified
advocate.
1. The Exclusion of Lay R~presentatives
An argument for interpreting "counsel" to include lay representatives
might be premised on the interest in individual autonomy underlying the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 3 9 Unquestionably, a narrow construc-
138. Contemporary decisions depart in a variety of respects from the original understand-ing that the right to counsel guaranteed nothing more than a right to retain counsel of one'schoosing, thus forbidding federal courts from outlawing professional advocacy, as somecolonies had done. As noted above, the right to counsel now guarantees appointed counsel toindigent defendants in state and federal court as well as a right to competent counsel. See supranotes 21-31 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Right to Counsel Clause has been read asa limitation on police interrogation practices. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 210(1964). Thus, it is hard to justify defining "counsel" strictly in terms of the framers' originalunderstanding, even assuming for argument's sake that their original understanding could be
discerned.Moreover, even if the framers' original understanding would otherwise be important, onemust focus on the contemporary function served by counsel because of the inconclusiveness ofthe historical backgound to the Sixth Amendment. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410(1972) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (because of the incondusiveness of the history relating
to the meaning of 'Jury" under the Sixth Amendment, "[o]ur inquiry must focus on the
function served by the jury in contemporary society.").
139. See Block, supra note 49, at 470:
The interests in dignity and autonomy that support the defendant's right to appear
pro se also support the right of a defendant to the assistance of lay counsel. A
defendant may feel just as strongly about having a third party represent him as he
does about representing himself. Similarly, the denial of lay representation may make
the defendant feel just as oppressed by the legal system as does the denial of self
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tion of the term undermines the defendant's interest in making decisions
relevant to a defense. If "counsel" does not refer to lay advocates, then
defendants who would prefer to be defended by nonlawyers are denied
respect for their preferences. Were autonomy the only interest protected by
the right to counsel, one would have difficulty justifying this construction.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the right to counsel
also serves other, paramount functions that would be seriously undermined
by defining untrained advocates as "counsel." In particular, the right to
counsel is intended to protect against the conviction of innocent defendants
and "to give substance to other constitutional and procedural protections
afforded criminal defendants."140 To fill the role contemplated by the
Supreme Court's decisions, "counsel" must possess both the skill and
training necessary to wage a competent criminal defense and the attributes
of character necessary to ensure full employment of talents to advocate
zealously and loyally on the defendant's behalf. But if "counsel" included
any lay representative, defendants would then be free to retain untrained
individuals, and courts could satisfy the mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright by
appointing untrained individuals as "counsel" to represent indigent defen-
dants. In determining whether "counsel" should include untrained advo-
cates, one must therefore decide which interests protected by the right to
counsel are more important: the interests in reliability and procedural
fairness or the interest in personal autonomy. If one accepts the Supreme
Court's view that the primary interests protected by the Right to Counsel
Clause are the former,' 41 one must conclude that untrained advocates do
not qualify as "counsel."
It is less clear, however, that to serVe the primary purposes of the Right
to Counsel Clause one must reject the approach taken in Whitesel. There,
the Sixth Circuit found that an individual may qualify as "counsel" not only
by meeting the standards set by licensing authorities for admission to the
bar but also by demonstrating, in some other way, possession of the legal
knowledge and skill (and, presumably, the character) expected of attorneys.
When it comes to protecting the interests of the accused, it should not
matter whether an advocate has navigated the bar admissions process; what
should matter is that, through some means, the advocate has demonstrated
representation. In both situations, licensed counsel is unwanted and possibly not
trusted.
140. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 377 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("while the right to select and
be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the
essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal
defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer
whom he prefers"). One might argue, of course, that even if the interest in personal autonomy
or dignity is second in importance to other interests protected by the right to counsel, it
deserves greater weight than the Supreme Court has accorded it. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The
Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 Am. Grim. L. Rev. 35,
92-98 (1991) (arguing that contemporary Supreme Court decisions unduly abridge the
"dignitary values" underlying the right); Green, supra note 37, at 1233-38.
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the necessary qualifications to provide a competent defense.142
The prevailing view is perhaps best explained, not by reference to
either the history or the purposes of the right to counsel, but by reference
to the judiciary's institutional interests. Interpreting "counsel" to include
individuals who are "learned in the law" but who have not satisfied
predesignated requirements for admission to the bar would create a variety
of problems for courts. First, it would require judges to devise and employ
a mechanism for testing the qualifications of nonlawyers on a case-by-case
basis-a pursuit that would be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.
Moreover, the invocation of such an ad hoc process for deciding who is"counsel" would encourage judges to act arbitrarily if not vindictively in
many cases, or, in the very least, expose judges to an accusation that they
had done so. For example, in a case in which the defendant seeks lay
representation, a judge with broad discretion to determine whether the
would-be advocate is qualified would be tempted to conclude that the lay
advocate is not. 4 3 Conversely, in a case such as Solina, in which the defense
lawyer is exposed after trial as an impostor, a court would be tempted todetermine that the nonlawyer was nonetheless qualified to serve as "coun-
sel." In that way, the court would preserve judicial resources that would
otherwise be expended on a retrial, avoid the possible unfairness to the
prosecution of proving a case after evidence had been lost or memories
dimmed, spare witnesses from recounting events they may prefer to put
behind them, and prevent the possible public perception that a guilty
person was freed on a "technicality."
Perhaps most importantly, allowing legally trained nonlawyers to serve
as defense advocates would undermine the judicial interest in maintaining
ethical standards. 144 Unlike lawyers, those who are not licensed to practice
law have no obligation to comply with the standards of professional ethics.
While a court might hold nonlawyers to those standards as a condition ofallowing them to defend criminal cases, nonlawyers would have far less
incentive than lawyers to act ethically. While lawyers face disbarment and
thus the loss of their professional livelihood for serious ethical lapses, lay
representatives do not.
In light of these institutional interests, courts have reasonably con-
cluded that the term "counsel" excludes those individuals who are either
unlicensed to practice law or have failed to satisfy licensing standards
relating to character and fitness. While a trial judge might have discretion
to permit a defendant to obtain the assistance of a lay representative at
142. See Block, supra note 49, at 476 (arguing that a criminal defendant should have the
right to control "his own defense by using a qualified lay counsel of his choice") (emphasis
added).
143. Cf Green, supra note 37, at 1250 (most judges will exercise discretion to disqualify
lawyers with potential conflicts of interest because they consider "the institutional interests in
rendering just verdicts and in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the legal system
[to be] more important than" the defendant's interest in choice of counsel).
144. This is one of the institutional interests identified by the Supreme Court in Wheat v.
United States, 486 U.S. at 160, as ajustification for disqualifying lawyers who appear to havea conflict of interest. See Green, supra note 37, at 1212-22 (arguing that Wheat was premised
on a misunderstanding of the ethical rules).
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trial,145 a defendant should not be able to assert a qualified right to appear
at trial with a lay representative, however well versed in the law that person
may be.146 Similarly, as the Second Circuit recognized in Solina, an accused
who, without knowledge and consent, is defended at trial by an individual
who does not qualify for admission" to the bar should subsequently receive
a new trial even if the nonlawyer received extensive legal training and
seems to have provided as good a defense as a licensed practitioner would
have provided. 147
2. The Inclusion of Unqualified Practitioners
The Sixth Amendment is now understood to promote the reliability of
the verdict and to protect an accused's other procedural rights by guaran-
teeing the accused an advocate capable of dealing with the legal complex-
ities of a criminal proceeding and testing the prosecution's proof. These
purposes are served if "counsel" is defined as advocates who, by virtue of
145. United States v. Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979,983-85 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (finding that
chosen representatives were not sufficiently qualified to constitute "counsel," but exercising
discretion to permit them to assist the defendant), affd, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 966 (1976). Other courts have held, however, that state statutes proscribing the practice
of -law by nonlawyers preclude trial courts from permitting representation by lay people in
criminal cases. See, e.g., Skuse v. State, 714 P.2d 368 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986); State v. Peterson,
266 N.W.2d 103 (S.D. 1978); Seattle v. Shaver, 597 P.2d 935 (Wash. 1979).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1978) (since a disbarred
attorney is not "counsel," there is no Sixth Amendment right to retain a disbarred attorney in
a criminal case).
147. Solina, 709 F.2d at 168-69; accord People v.Johnson, 822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992); People
v. Felder, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (N.Y. 1979) ("We perceive no difference between an absolute
deprivation of counsel and 'representation' by an unlicensed lay person-in both instances
defendant is denied the right that the Sixth Amendment was designed to guarantee, the right
to representation by an attorney."). In fact, in Solina, both the district court and the court of
appeals found that Solina had received reasonably competent representation and that, given
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, there was no reason to believe that a licensed
practitioner could have secured a better result. 709 F.2d at 161-64, 169. Nevertheless, the
court concluded that Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and other Supreme Court
decisions required automatic reversal of a conviction procured in the absence of counsel or a
waiver of the right to counsel. Similarly, in Felder the court concluded that the defendant's
conviction must be reversed automatically, notwithstanding a lower court's determination that
the nonlawyer's representation did not prejudice the defendant. Felder, 391 N.E.2d at 1277.
The courts' requirement that a conviction be reversed automatically when the defendant is
represented by someone other than "counsel" distinguishes this violation of the right to
counsel from otheK violations. For example, a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is not established unless the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's poor performance.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Similarly, proof of a violation of the right to conflict-free
representation ordinarily requires a showing that defense counsel's performance was adversely
affected by his conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Indeed, in
Solina the court noted the defendant's right to conflict-free representation may have been
violated by the nonlawyer's representation, since the impostor's fear of being unmasked may
have interfered with his ability to give zealous advocacy, but that this problem might not
automatically require reversal of a conviction. See Solina, 709 F.2d at 164-65.
These cases also stand in contrast to those in which it was the prosecutor, rather than the
defendant's representative, who turns out to have been unlicensed. In such cases, a new trial
will not be ordered in the absence of a showing that the defendant suffered some prejudice
because the prosecutor was not admitted to practice law. See, e.g., Linares v. Senkowski, 964
F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1992); People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119 (NY. 1990).
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training and character, are qualified to defend a criminal case. They are not
necessarily served, however, if "counsel" is defined to include individuals
who possess a law license or once satisfied licensing requirements, without
regard to whether they are qualified to practice law in general or to defend
criminal cases in particular.
Defining "counsel" to mean a "qualified" defense advocate comports
with the fundamental premise of the decisions recognizing a right to
counsel-that partisan advocacy is needed on both sides of the case to
ensure that the truth emerges at trial. 48 Thus, "when the accused [is]
confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor,"'149 the reliability of the trial verdict depends on the
presence of an advocate for the accused who will navigate those legal
intricacies and test the prosecutor's proof. Defense counsel's capacity to fill
the role contemplated by the constitutional guarantee presupposes that
counsel possesses the "skill and knowledge [that] is necessary to accord
defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to
which they are entitled,"'' 50 Thus, an accused must be represented by
someone who has some knowledge of criminal law and procedure and some
skill as a trial advocate. Moreover, to fulfill the role contemplated by the
Sixth Amendment right, defense counsel must be committed to the values
and ethical precepts of the legal profession. In particular, an advocate must
accept ethical responsibilities to act competently and loyally on the client's
behalf. It is not enough -that a lawyer possesses the skill and knowledge
necessary to defend the accused skillfully: the responsibility to do so must
be taken seriously.' 5'
On the other hand, if "counsel" includes all those individuals who
satisfy particular aspects of the licensing process, then there is no assurance
that "counsel" will satisfy the role ascribed by the Sixth Amendment.
Whether duly licensed attorneys, who come within the judicial definitions
of "counsel," possess the requisite knowledge, skill, and character to ensure
partisan advocacy in criminal cases will depend entirely on the vagaries of
the licensing process in a given jurisdiction at a given time. Consider the
148. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
149. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).
150. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 275 (1942)).
151. The importance of this commitment is underscored by several of the Court's
right-to-counsel decisions which rely on presumptions regarding the quality of defense
counsel's representation at trial. For example, the Court has held that, in determining whether
trial counsel provided effective assistance, a court must presume that the attorney exercised
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. This presumption is warranted
as a factual matter only if "counsel" is taken to mean an attorney not only who, by virtue of his
training and experience in the law, is capable of exercising reasonable judgment about the
conduct of a criminal defense, but also who is committed to doing so. Similarly, in the context
of conflict-of-interest cases, the Court has instructed trial judges to assume that defense
counsel will uphold his ethical obligations. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47
(1980); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978). See generally Green, supra
note 37, at 1223-30 (discussing Court's view of the defense attorney's role in maintaining
ethical standards). This assumption is valid only if the definition of "counsel" excludes those
attorneys who lack familiarity with, and fealty to, prevailing ethical standards.
[1993]
LETHAL FICTION: THE MEANING OF COUNSEL
following possible methods of licensing attorneys, some of which, if
unthinkable today, were easily imaginable at other points in our history.
States A, B, and C abolish all fitness and character requirements,
trusting to the marketplace to ensure that licensed attorneys are
fit to provide the legal services that they are retained to provide.
State A allocates law licenses to anyone who will pay a predesig-
nated fee.' 52 State B allocates licenses by auctioning them off to
the highest bidders. State C distributes a predesignated number of
licenses and permits lawyers to transfer them. 5 3
State D preserves character and fitness requirements, but adopts
a cursory process for ascertaining a candidate's qualifications like
those that existed in the western states and territories prior to the
Civil War, so that anyone who knows "some law" will be admitted
to practice. 154
State E, responding to Supreme Court decisions expanding access
to counsel, permits anyone with a college degree to become a
licensed attorney with authorization to provide a criminal defense.
However, to protect clients other than criminal defendants, State
E requires a law degree and other qualifications for a "specialized
license" to provide all other legal services.
State F redefines the practice of law to include a wide range of
professional services, including accounting, real estate brokerage
and psychological counseling, and adopts arduous training and
testing requirements that are designed, not to ensure the compe-
tence of lawyers to provide the designated services, but to discour-
age most individuals from seeking a law license, thereby preserv-
ing lawyers' monopoly of practice and enhancing the value of the
license. State F assumes that, once licensed, lawyers will specialize
in particular areas of practice and, over time, acquire the neces-
sary skills and knowledge.
Under the prevailing judicial approaches, an individual who became an
attorney under any of these licensing schemes would be "counsel." Yet the
advocate would not necessarily be capable of protecting a defendant's rights
and testing the prosecution's evidence, as contemplated by the Sixth
Amendment.
It follows, then, that "counsel" cannot include duly licensed attorneys
at all times and in all places without regard to the standards under which
they qualified for a license. Such a construction would be vastly overinclu-
sive. If law licenses were dispensed indiscriminately, or by standards
unrelated to fitness to defend a criminal accused, then there would be no
152. Several state legislatures in the 1840s and 50s abolished educational and training
requirements for admission to the bar. See supra note 130.
153. Along these lines, Professor Chroust recounts the story of Simon Suggs, an early
nineteenth-century Arkansas lawyer, who practiced under a license that he won from a young
lawyer at a card game. 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 105 (citing Baldwin, Flush Times in
Alabama and Mississippi (1854)).
154. See 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 106; Robert B. Stevens, Law School: Legal Education
in America from the 1850's to the 1880's 25 (1983).
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reason to expect licensed attorneys to be capable of fulfilling the functions
prescribed by the Sixth Amendment. If the licensing process in a given
jurisdiction were designed, however, to ensure that those who are autho-
rized to represent criminal defendants are generally capable of doing so
competently, then one could fairly construe "counsel" to include attorneys
duly licensed in that jurisdiction. One simply cannot say that duly licensed
practitioners are "counsel" without scrutinizing the process by which they
were licensed.
III. WHY MOST ATTORNEYS ARE UNQUALIFIED TO REPRESENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
A. Interpreting "Counsel" in Light of Contemporary Licensing Processes:
The Factual Premises
One might accept the view that, to be included as "counsel," an
individual must be qualified to represent a criminal accused competently,
but argue nonetheless that attorneys who are duly licensed under the
existing licensing schemes are "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment. This
argument might be based on either or both of the following factual claims
about the contemporary processes: first, that these processes are in fact
designed to assure that licensed practitioners are qualified to defend
criminal cases competently; and, second, that these processes succeed in
that aim. If these factual premises are correct, then it might be argued duly
licensed attorneys should qualify as "counsel" categorically even if, in any
given case, the attorney's conduct after admission to the bar suggests
incompetence in representing criminal defendants.
One might argue, first, that appropriate deference to judicial authority
requires regarding duly licensed attorneys as "counsel" in jurisdictions in
which courts employ their licensing processes at least in part to ensure that
attorneys are qualified to defend criminal cases. Deference to the determi-
nations made by courts is warranted for several reasons. To begin with, the
Constitution presupposes that the courts will determine the necessary
attributes for competent criminal defense attorneys and will determine who
possesses them. Courts have traditionally controlled the admission and
disbarment of lawyers' 55 because the experience and objectivity of judges
place them in the best position to resolve these questions, and because their
obligation to oversee the administration of criminal justice gives them the
greatest incentive to do so.' 56 The issue of whether an individual qualifies
as "counsel" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment is ultimately a question
of constitutional interpretation which, like most such questions, is entrusted
155. See, e.g., Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856) ("It has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine
who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed."); Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate
the Practice of the Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 525 (1983).
156. See, e.g., People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, CJ.)
("If the house is to be cleaAed, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for
strangers, to do the noisome work.").
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to the courts to resolve. Moreover, a considerable degree of judgment and
discretion are required both to identify the attributes of a competent
defense lawyer and to test whether an individual qualifies. Courts must first
identify those attributes of knowledge, skill, and character that an attorney
must generally possess in order to be capable of waging an adequate
criminal defense; they must then develop a process for ascertaining
whether an attorney possesses those attributes. Both determinations are
subjective; neither can be made with any degree of precision. Therefore, a
judicial determination that a particular individual is qualified to serve as a
criminal defense counsel is entitled to an extraordinary measure of defer-
ence.
In addition, one might argue that, as a matter of sensible line-drawing,
all duly licensed practitioners are "counsel," because the contemporary
licensing processes successfully assure that most practitioners are capable of
defending criminal cases. While some practitioners who obtain a license are
not qualified, and some who later cease to be qualified are not weeded out
by the disciplinary process, the overwhelming majority of presently licensed
attorneys are qualified to serve as defense attorneys. The only alternative to
including all duly qualified attorneys as "counsel" would be to require an ad
hocjudicial inquiry into the qualifications of defense counsel before every
criminal trial. Such an inquiry would be extremely burdensome, but
possibly no more successful, than the existing processes as a device for
distinguishing between qualified and unqualified practitioners. Moreover,
as noted earlier, it would provide an undesirable opportunity for discrim-
inatory judicial practices. 157
If the factual premises of these arguments are correct-if courts have
successfully devised procedures for assuring that the vast majority of
attorneys are qualified to defend criminal cases-then duly licensed attor-
neys should, indeed, qualify as "counsel." Constitutional provisions, partic-
ularly in the criminal context, commonly are interpreted in light of
generalizations that hold true in most, but not all, cases.158 Such a mode of
interpretation would be appropriate in defining "counsel" as well. In other
words, in determining who is "counsel," it is reasonable to defer to a
standardized judicial process that is reasonably calculated to identify those
individuals who are qualified to represent criminal defendants.
The question, however, is whether the contemporary licensing pro-
cesses actually meet the constitutional standard by assuring that the vast
majority of practitioners are qualified to play the role in a criminal case
contemplated by the Sixth Amendment right.' 59 As discussed in the next
157. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, I IlS. Ct. 2546, 2558 (1991) (presumption is justified
when case-specific inquiries are inappropriate and "a per se rule will achieve the correct result
in almost all cases"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements made to the police
in response to custodial interrogation and without a waiver of rights are presumed to be
coerced because the police-dominated atmosphere is inherently coercive and the secrecy of
custodial interrogation prevents accurate case-by-case determinations of whether individual
prisoners were in fact coerced).
159. See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2358 ("Per se rules should not be applied, however, in
situations where the generalization is incorrect as an empirical matter; the justification for a
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subparts, they do not. A license to practice law is not intended by licensing
authorities to denote that an individual possesses the knowledge and skill
adequately to represent a criminal accused. And, in fact, most attorneys
who receive a license are not immediately qualified.
B. Qualiications for Representing a Criminal Accused
The Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel presuppose that a criminal defense attorney is capable of
serving competently on behalf of the accused during the course of the
criminal process. 60 Throughout the process, defense counsel functions
variously as advocate, as advisor, and as negotiator:
In his role as advocate, a defense counsel preserves the accused's
interests in procedural fairness during the trial and an advanta-
geous outcome. In his advisory capacity, a defendant's lawyer
ensures that his client has access to information relevant to the
pretrial and trial decisions that the accused must make himself.
Finally, when he acts as negotiator, counsel gives the accused the
advantage of the procedural means for mitigating the harshness
of an otherwise deserved deprivation.' 6'
Often, defense counsel serves more than one role at once. For example,
prior to trial, defense counsel may seek information from various sources,
including the defendant, witnesses, and the prosecution, in connection with
all three functions. The information learned from the investigation is
necessary: to enable counsel to evaluate the prospects for acquittal so that
the defendant can make an informed decision whether to plead guilty; so
that the defense attorney can negotiate effectively with the prosecutor in
the event the defendant decides to pursue a negotiated plea of guilty; and
to enable the attorney to advocate on the defendant's behalf in the event the
defendant decides to stand trial.
conclusive presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not reach the
correct result most of the time.").
160. The stages of the criminal process during which a criminal accused has the right to
counsel extend from the formal commencement of criminal proceedings until the conclusion
of an appeal as of right. See Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2566 (no right to counsel in postconviction
proceedings after first appeal); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (right to counsel"attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated");
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel under the Equal Protection Clause
for indigents on appeal as of right). Although a criminal defense lawyer may perform a variety
of functions prior to the filing of criminal charges, see, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Defending White
Collar Crime (1985) (principal aim of white collar defense attorney retained prior to or during
a criminal investigation is to forestall the filing of criminal charges), at that stage of a criminal
process the accused has no constitutional right either to the appointment of counsel or to
competent counsel. See, e.g., Claudio v. Scully, 791 F. Supp 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (no relief
where lawyer incompetently advised defendant to confess to murder, because defendant had
not yet been charged, and therefore the right to counsel did not apply); Commonwealth v.
Moreau, 572 N.E.2d 1382 (Mass. 1991).
161, Green, supra note 10, at 1076; see also id. at 1079-91 (addressing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the context of defense counsel's functions as an advocate, counselor,
and negotiator).
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There is substantial agreement within the organized bar and the
judiciary that an attorney representing a criminal accused must possess
particular attributes to perform these functions competently. It would take
a multi-volume treatise to describe fully the skills and knowledge a criminal
defense attorney must possess and their importance. In general terms,
however, the professional literature reflects a consensus that, at the very
least, a criminal defense attorney must possess certain lawyering skills
which are employed in virtually all areas of practice, that the attorney must
possess trial skills and be familiar with trial procedure generally, and that
the attorney must be versed particularly in criminal law and procedure. In
addition, the attorney may need detailed knowledge of individual areas of
criminal law or procedure to be qualified to represent criminal defendants
in certain especially complex criminal cases.
The legal profession has identified skills with which lawyers must be
familiar before being qualified to assume ultimate responsibility for repre-
senting a: client in any type of matter. The most comprehensive, contem-
porary elaboration of those skills is contained in theJuly, 1992 report of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession, whose members included prominent judges, academics, and
leaders of the organized bar.162 The centerpiece of the report is a Statement
of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values which, drawing
upon the prior professional literature and surveys of lawyers, describes in
detail ten lawyering skills that virtually any lawyer needs in order to be
equipped to practice capably. 163 "Fundamental" laWyering skills included
problem solving,164 legal analysis and reasoning, 65 legal research, 166 fac-
tual investigation, 67 communication, 168 counseling, 169 and negotiation. 17°
162. MacCrate Report, supra note 58. The author of this Article served as a consultant to
the Task Force.
163. Id. at 135-221. The Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional
Values has also been published as a free-standing document.
164. Id. at 141-51; accord American Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing
Professional Education, A Model Curriculum for Bridge-the-Gap Programs 7, 13 (Discussion
Draft 1988); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st- Century Perspective,
34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 614 (1984); David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal
Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 30J. Legal Educ. 67, 77 (1979); H. Russell Cort
& Jack L. Sammons, The Search for "Good Lawyering": A Concept and Model of Lawyering
Competencies, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 397, 406, 441-43 (1980); Douglas E. Rosenthal, Evaluating
the Competence of Lawyers, 11 Law & Soc'y 256, 270-71 (1976).
165. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 151-57; accord American Bar Ass'n Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force
on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools 11 (1979); Amsterdam, supra note 164,
at 613.
166. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 157-63; accord Leonard L. Baird, A Survey of the
Relevance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29 J. Legal Educ. 264, 273-74 (1978);
Barnhizer, supra note 164, at 78; John 0. Mudd & John W. LaTrielle, Professional
Competence: A Study of New Lawyers, 49 Mont. L. Rev. 11, 17 (1988); Robert A. Schwartz,
The Relative Importance of Skills Used by Attorneys, 3 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 321, 324-33
(1973).
167. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 163-72; accord David A. Binder & Paul Bergman,
Fact Investigation: From Hypothesis to Proof 2-4 (1984); Frances K. Zemans & Victor G.
Rosenblum, The Making of a Public Profession 125-26 (1981); Baird, supra note 166, at 273,
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All are employed as a matter of course in defending a criminal accused.
As a trial lawyer, defense counsel must also possess trial skills and be
versed in trial procedure. While a rudimentary knowledge of litigation
procedure may be necessary for most lawyers, 171 for criminal defense
attorneys and others who serve as trial lawyers familiarity with litigation
procedures obviously must be both detailed and practical. For example, a
litigator must know how to prepare a case for trial. This requires facility in
obtaining information from clients, witnesses, and adversaries, and in
selecting and making appropriate pretrial motions.' 72 Likewise, a litigator
must know how to try a case effectively. This calls for an ability to develop
trial strategy, prepare and examine witnesses, make appropriate eviden-
tiary objections, handle evidence, and make effective opening and closing
arguments. 7 -3
Moreover, to litigate on behalf of criminal defendants in particular,
one must be familiar with criminal law and procedure. To be sure, an
attorney need not be conversant in all the intricate details of these
constantly developing areas of law because opportunities are provided
during the criminal process, especially prior to the commencement of a
trial, to conduct research into those particular aspects that are relevant to
the case. However, a considerable grounding in criminal law and procedure
is necessary, both because the opportunity for pretrial study and prepara-
tion is too limited for an attorney to engage in extended self-education, 7 4
and because many immediate decisions must be made throughout the
criminal process which presuppose a knowledge of criminal law or
procedure. 175 Besides a general grounding, detailed knowledge of discrete
281; Schwartz, supra note 166, at 324-25.
168. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 172-76; accord Zemans & Rosenblum, supra note
167, at 125-26; Baird, supra note 166, at 273-74; Mudd & La Trielle, supra note 166, at 18-19.
169. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 176-84; accord Baird, supra note 166, at 273-74;
Schwartz, supra note 166, at 324-25. See generally Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh,
Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation (1990); David
A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991).
170. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 185-90; accord Zemans & Rosenblum, supra note
167, at 125; Baird, supra note 166, at 273-74.
171. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 191-99.
172. Id. at 192-94.
173. Id. at 194.
174. Courts have considerable discretion in scheduling criminal cases and need not afford
defense counsel much time to prepare a case for trial. Courts have found it reasonable to
permit as little as three or four days for trial preparation. See, e.g., Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444 (1940) (three days to prepare defense in capital case); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95,
106-07 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983). In federal criminal cases, the trial may
not begin less than thirty days after the defendant first appeared in court with counsel. 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (1988). Thus, defense counsel in federal cases will ordinarily have at least
thirty days in which to prepare for trial.
175. For example, decisions about how to question a witness, either in the course of
investigation or in the course of criminal proceedings, must be made almost spontaneously
with an eye toward possible procedural motions and substantive defenses. Similarly, at trial,
objections to the admission of testimony or evidence, to the prosecutor's statements to the jury,
or to the trial judge's jury instructions, must be made immediately. Even advice to a defendant
about whether or not to plead guilty often must be provided within a limited span of
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areas of criminal law and procedure are needed to represent an accused
competently in certain complex cases-death penalty cases being the most
prominent example.' 76
C. The Inadequacy of the Licensing Process
The organized bar recognizes that the licensing process is not meant to
ensure, and does not in fact ensure, that an attorney possesses the attributes
needed to provide a competent criminal defense. The inadequacy of a
license as a measure of qualification becomes clear upon review of that
process. No part of the licensing process-law school training, a bar
examination, and character review-is directed at ensuring that candidates
for admission to the bar possess fundamental lawyering skills, a working
knowledge of the trial process, or practical familiarity with criminal law and
procedure. On the contrary, those who oversee the different aspects of the
process assume that few if any licensed practitioners will possess these
attributes.
First, the legal training required for admission to the bar-typically, a
three-year'program of law school education 177is not designed to produce
candidates for the bar who are qualified to represent clients generally,
much less those particular clients whose lives or liberty are jeopardized by
a criminal prosecution. Accreditation standards do not require law schools
to ensure that students are qualified to practice law; they simply require law
schools to "qualify [students] ... for admission to the bar," that is, to pass
the bar examination,17 8 which principally measures candidates' knowledge
of substantive legal principles and facility in legal analysis. Accordingly, the
central undertaking of law schools in this country has traditionally been to
time-occasionally as little as minutes.
176. See Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181, 182 (Ga. 1989) ("it has become apparent that
special skills are necessary to assure adequate representation of defendants in death penalty
cases"); Irving v. Smith, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983) ("death penalty litigation has become
highly specialized . . . . [Flew attorneys have 'even a surface familiarity with seemingly
innumerable refinements'" on Supreme Court's decisions in this area); State v. Savage, 577
A.2d 455 (N.J. 1990) (Handler, J., dissenting) ("a myriad of complexities, substantive and
procedural, ... characterize all death-penalty trials"); Steven B. Bright, Minority Report, in
ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at app. 19-20 (discussing standards of qualification
that should be set for the defense of capital cases), reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 209, 217-18
(1990); Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 303; Fong, supra note 9, at 490; see also Thurgood
Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1986) ("Death penalty litigation has become a specialized field
of practice").
177. Although some jurisdictions require some additional training prior to or shortly after
admission to the bar, the transitional courses, usually referred to as "bridge-the-gap" courses,
are generally cursory and focus on substantive legal knowledge-rather than on developing
lawyering skills. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 295.
178. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 261 (citing American Bar Ass'n Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar, Standards for Approval of Law Schools and Interpre-
tations, Standard 301(a) (1991) [hereinafter ABA Standards]).
Thus, law schools do not necessarily accept the responsibility that one might ordinarily
associate with their traditional role as gatekeepers to the profession. Neither standards for
admission nor standards for graduation are intended to exclude those who are unlikely to
become qualified lawyers.
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impart substantive law and instruction in legal analysis.' 79
Law school students may graduate although deficient in much of the
skill and knowledge that the professional literature deems essential to
provide a competent criminal defense. Until two decades ago, legal
research was the only lawyering skill other than legal analysis in which
students received instruction.'80 Even today, substantive law and legal
analysis and research are the principal focus of a legal education for
virtually all law students, and the exclusive focus for many. While law
schools offer course instruction in other lawyering skills through clinical
programs or simulations, such instruction is generally offered on an elective
basis and rarely made available to all students.' 8 ' Consequently, most law
students receive little or no training in such fundamental skills as problem
solving, factual investigation, interviewing, negotiation, and client
counseling. 18 2 Similarly, many students do not elect courses in either trial
advocacy or criminal procedure,183 and elective courses in these areas rarely
aim to develop students' skill or knowledge to the level expected of
competent defense attorneys.
Later stages in the licensing process also fail to ensure the fitness of
those who practice law. Like law schools, bar examiners do not demand that
candidates for admission to the bar possess the skills and knowledge
necessary to serve clients competently. Although some attention is occa-
sionally paid to the notion that licensing authorities should use the
examination to ensure that candidates for admission to the bar are qualified
to render legal assistance, 8 4 bar examinations are in fact devoted princi-
pally to testing candidates' substantive knowledge and, to a lesser extent,
their skills in legal analysis and writing. 8 5 At present, the bar examinations
of only three states include any questions at all designed to test other
lawyering skills.18 6 Thus, the bar examination does not demand any type of
179. See, e.g., Cort & Sammons, supra note 164, at 415 ("If legal educators agree on
anything, it is that legal analysis is taught in law schools").
180. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 236-37.
181. Id. at 240. Accreditation standards do not require law schools to offer instruction in
professional skills to all students. Id. at 265 (citing ABA Standards, supra note 178, Standard
302(a)(iii)).
182. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 240; Donald N. Zillman & Vickie R. Gregory, The
New Apprenticeships: An Empirical Study of Student Employment and Legal Education, 12
J. Contemp. L. 203, 210-11 (1987).
183. A course in substantive criminal law is required for all, or virtually all, law students in
their first year of law school. The course is typically used largely for the purpose of introducing
new students to legal analysis. Few would argue that the course aims to provide the knowledge
of criminal law needed to represent criminal defendants competently.
184. See, e.g., White, Lawyer Competency and the Law School Curriculum: An Opportunity
for Cooperation, 53 The Bar Examiner 4, 7-8 (Feb. 1984) (quoting Statement of the Council
of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar and the Board of Managers
of the National Conference of Bar Examiners (July 1971)) ("public authority . • . by
examination should determine that the content of the applicant's education is such that, upon
admission he [or she] will be able to adequately serve the public.").
185. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 277-80 (discussing traditional bar examinations).
186. See id. at 280-82 (discussing "performances tests" included as part of the bar
examination in Alaska, California, and Colorado).
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training beyond what is traditionally provided by law schools.
In light of the limited demands of the licensing process, the organized
bar assumes that newly admitted attorneys will be unprepared to represent
clients without supervision.18 7 The bar has traditionally assumed, however,
that new attorneys will develop lawyering skills and necessary legal knowl-
edge in legal practice settings. Ideally, they will receive training and
supervision in practice and will not assume ultimate responsibility for a
client's cause until, through that means, they have become qualified to do
so. But nothing requires them to wait. Newly admitted attorneys in the
United States may immediately assume responsibility for representing
clients. Moreover, the new lawyer may provide representation in virtually
any matter, including the defense of a criminal case, since special authori-
zation is required for few specialized areas of legal practice. Although most
new lawyers do not immediately enter small or sole practices in which they
represent clients without supervision, some do, much to the increasing
concern of the organized bar.188
While most practicing lawyers undoubtedly do acquire greater legal
knowledge and proficiency following admission to the bar (albeit, some-
times at the expense of their initial clients), it does not follow that they
eventually develop the skills and knowledge needed to represent a criminal
accused. Over the past half-century, the practice of law has become
increasingly complex. Today, most lawyers specialize in one or more areas
of practice.18 9 Criminal law is one among a variety of specialties identified
by practitioners which also include real estate practice, civil litigation,
corporate law, probate law, negligence law, family law, trusts and estates,
and tax law. 190 In urban and metropolitan suburban areas, most defense
counsel in serious criminal cases are either attorneys in private practice
specializing in criminal defense representation' 9' or full-time public
defenders.' 92 Prosecution of criminal cases is, likewise, an area of
specialty. 193 Attorneys who specialize in the practice of criminal law may
187. Id. at 285 ("[I]t is unrealistic'to expect even the most committed law schools ... to
produce graduates who are fully prepared to represent clients without supervision. Licensing
authorities must be concerned with the problem of how to regulate entry into the profession
of those partially-prepared lawyers."); Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Discussion Draft Report on Admission to the
Bar in New York in the Twenty First Century-A Blueprint for Reform, 47 The Record of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 464, 499-502 (Jan. 2, 1992) [hereinafter
Blueprint for Reform].
188. See, e.g., Report and Recommendations of the Commission on Lawyering Skills of the
State Bar of California (Oct. 11, 1991); Blueprint for Reform, supra note 187.
189. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 40-46.
190. Id. at 41. Criminal law is one of thirty-five areas of specialization listed in the 1990-91
Manhattan telephone directory, id. at 43 n.44, and one of twenty-four specialty areas
identified by the American Bar Association. See American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on
Specialization, Model Standards for Specialty Areas (1990).
191. MacCrate Report, supra note 58, at 41.
192. See id. at 55-56 (approximately 1500 offices operated by public defender programs and
legal services programs provide defense representation).
193. In 1991, there were more than 20,000 district attorneys and assistant district attorneys
practicing in the United States. Id. at 96-97.
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take advantage of opportunities to develop the skills and acquire the
knowledge identified as essential to be a competent criminal defense
lawyer, but the overwhelming majority of licensed attorneys will not. Most
lawyers never engage in courtroom advocacy after admission to the bar.194
Of those who do, many do not engage in criminal advocacy. No lawyer can
be competent in all or even many areas of practice, and attorneys expend
considerable effort simply to keep abreast of developments in the few areas
of the law in which they concentrate. 95 Because most newly licensed
attorneys go on to practice outside the area of criminal law, most never will
acquire the attributes of a qualified criminal defense advocate.
The prevailing standards of professional conduct reflect the realities
that the mere possession of a license does not mean an attorney is qualified
to practice in all areas of law, and, in particular, that a license does not mean
that an attorney is qualified to represent criminal defendants. The ethical
standards drafted by the American Bar Association and subsequently
adopted in most states as the basis of professional discipline recognize that,
as the practice of law has become increasingly specialized and complex, it
takes considerable work simply to become and remain proficient in even a
narrow area of law practice. 196 Lawyers are therefore enjoined from
accepting work that they are unqualified to perform. 97 Moreover, the
American Bar Association, in enacting standards for the defense of criminal
cases, has stressed in particular that licensed practitioners are not necessar-
ily qualified to represent an accused. 198 It has therefore recommended that
194. Id. at 116.
195. Id. at 42.
196. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 6-1 & n.1 (1980) (citingArthur
J. Levy & W.D. Sprague, Accounting and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?, 52
A.B.A. J. 1110, 1112 (1966)); Rochelle & Payne, The Struggle for Public Understanding, 25
Tex. B.J. 109, 160 (1962)).
197. Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(1) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer should not handle a matter "which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating himself with a lawyer who is competent to handle it."
Ethical Consideration 6-3 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility elaborates on this
rule, as follows: "While the licensing of an attorney is evidence that he has met the standards
then prevailing for admission to the bar, a lawyer generally should not accept employment in
any area of the law in which he is not qualified." Model Rule 1.1, a counterpart provision of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, enjoins attorneys to provide "competent
representation," which requires, among other things, "the legal knowledge [and] skill ...
reasonably necessary for the representation."
Other professional standards reflecting the recognition that lawyers are not qualified to
practice in all areas of the law include Disciplinary Rule 2-108(b) and Model Rule 5.6(b), which
make it unethical for a lawyer to agree to restrict his right to practice as part of a settlement
agreement. These rules are designed to ensure clients free access to competent legal
representation. See, e.g., Shebay v. Davis, 717 S.W.2d 678 (rex. Ct. App. 1986); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1039 (1968); Mich. Op. CI-1165
(1986); Co-opting the Competition, 78 A.B.A. J. 101 (Aug. 1992) ("Buying off the most
experienced plaintiff's lawyers clearly deprives the public of top-flight representation.").
198. See American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice § 5-2.2 commentary at 27-29
(1986) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he standard rejects the notion that every member of the bar admitted to practice
in a jurisdiction should be required to provide representation. The practice of
criminal law has become highly specialized in recent years, and only lawyers
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when courts appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants, they
choose only from among lawyers in the jurisdiction ,who are "experienced
and active in trial practice, and familiar with the practice and procedure of
the criminal courts."1 99
The licensing process provides no guarantees, however, that criminal
representation will be undertaken only by qualified attorneys. The attorney
disciplinary process is not adequately designed to eliminate attorneys who
are demonstrably unqualified to perform the legal work they undertake.
Discipline traditionally has been directed at only those attorneys who
engage in the most egregious conduct, such as the commission of a crime or
the theft of a client's funds.200 At one time, because of the self-
protectiveness of the bar, and today because many disciplinary offices are
underfunded and the relevant disciplinary rules are vague, disciplinary
authorities generally decline to proceed against attorneys who perform
incompetently except where they are guilty of the grossest neglect.20' Over
the years, some judges and bar leaders have identified the particular need
to take disciplinary action against trial lawyers who practice ineptly, but
disciplinary authorities have not taken up the charge.20 2 The judiciary bears
particular responsibility for their'failure to do so, not only because the
courts oversee the disciplinary process, but also because trial judges rarely
institute disciplinary proceedings against the attorneys they see in court
experienced in trial practice, with an interest in and knowledge of criminal law andprocedure, can properly be expected to serve as assigned counsel. While it isimperative that assigned counsel possess advocacy skills so that prompt and wisereactions to the exigencies of a trial may be expected, this alone is not deemedsufficient. There must also be familiarity with the practice and procedure of thecriminal courts and knowledge in the art of criminal defense.
See also id. § 4-1.5 commentary at 19-21 (1986):
[L]awyers and judges are unanimous in acknowledging that not every lawyer licensedto practice is actually able to try a case in court effectively. Though only a fraction ofall criminal cases go to trial, the judgment and experience of a trial lawyer are also
essential in the process of negotiation leading to a disposition without trial. But thenature of a trial lawyer's experience in civil trial practice is such as to qualify thelawyer for participation in criminal practice if additional training and experience in
criminal law and procedure is acquired.
199. American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice § 5-2.2 (1986).
200. See Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and ProfessionalRegulation, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 917, 999 ("[Dlisciplinary agencies do not prosecute
and impose sanctions on an attorney unless the case against him meets an extremely high
threshold of lawyer deviance."); see also David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 799, 822-30 (1992) (identifying structural limits that make lawyer disciplinary
processes ineffective).
201. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 200, at 985, 996-99; Conference of Chief JudgesTask Force on Lawyer Competence, Report With Findings and Recommendations to the
Conference of Chief Justices 37-40 (1982) [hereinafter Chief Judges Report] ("[C]asesreported by disciplinary committees as competence investigations almost always involved
incidents of substantial neglect rather than instances of general incompetence.").
202. See, e.g., Dorothy L. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective,1978 Am. B. Found. Res.J. 105, 107 (citing remarks ofJudge Irving R. Kaufman and former
ABA President Chesterfield Smith).
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who appear to be incompetent as trial advocates. 203
Judges have recognized that the licensing process does not ensure that
attorneys are fit to perform the tasks they undertake. 204 Indeed, judges
frequently have complained that even among the minority of licensed
practitioners who serve as trial lawyers, many lack the requisite skill,
knowledge, or character to do so competently. For example, Chief Justice
Burger's observations, made exactly two decades ago, continue to resonate:
Our failure to inquire into advocates' qualifications-as is done,
for example, in separating surgeons from doctors generally-
reveals itself in the mounting concern of those who see the
consequences of inadequate courtroom performance and look for
its causes.
First, and perhaps overriding other causes, is our historic
insistance that we treat every person admitted to the bar as
qualified to give effective assistance on every kind of legal
problem that arises in life, including the trial of criminal cases in
which liberty is at stake .... It requires only a moment's reflection
to see that this assumption is no more justified than one that
postulates that every holder of an M.D. degree is competent to
perform surgery on the infinite range of ailments that afflict the
human animal.
There is no parallel in any area of life's problems having serious
consequence to our naive assumption that every graduate of a law
school is, by virtue of that fact, qualified for the ultimate confron-
tation in a courtroom. 20 5
Other leading jurists have similarly decried the poor quality of trial
advocates. 206
A 1975 survey of 1422 judges indicated that these concerns were
widely shared. Most of the judges who responded to the survey reported
that twenty percent or more of the attorneys who had appeared before
203. See American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report
to the House of Delegates 41 (1991) [hereinafter McKay Report]; Maddi, supra note 202, at
129-30; F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It
Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. Ill. L. Rev. 193; E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges
to Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 Utah L.
Rev. 95. At least in the case of state trial judges who intend to seek reappointment or
reelection, the reluctance to report incompetent lawyers may reflect a self-interested desire to
avoid making enemies of lawyers who might later work against them.
204. See, e.g., Chief Judges Report, supra note 201, at 14-15 (the law school and bar
admissions processes assure that a lawyer has basic knowledge of broad areas of the law, skill
in legal problem identification and legal reasoning, and basic intellectual capacity, but do not
assure, inter alia, specific knowledge in a field of practice or sufficient skills in interviewing,
counseling, drafting, or advocacy).
205. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 227,
230-31 (1973) [hereinafter The Special Skills of Advocacy]. See also Warren E. Burger,
Remarks on Trial Advocacy: A Proposition, 7 Washburn L.J. 15 (1967).
206. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1
(1973); Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 42 U. Cii.
A.B.A. J. 569 (1975).
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them in the previous year were incompetent.20 7 On average, the judges
believed that almost one-eighth of the litigants who appeared before them
were prejudiced by their attorney's incompetence.2 08 Judges cited inade-
quacy of experience or training as a principal reason for the incompetence
of trial lawyers.20 9 Some lawyers considered to be incompetent were found
lacking in fundamental lawyering skills, such as the analytic ability to frame
issues and objectives properly. Others were deemed deficient in litigation
skills in particular; for example, they lacked adequate knowledge of the
rules of evidence and procedure, were unfit to conduct a cross-examination
or argue before a jury, or were inable to handle evidence and present
expert testimony. Others lacked sufficient familiarity with the substantive
law at issue in the case on trial.210 It follows, of course, that if significant
numbers of trial lawyers are unqualified to litigate the cases they take on,
the majority of lawyers, who never try cases, are even more unqualified to
conduct trials.
More recently, a special committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to review the Criminal
Justice Act issued an interim report which found that, because of the
complexity of federal criminal law, even "an experienced state court
criminal defense practitioner" who appears occasionally in a federal court
cannot "be expected to perform competently. 21' The committee criticized
the practice prevalent in some federal districts of requiring every member
of the bar to accept appointments to represent indigent criminal defen-dants, "regardless of whether the lawyer has experience in criminal cases,"
and recommended that appointed counsel "possess at least basic, minimumqualifications," including "minimum levels of experience in criminal de-
fense, as well as specific experience or training in criminal practice in
federal court. 212
On the bench, judges have nevertheless indulged the assumption-
dismissed by ChiefJustice Burger as unjustified and naive-that any lawyer
can try a criminal case competently.2 13 Pressed by the exigencies of
providing representation to indigent criminal defendants, courts often
assign criminal cases to members of the private bar who lack the requisite
207. Maddi, supra note 202, at 116.
208. Id. at 144.
209. Id. at 124. This was the second most frequently cited explanation, the first being lack
of preparation. Id.
210. Id. at 125-28.
211. Criminal Just. Act Review Comm., Interim Report, reprinted in 51 Crim. L. Rep. 2335,
2344 (1992).
212. Id. at 2343-44. The committee further noted that, "because of the wide range ofcomplexity in federal criminal cases, a 'tiering' of the Criminal Justice Act panel is advisable toqualify attorneys for appointment for different levels or types of cases, depending upon their
experience and training." Id. at 2344.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 786 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1986) (court rejectedchallenge to effectiveness of attorney who had practiced law for only one year, had never tried
a criminal case, and was unfamiliar with local court rules and rules of evidence, noting: "[a]nattorney can render effective assistance even if he has no prior experience in criminal
advocacy").
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training and experience in trying criminal cases. 214 By way of example, in
Stern v. County Court,215 a county courtjudge in a rural Colorado county was
forced to appoint a private attorney to represent an indigent defendant on
felony assault charges when it turned out that the state public defender's
office had a conflict of interest that precluded its participation in the case.
The judge selected a local lawyer who had not represented a criminal
defendant in eleven years and had not kept up with criminal law during
that period. When the lawyer sought to withdraw from the representation
because he was confessedly unqualified to defend the accused,216 the trial
court denied the motion and the appellate court agreed with its decision,
finding that the lawyer had not met his "burden of showing he is
incompetent" 217-a burden premised on the assumption, known by judges
to be unrealistic, that licensed practitioners are almost invariably qualified
to defend criminal cases.
The bottom line is that attorneys are far less qualified to be "counsel"
today than they were two hundred or more years ago, notwithstanding the
self-congratulatory claims of the organized bar that today's attorneys are far
better prepared for the practice of law than were attorneys at earlier stages
in this country's history. While it is true that far more training is required
of attorneys today, and examinations for the bar are far more rigorous than
they once were, educational demands have not kept pace with the increas-
ing complexity of law practice. Although licensing standards were not
rigorous in the colonial and post-revolutionary periods, the level of skill
required of practitioners was roughly commensurate with the complexity of
law practice: in the colonies in the seventeenth century, 218 and in the
western frontier in the early eighteenth century,219 licensing standards
were low,220 but the law was not well developed and courtroom procedures
214. See, e.g., Indigent System is Voided, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 3 (New Orleans judge
struck down system for compensating appointed lawyers in criminal cases, and, finding that
public defenders were overworked, ordered the appointment of private attorneys to represent
defendants in lesser felony and misdemeanor cases).
215. 773 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1989).
216. Although a court might ordinarily be skeptical of a lawyer's profession of incompe-
tence in such a context, seeing it as a pretext to avoid taking an assignment for little or no
compensation, Stem's past willingness to represent civil litigants on assignment from the court
strongly suggested that, in this case, the protestation was sincere. See id. at 1079 n.3.
217. Id. at 1079. The court gave no clue about what more, beyond Stem's eleven-year
hiatus from criminal defense representation, was needed to meet this burden.
For additional cases rejecting an attorney's claimed inability to represent criminal defen-
dants, see DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) and Wood v. Superior
Court, 690 P.2d 1225 (Alaska 1984), both of which are discussed in Stern, 773 P.2d at 1079-80.
218. Becausejudges in early colonial courts were not lawyers, "[t]he law itself was extremely
flexible and amateurish" and judicial proceedings were informal. Therefore, knowledge of the
law was unnecessary; it would in any event have been virtually impossible to come by, since law
books and published decisions were not yet available. 1 Chroust, supra note 12, at 25-26.
219. See 2 Chroust, supra note 12, at 107-08 (discussing the practice of frontier lawyers).
220. In some respects, early bar admission practices, although superficially less rigorous,
may have been more demanding than contemporary practices. Applicants for the bar in 1791
were members of a small society, and judges and others who considered their applications for
admission to the bar would have had easy access to information about their abilities and
character. Moreover, unlike today, the judges who determined admission to the bar had an
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were informal, therefore little was needed by way of training and experi-
ence to provide competent representation. Moreover, lawyers almost by
definition were courtroom advocates; in examining candidates for the bar
to determine their fitness to be attorneys, the precise question for the court
was whether they were qualified to serve as trial lawyers. 221 Therefore,
licensing requirements were specifically tailored to the lawyer's role as trial
lawyer. For these reasons, it might have been reasonable to assume at one
time that a duly licensed attorney was qualified to provide any manner of
legal service, including the defense of a criminal accused. Today, that is
demonstrably untrue.
IV. WHY THE FICTION is LETHAL: THE IMPACT OF UNQUALIFIED
ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES
Defining "counsel" to include all duly licensed lawyers has dire
consequences in death penalty cases for three reasons. First, capital
defendants in many jurisdictions have limited access to qualified attorneys.
Second, an inadequate defense rendered by an unqualified attorney is
particularly likely to influence the outcome of a death penalty case. Finally,
many condemned defendants have no appellate remedy in cases in which
the imposition of the death sentence was attributable to the poor quality of
the defense.
A. The Unavailability of Qualified Lawyers
Most capital defendants are indigent and therefore rely on assigned
counsel to represent them.222 In some jurisdictions, courts assign attorneys
who have expertise in capital representation. For example, Virginia, 223
Ohio, 224 and Oklahoma225 have established programs for assigning quali-
opportunity to meet the candidates face-to-face, to test them orally, and to form their own
judgment about their qualifications.
221. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
222. See Gary Hengstler, Attorneys for the Damned, 73 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (Jan. 1987)
(according to D.C. Circuit Judge AbnerJ. Mikva, 99.5% of the 1800 prisoners on death row
are indigent).
223. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.7 (Michie 1992) requires the appointment from a list
established by the Public Defender Commmission. The Commission is authorized to establish
standards that "take into consideration" criteria which include licensure in Virginia, back-
ground in criminal litigation, experience in felony practice and death penalty litigation,
familiarity with the court system, current training in capital litigation, and "proficiency and
commitment to quality representation." Id. § 19.2-163.8(A).
224. Ohio has extensive regulations that govern the training of capital defense attorneys.
Court rules mandate that at least two attorneys be appointed to represent an indigent capital
defendant, one of whom maintains an Ohio office and has "experience in Ohio criminal trial
practice." Ohio C.P. Sup. Rule 65(I)(A)(1) (Baldwin 1991). Lead counsel must: (1) be admitted
to the Ohio bar or allowed to practice pro hac vice; (2) have a minimum of three years civil or
criminal trial experience; (3) have specialized capital defense training, as defined by regula-
tions; (4) have experience as lead counsel in at least one capital jury trial or co-counsel in at
least two capital trials; and (5) have several experiences in a variety of delineated murder
and/or violent felony trials. Ohio C.P. Sup. Rule 65 (I)(A)(2). Co-counsel must meet similar
standards. Ohio C.P. Sup. Rule 65 (I)(A)(3). To enter the approved counsel list, an attorney
must have at least twelve hours of specialized training every two years. Rules of Superinten-
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fled lawyers to capital defendants. 226 In contrast, Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, five of the southern states in which the
death penalty is imposed most frequently, have no statewide system for
providing representation to indigent defendants generally, much less to
indigent defendants facing the death penalty.227 In most of the counties in
those states, indigent defendants are assigned attorneys from the private
bar.228 The assigned attorney may be completely unfamiliar with criminal,
much less capital, representation.229
dence for Courts of Common Pleas, Appendix of Ohio Death Penalty Indigent Defense
Regulations, Reg. II (Baldwin 1991). Specialized training seminars must include at least six
hours of instruction in investigation, preparation and presentation of the trial or appeal. Id.
at Reg. IA (Baldwin 1991).
225. Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1355.10 (1991) establishes a Capital Litigation Division to act as
lead counsel unless it contracts with county defender programs; the trial court may also
appoint local attorneys from a list of attorneys who volunteer and meet qualifications of the
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Board. An Oklahoma House Bill advocates that defend-
ers be licensed to practice within the state, have criminal defense experience, and be licensed
for at least four years before appointment. 1991 Okla. ALS 1612 § 1355.11(F); 1991 Okla. HB
1612.
226. Georgia has been reviewing its provisions which allow counties to determine the
indigent defense delivery system, as provided in Ga. Code Ann. § 17-12-4 (1991)(counties
determine mechanism of indigent defense system, after which court rules can require
assignment on "equitable basis through a systematic, coordinated defender plan" or arrange
for a nonprofit legal aid agency to provide defense). A Senate Bill would establish a
multicounty public defender for capital cases, who "must have been licensed to practice law"
in Georgia for at least five years and "must be competent to counsel and defend a person
charged with a capital felony." 1992 Ga. ALS 1143 § 17-12-95, 1992 Ga. Laws 1143, 1992 Ga.
Act 1143, 1992 Ga. SB 545.
227. Bright, supra note 9 at 689 n.51.
228. Id. (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Defense for the
Poor, 1986 at 3 (1988)).
229. Some states impose no limits whatsoever on whom may be assigned. See, e.g., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 925.035 (West Supp. 1991) (court appoints public defender; if conflict of interest,
court appoints one or two members of bar); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04 (West
1992) (court appoints one or more "practicing attorneys"). Other states have provisions
requiring appointed lawyers to have experience defending criminal cases, although not
necessarily any familiarity with capital representation. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-5-54 (1991)
(counsel must have minimum five years "active" criminal law experience); La. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 512 (West Supp. 1990) (counsel must have been admitted to the bar for five
years); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (court appoints two attorneys, one of
whom must have five years experience as a licensed attorney and at least three years in actual
trial of felonies; only one attorney may be from the Public Defenders' staff). Moreover, the
level of prior experience in the defense of criminal cases required by these statutes is fairly
slight, as illustrated by the decision in Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d 1072, 1100-03 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991). In that case, the trial court appointed two lawyers to represent the capital
defendant, and both sought unsuccessfully to be relieved because they had inadequate
experience in defending criminal cases and considered themselves incompetent to defend the
accused. On appeal, the court found that E. Thomas Heflin, one of the two lawyers, had
satisfied that statutory requirement of "no less than five years' prior experience in the active
practice of criminal law," even though he was principally engaged in civil practice. As evidence
of Heflin's "active practice of criminal law," the court pointed to evidence that he had tried a
murder case several years prior to his appointment, and that in the seven prior years, he had
also "handled" three other felony cases and around a dozen misdemeanor cases, none of
which, as far as the trial courts' findings reflected, went to trial.
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In the states where assigned lawyers do not necessarily specialize in the
defense of criminal cases, the assignment of unqualified attorneys appears,
by virtually all accounts, to be a common occurrence. Although judicial
decisions in capital cases only occasionally allude to the inexperience or
inexpertise of trial counsel, 23 0 it is often plain from a reviewing court's
description of trial counsel's conduct that the attorney came to the case
almost completely unfamiliar with trial advocacy, with criminal defense
generally, or with the death penalty law and procedure in particular.23 1
Moreover, there is considerable anecdotal information about the inexperi-
ence of trial lawyers in many capital cases23 2 as well as their lack of
230. See, e.g., Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 1991) (defense lawyer,
a county public defender, had been a member of the bar for less than a year and had never
before handled a capital murder trial); Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (defense lawyer had been admitted to the bar for only eight weeks and had never
handled a serious criminal trial); King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1464 (11th Cir. 1984)
(discussed at length in Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering
in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 245,248-49 (1990-91)), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1016 (1985); House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 611-13 (11th Cir.) (retained local counsel had
never represented a capital defendant and had never read the state statute governing capital
cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Johnson v. Kemp, 615 F. Supp. 355, 361 (S.D. Ga.
1985), affd, 781 F.2d 1482 (1lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying
text (citing cases).
For the most part, courts make no mention of the trial lawyer's qualifications. It is easy to
understand why. Trial counsel's background would rarely be reflected in the trial record.
Subsequent attorneys challenging the quality of the trial representation in postconviction
proceedings do not generally develop a record of trial counsel's inexperience. And courts
issuing opinions in capital cases, insofar as they are aware of the inadequacy of trial counsel's
qualifications, often have no reason to make a point of it.
231. See ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 53-55, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev.
at 66-68; Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1480 (4th Cir. 1991) (defense counsel failed
to object to jury instruction because he was "conceded[ly] ignorant of" the relevant Supreme
Court decision); Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 797-99 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (attorney did not
present mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage of the capital case because he was not
familiar with the death penalty statute); see also infra note 284 and accompanying text (citing
cases).
232. For example, Ronald Tabak recounts the case of John Eldon Smith, whose trial
attorney, a utilities lawyer, failed to challenge the composition of the jury pool. A challenge to
the identical pool was raised by counsel for Smith's wife, Machetti, who was a co-defendant in
the case. Both were convicted and sentenced to death. Machetti's claim was eventually upheld
on appeal and she won a life sentence on retrial. The appeals court refused to consider Smith's
claim on appeal, because it had not been preserved at trial, and he was subsequently executed.
Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 840-41 (1986) (citing Smith
v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983), and Machetti v.
Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983)).
Stephen Bright tells the story of a lawyer for two capital defendants who, when later asked
to name any criminal law decisions from any court, could name only two cases, Miranda and
Dred Scott, the latter of which is not in fact a criminal case. Bright, supra note 9, at 689; see also
ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 55-56, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 68-69;
Bright, supra note 9, at 680 n.4 (citing State v. Leatherwood, No. DP-70 (Miss. 1986), a capital
case in which half of the cross-examinations of the prosecution witnesses were conducted by
a third-year law student); Fatal Defenses; Fatal Flaws, Lawyer's Sentence: A Client, Nat'l L.J.,
June 11, 1990, at 44 (defense lawyer in'State v. Wille, 87-KA-1309, had previously been
convicted of submitting a false statement to a government agency and had received a
suspended sentence; in fulfillment of his obligation to perform community service as part of
the sentence, he was assigned to represent Wille in a capital trial, although he had no
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adherence to professional values. 233 The view that lawyers for capital
defendants are typically unfit has been expressed often by knowledgeable
judges234 as well as by academics and practitioners who specialize in
death-penalty litigation. 235
Two principal factors make it likely that lawyers appointed from the
private bar will be unfit to represent capital defendants. The first is the
inadequacy of provisions for compensating lawyers in death penalty
cases.236 Since the vast majority of capital defendants are impecunious,
lawyers have no financial incentive to develop expertise in death penalty
litigation in order to attract paying clients. The paltry compensation
provided to lawyers who are appointed to defend capital cases in many
states likewise discourages members of the private bar from developing an
expertise in death penalty litigation and seeking out assignments. In many
states, the hourly rate for defending criminal cases is exceedingly low to
begin with, and many also limit the number of hours that will be
reimbursed. 237 Since a competent defense of a capital case demands
experience in trying criminal cases); Miriam Rozen, The Right to a Probate Lawyer, Am. Law.,
Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 79 (in Louisiana, private attorneys, some of whom lack experience in
criminal defense representation, are regularly appointed to represent indigent criminal
defendants in cases, including capital cases, that public defenders cannot handle because of
conflicts of interest or overloaded dockets); Sherill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 80, 100.
233. One study revealed that in the five southern states listed above, defense attorneys in
death penalty cases were far more likely to be disciplined or disbarred than other lawyers: Nat'l
L.J., June 11, 1990, at 44; see also RonaldJ. Tabak &J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice:
A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 59, 74 & n.92
(1989).
234. The late Judge Alvin Rubin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
quoted in 1990 as observing that most lawyers in capital cases were of the kind "who passes the
bar but barely can pass muster." Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just
a Nominal Right?, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 42.
235. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 230, at 249 ("Approximately 90% of capital defendants are
poor, and the poor all too frequently are represented by the incompetent or inexperienced.
Amazingly, one-quarter of Kentucky's death row inmates had trial attorneys who have since
been disbarred or resigned rather than face disbarment!") (emphasis in original). Bright, supra
note 9, at 689 ("Many capital cases are defended by small town lawyers who do not specialize
in criminal law, much less the subspecialty of capital punishment law."); Stephen B. Bright, In
Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged
Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 849, 857-62 (1992).
236. See ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 62, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 77
("It is thus practically impossible to interest recent law school graduates in this area of law,
because it is almost impossible to make a living practicing capital cases.").
237. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-12-21(d)(1975 & Supp. 1991) ($1000 felony case; $1000
capital case, out-of-court hours); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108(b) (Michie 1992) (capital
counsel paid according to experience, time, and effort, to a maximum of $1000); Fla. Stat.
Ann. ch. 925.035 (Harrision 1991) (public defender paid reasonable expenses plus a
maximum of $3500 for capital case); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 113-3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1991) (maximum $1250 for any felony case, except in "extraordinary ... protracted" case); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.070(1) (Michie/Bobbs- Merrill 1990) ($1000 maximum in all cases); Nev.
Rev, Stat. § 7.125(2) (1991) ($12,000 maximum for appointed capital counsel who is not
public defender); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-8(B) (Michie 1978) ($400 felony for work at the
district court level); N.Y. County Law § 722-b (McKinney 1992) (inactive provision provides
for crime punishable by death, where one attorney assigned, maximum of $2400; where two
or more counsel assigned, $3,200); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1355.13(A) (West 1991) ($20,000
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considerable investigation and preparation, lawyers assigned to defend
such cases face the prospect of expending many hours for little pay.238 As
a result, this has become work that few lawyers voluntarily undertake and
that many seek to avoid.239
maximum in capital cases); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1990 (maximum %750 in
capital case; public defender paid same hourly rate of $10 per hour out of court, $15 per hour
for in-court time); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-207 (1991) (maximum $1000 to any trial
attorney except public defender); see also In re Berger, 111 S. Ct. 628 (1991) (appointed
counsel in capital case in the Supreme Court may receive no more than $5000, an amount
sufficient "to induce capable counsel to represent capital defendants in this Court").
Not surprisingly, commentators have harshly criticized fee-cap provisions. See Anthony
Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid
Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 281 (1991); Albert L. Vreeland, Note,
The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 626 (1991). Perhaps more surprisingly, some
courts have found fee cap provisions so financially burdensome that they violate the
constitutional rights of the attorneys who are required to accept assignments in criminal cases.
See, e.g., DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); Arnold v. Kemp, 813
S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986); State exrel.
Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
To put in perspective the unreasonableness of compensation provided to assigned lawyers
in capital cases, one need only compare the statutory fees that have been awarded as"reasonable" under the federal Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 593(f) (1988), in white
collar cases that do not even involve trials. That Act provides for the payment of "reasonable
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses" incurred by a federal employee who successfully
defends against charges relating to his public employment or duties. Pursuant to the Act,
former Attorney General Edwin Meese was reimbursed $460,509 out of a claimed $575,598
for expenses in connection with defending against an investigation by a court-appointed
Independent Counsel that never resulted in criminal charges. In re Edwin Meese, III, 907 F.2d
1192 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (former Assistant
Attorney General reimbursed $861,589 in attorneys' fees incurred in defending against filing
of criminal charges). See generally Joel Cohen, Can a Criminal Defendant or Subject Recover
the Costs of a Successful Defense?, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 14, 1992, at 1.
238. Counties commonly pay attorneys $20-$30 per hour for preparation time and $30-$50
per hour for court appearances in capital cases. Robert L. Spangenberg, U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
National Criminal Defense Systems Study: Final Report 19 (1986). Most fee cap provisions
impose a maximum allowance of $500 to $1000 in capital cases. See supra note 237. Hence,
after 50 hours, most appointed attorneys would be working for free; overhead and additional
expenses result in an economic loss for appointed counsel. The enormous task of defending
a capital client can cost, according to one estimate, $106,350. New York State Defenders Ass'n,
Capital Losses: The Price of the Death Penalty for New York State 18 & n.48 (1982).
Stephen Bright recounts the experience of two attorneys representing a capital defendant
in Mississippi who received the maximum of $1000, resulting in payment of $2.98 and $2.56
per hour respectively; upon factoring in overhead expenses, they lost more than $20 per hour
defending the case. Bright, supra note 9, at 680 n.3 (citing Brief for Appellant at 11-12, State
v. Wilson, Nos. 89- 301, 89-302 (Miss. 1989)).
239. Tabak, supra note 232, at 801-02 (quoting Walker, State's Law Fees Said to Create
"Disaster" in Legal Help to Poor, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 29, 1985, at 1A (Former
Virginia State Bar president noted that capital defense lawyers are paid, in effect, only $1 per
hour in some cases; as a result, '"asking [an attorney] to take a court-appointed case, especially
a capital murder case, is asking [an attorney] to take an economic bath and lawyers are
beginning to say no."')).
Guidelines developed by the U.S. Judicial Conference to assist federal courts in interpreting
and applying provisions of the Criminal Justice Act regarding the appointment and compen-
sation of lawyers in death penalty proceedings recognize both that licensed practitioners are
not invariably qualified to defend capital cases and that adequate compensation is necessary to
secure qualified counsel. See 7 Guidelines for Administration of Criminal Justice Act § 6.02(A)
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In addition, lawyers are discouraged from specializing in the defense
of capital cases because of the community antipathy which generally
surrounds these cases. Lawyers understandably fear that they, as well as
their client, will become the object of local outrage. 240 This not only adds to
the emotional toll of representing an individual whose life is at stake,241 but
it also exacts a financial toll for a lawyer who must enjoy a positive
reputation in the community to succeed in private practice. Concern for
their community standing is thus another factor leading attorneys to resist
assignments of capital cases. 242
Recognizing that the representation of capital defendants involves
unusual financial and emotional burdens, courts are reluctant to impose
repeatedly on the few local attorneys who specialize in defending criminal
cases. 243 The result is that no private lawyer with experience in defense
representation will gain expertise in death penalty cases either of his own
initiative or through recurrent assignments. Rather, lawyers assigned from
the private bar will typically have no experience in capital representation,
and often will be inexperienced in defending any kind of criminal case.
(1990) (counsel "shall be compensated at a rate and in an amount determined exclusively by
the presiding judicial officer to be reasonably necessary to represent the [capital] defendant,
without regard to CJA hourly rates or compensation maximums" that apply in noncapital
cases), quoted in In re Berger, 111 S. Ct. 628 (1991).
240. See ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 49-50, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev.
at 63; Berger, supra note 230, at 249; Tabak, supra note 9, at 407; "You Don't Have to Be a
Bleeding Heart," Representing Death Row: A Dialogue Between Judge Abner J. Mikva and
Judge John C. Godbold, 14 Hum. Rts. Q., Winter 1987, at 22, 24.
One would not ordinarily expect the impact of community outrage to be reflected in the trial
or appellate record in a capital case, but surprisingly, it often is manifest. See Bright, supra note
9, at 692-93 & n.67 (citing cases). For example, in Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.
1991), the defense lawyer's closing argument was designed to distance the lawyer from an
unpopular client:
Mr. Wallace explained that he and his co-counsel were appointed counsel; that they
were local lawyers and not "bleeding heart, anti-death penalty lawyers"; that the
reason they were representing Horton was because it was their "civic duty"; and they
stated that they "have to deal with [the prosecutors] every day. It's important for me
to stay in good with them. [I feel] there is a lot of peer pressure on me [but] nobody
has tried to pressure me."
Id. at 1462-63.
241. See Vivian Berger, Born Again Death, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1308 (1987) (reviewing
Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Eighties: An Examination of the Modem System of
Capital Punishment (1987)) ("Capital defense probably would constitute one of the hardest,
most draining roles a lawyer could assume even if the job commanded more pay-and respect,
not antagonism, from the community.").
242. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1494-95, 1503, 1522 (1Ith Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
243. See, e.g., Affidavit of William F. Coleman, Senior Circuit Judge, Seventh Circuit Court,
District of Mississippi (Nov. 30, 1988), reprinted in ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at
62, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 75; see also John C. Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of
Death Sentenced Inmates, 42 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 859, 866
(1987).
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B. The Impact of Unqualified Lawyers in Capital Cases
The precise impact of unqualified lawyers in capital cases cannot be
measured. Knowledgeable observers have often asserted, however, that
many death-row prisoners would not have been sentenced to death if they
had been represented by qualified trial lawyers. 244 There are two obvious
reasons why this should be so. First, unqualified trial lawyers ordinarily
provide poorer representation than qualified trial lawyers. Second, the
outcome of capital cases frequently turns on the quality of the defense.
The first reason-that unqualified trial lawyers ordinarily provide
substandard representation-seems true almost by definition. 245 To be
sure, just as some qualified lawyers may occasionally perform inadequately,
some unqualified lawyers may occasionally stumble onto an effective
defense. For example, a decision not to call witnesses, although a product
of the lawyer's inept investigation or lack of trial experience, will sometimes
prove to be precisely the decision that a qualified lawyer would have made
after locating and interviewing prospective witnesses and reviewing avail-
able options-but not often.246 One can ordinarily expect a strong corre-
lation between the lawyer's qualifications and trial performance.
Unqualified lawyers are particularly likely to perform poorly in capital
cases, which are procedurally more complex than other criminal trials. 247
Legal standards that are uniquely applicable to capital cases have been
developed with respect to different phases of the determination of guilt,
244. See, e.g., Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring)("accused persons who are represented by 'not legally-ineffective' lawyers miy be condemned
to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the
clemency of a life sentence"); ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 51-52, reprinted in 40
Am. U. L. Rev. at 65; Bright, supra note 9, at 680; Tabak, supra note 232, at 810.
245. Cf. Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Committee to Consider Standards
of Admission to Practice in the Federal.Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
79 F.R.D. 187, 196-98 (1978) ("survey data shows that lawyers without previous trial
experience are much more likely to turn in inadequate performances").
246. In capital cases, for example, it is not uncommon for unqualified lawyers to fail to
present evidence in mitigation of the defendant's sentence. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 176,
at 2 ("The federal reports are filled with stories of counsel who presented no evidence in
mitigation of their client's sentences because they did not know what to offer or how to offer
it, or had not read the state's sentencing statute.") (emphasis in original). Commentators
recognize that this omission is rarely sound as a matter of strategy. See, e.g., Dennis N. Balske,
New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 Akron L. Rev. 331, 361 (1979);
Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 10 ("Reviewing courts should assume that a reasonably
competent attorney could develop and present a meaningful mitigating case for any capital
defendant."); Roy B. Herron, Defending Life in Tennessee Death Penalty Cases, 51 Tenn. L.
Rev. 681 (1984). In rare cases, however, presenting no evidence may be sound strategy. See
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (introduction of mitigating evidence would have
opened the door to the state's introduction of damaging rebuttal evidence). Unqualified
attorneys who happen to be assigned to represent capital defendants in such cases may
therefore provide competent representation at the sentencing proceeding in spite of them-
selves.
247. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; Vreeland, supra note 237, at 645-50
(discussing the requisites of an effective capital defense); see e.g., Armstrong v. Dugger, 833
F.2d 1430, 1433 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (trial lawyer testified in evidentiary hearing that his negligible
preparation for the penalty phase of the trial was attributable to his "inexperience coupled
with the fact that it was a new procedure").
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from jury selection 248 to the judge's instructions on the law.249 Lawyers who
are unfamiliar with these standards cannot effectively seek redress when
the court or the prosecutor departs from them.250
Moreover, in a series of decisions in the 1970s, the Supreme Court
required trials in capital cases to include a penalty phase at which the
defendant has the right to present mitigating evidence and the jury
determines whether to impose or recommend the death sentence in
accordance with statutory guidelines. 251 A defense lawyer must be familiar
with legal standards, such as those governing the admissibility of evidence
and the propriety of prosecution arguments, that are uniquely applicable to
the penalty phase of a capital case.252 Moreover, as Professor Goodpaster
explained in an article a decade ago, the special procedures in capital cases
248. Most recently, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel is constitutionally entitled
to inquire into whether prospective jurors would automatically impose the death sentence
without regard to mitigating circumstances. See Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). In
earlier cases, the Court has held that prospective jurors may not be excluded from the jury
because they voice general objections to the death penalty or express conscientious or religious
scruples against its infliction, see, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), while also issuing decisions
limiting the impact of this rule. See, e.g., Roass v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
249. For example, a capital defendant is constitutionally entitled to an instruction with
respect to lesser included offenses that are supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Schad v.
Arizona, 111 $. Ct. 2491 (1991); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980). See generaUy Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal
Procedure 1160-67 (4th ed. 1992).
250. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (federal court's consideration of
constitutional challenge to jury instruction at sentencing stage of a capital case was foreclosed
by defense counsel's failure to object to the instruction at trial).
251. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (state death penalty statute unconstitutionally
restricted defendant's ability to introduce evidence of mitigating factors); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (statute mandating death sentence for first degree murder
violated the Eighth Amendment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding state death
penalty statutes providing for bifurcated trials in capital cases and setting standards governing
the jury's decision in the sentencing phase); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (same); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam) (death penalty statutes giving jurors standardless discretion to decide whether to
impose the death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment). For commentary on these
decisions, see Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Margaret J.
Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1143 (1980); MargaretJ. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989 (1978).
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has adhered to the requirement of a penalty phase
in death penalty cases at which jurors must consider all mitigating circumstances before
imposing the death sentence. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (states
may not require mitigating factors to be found unanimously); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987) (jury improperly barred from considering nonstatutory mitigating circumstances);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (defendant unconstitutionally denied right to
present mitigating evidence to the effect that he had adjusted well in jail between the time of
his arrest and trial). But see Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (upholding instruction
that the jury "shall impose a sentence of death" if aggravating circumstances outweighed
mitigating circumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding state
statute requiring jury to impose death sentence if it finds at least one statutory aggravating
factor and no mitigating circumstances).
252. See Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties 97-134 (1991).
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impose unique responsibilities on defense lawyers which include conduct-
ing an investigation prior to trial to uncover information that may be
presented in mitigation of the sentence, 25 attempting to select jurors who
are least likely to impose a death sentence,254 and conducting the defense
during the guilt phase of the trial in light of its potential impact on the
jury's sentencing decision.255
Most importantly, the defense lawyer's role at the sentencing proceed-
ing calls for an unusual exercise ofjudgment in attempting to persuade the
jury that the defendant should not be put to death.256 Counsel is relatively
unconstrained in this task, and may attempt to portray the defendant's
positive qualities, to demonstrate unusual circumstances in the defendant's
background that make the heinous conduct understandable, or simply to
make the jury see the defendant as a human being.257 The attorney may
attempt to capitalize on lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt or seek
to persuade the jury that a death sentence is not appropriate for the type of
murder the defendant committed. 258 The defense attorney is thus pre-
sented with a wide range of options about what evidence and arguments to
present in mitigation of the sentence and how to present them. Represen-
tation at the sentencing hearing varies so greatly from the ordinary work of
lawyers, including criminal defense lawyers, and draws on such a variety of
skills and knowledge, that it would take incredible dumb luck for an
ill-trained attorney to happen upon a competent approach.
253. Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 317,321; accord Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the
Eighties: An Examination of the Modem System of Capital Punishment 54 (1987):
Unfortunately, many attorneys who represent capital defendants do not understand
the significance of the penalty trial. The typical defense attorney has had little or no
prior experience in dealing with capital cases and does not understand that there is
a vast difference between representing a defendant in an ordinary criminal trial and
representing a capital defendant in the penalty trial. As a result, many of these
attorneys do not even begin to prepare for the penalty trial until after their client has
been adjudicated guilty of a capital crime-and as David Stebbins has said, "By then,
it's too late."
See also Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1991) ("To save the difficult
and time-consuming task of assembling mitigation witnesses until after the jury's verdict in the
guilt phase almost assures that witnesses will not be available."); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523,
533 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985).
254. Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 325-28.
255. Id. at 328-34. For example, if the defense during the guilt phase is predicated on the
defendant's denial of culpability (as opposed to simply putting the prosecution to its proof or
admitting guilt but arguing lack of intent or relying on an affirmative defense), the jury at
sentencing will be unlikely to credit any "admission of guilt or evidence of extenuating
circumstances, remorse or rehabilitation." Id. at 330.
256. Id. at 334-39. In Florida, where the trial judge may override ajury's recommendation
and impose the death sentence, see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), broad discretion
is provided to the judge in his role as sentencer as well as to the jury in its advisory role.,
257. See Balske, supra note 246, at 357-58; Alan W. Clarke, Virginia's Capital Murder
Sentencing Proceeding: A Defense Perspective, 18 U. Rich. L. Rev. 341 (1984); Goodpaster,
supra note 9, at 334-39.
258. One study suggested that these are the most important factors influencing juries in
deciding whether to impose the death sentence. See William S. Geimer & Jonathon Amster-
dam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases,
15 Am.J. Crim. L. 1, 28, 47 (1988).
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Of course, the poor quality of representation does not invariably affect
the outcome of a capital case. There are undoubtedly cases in which,
because of the heinousness of the crime or the depravity of the defendant,
the jury will impose the death penalty no matter how persuasively the
defense lawyer presents the case for mercy. And there are other cases in
which the jury will decline to impose a death sentence no matter how poorly
defense counsel performs. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that
the quality of defense representation is an important factor in many
cases. 259 Moreover, given the unique characteristics of the capital sentenc-
ing process, the outcome is likely to turn on the quality of defense
representation.
The quality of defense representation may have an impact in some
capital cases, as in all types of criminal cases, upon the jury's decision on
whether there is a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt.260 The jury
will generally be unaware of exculpatory evidence unless defense counsel
learns of it from the client, during investigation, or by way of discovery, and
brings it to the jury's attention effectively through the testimony of defense
witnesses or through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. 26'
Through witness examinations and through -arguments to the jury, defense
counsel may raise doubts about the defendant's guilt that jurors might not
otherwise perceive. Furthermore, the extent to which the jury is receptive
to the defense may turn, in part, on the success of the defense attorney in
the process of selecting the jury.
Nevertheless, in guilt or innocence, the quality of defense represen-
tation is likely to make a difference only in a limited number of marginal
cases. In many if not most capital cases, the prosecution's proof will be so
overwhelming that a competent defense will not result in an acquittal. On
rare occasion, the prosecution's case may be so weak that even without the
benefit of competent representation, a defendant will secure an acquittal.
The quality of representation will affect the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence only in cases in between those two extremes.262
What makes the quality of the defense uniquely important in capital
cases, however, is the sentencing process and the role of jurors in that
process. In deciding whether to impose or recommend a sentence of death,
the jury is generally instructed to determine whether one or more aggra-
vating circumstances was present at the time of the crime and, if so,
259. ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 64; Richard J. Wilson, Empty Handed
Justice, 22 Judges J. 20, 22 (1983) (One Texas "study found that three-quarters of those
convicted of capital murder with court-appointed lawyers were sentenced to death, while only
about one-third of those represented by private attorneys received the ttimate penalty."); see
also Kamisar, supra note 24, at 365.
260. In some cases, the jury will be called on to decide other issues as well, such as whether
or not the defendant has established an affirmative defense.
261. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.) (no grounds for relief when new
evidence of innocence is discovered after trial), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
262. See, e.g., Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1479 (4th Cir. 1991) (despite the
strength of the prosecution's proof "there [were] in it enough possibilities for fair and rational
doubt" that directly exculpatory forensic evidence available to the defense but not introduced"probably would have generated enough of real doubt to prevent a finding of guilt.").
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whether one or more mitigating circumstances are present that outweigh
the aggravating factors. While the court's instructions constrict the jury's
discretion to impose the death sentence, they generally allow jurors wide, if
not unconstrained, discretion to spare the defendant.263 Moreover, what
little is known about how juries actually make their decisions in capital cases
suggests that in practice jurors decide whether to impose the death
sentence almost wholly on the basis of their own criteria, in part because of
their inability to understand the court's instructions.264
The quality of defense representation is likely to matter in the
sentencing stage of the vast majority of capital cases. Because of the breadth
of the jury's discretion and the subjectivity of its decision, the imposition of
a death sentence will rarely, if ever, be a foregone conclusion.26 5 Moreover,
the quality of defense representation plays a critical role because of the vast
range of information relevant to the sentencing decision that the jury can
learn only through defense counsel's efforts and because of the jury's
susceptibility to persuasive argument. Thus, in capital cases, more than any
other class of criminal cases, the quality of representation will make a
difference-and the difference will be between life or death for the
accused.266
C. The Inadequate Remedy for Inadequate Representation
When the jury's decision to impose the death sentence is attributable
to inadequate representation by an unqualified lawyer, the defendant often
has no recourse under the law. Any claim for relief must be premised on the
right to effective assistance of counsel as interpreted by the Supreme Court
263. Among other things, the Court has held that a state may not require that mitigatingcircumstances be found unanimously. Thus, the defense need only persuade a single juror of
the existence of a mitigating circumstance that makes a death sentence unwarranted. See
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990). Next term, however, the Court will review
Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2937
(1992), a decision upholding a statutory sentencing scheme for capital cases which consider-
ably constricts the jury's discretion to consider possible mitigating circumstances.
264. See Free v. McGinniss, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10321 (N.D. II. July 7, 1992) (finding,based on studies of Professor Hans Zeisel and other experts, that jury instructions in Illinois
capital case were not "intelligible and definite enough to provide even a majority of jurors
hearing them with a clear understanding of how they are to go about deciding whether the
defendant lives or dies"); Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the
Capital Penalty Phase: Legal Assumptions, Empirical Findings and a Research Agenda, 16Law & Hum. Behav. 185, 188-89 (1992); Jonathon R. Sorenson & James W. Marquart,
Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev.
L. & Soc. Change 743, 775 (1990-91).
265. "Improbable as it may seem to people unexposed to death litigation, even perpetrators
of appalling crimes may evoke sympathy from twelve not unduly sentimental jurors if a well-
prepared defense team can 'present the defendant in a way that will provoke the jury's
understanding and empathy'. .. and, at the same time help them to 'understand why the
defendant's deviant behavior occurred."' Vivian Berger, Born Again Death, 87 Colum. L. Rev.1301, 1308-09 (1987) (quoting Welsh S. White, supra note 253, at 54, 57).
266. Cf Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An
Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 113, 129 (1987) (simulated
study demonstrated that choice of defense strategy influenced jury's decision whether to
impose the death penalty).
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in its 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington.267 In Strickland, which
rebuffed a condemned prisoner's claim that he had been deprived of
competent representation at the sentencing stage of a capital murder
proceeding, the Court adopted a test with two components: a convicted
defendant must show, first, "that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness '268 and, second, "that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. '269
The Strickland standard does not entitle the defendant to a qualified
attorney.27 0 The Strickland standard calls for an ex post inquiry into the
lawyer's conduct and its influence on the outcome of a criminal proceeding,
not an ex ante inquiry into the lawyer's capacity to provide an adequate
defense. At most, the inadequacy of a defense attorney's skill or knowledge
may be relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of his conduct.271 For a
variety of reasons, a death row prisoner who suffered at the hands of an
unqualified advocate often will be unable to satisfy the Strickland
standard. 27 2
To begin with, Strickland instructs that the "reasonableness" of a
defense lawyer's representation will be governed by "prevailing profes-
sional norms. '2 73 If the quality of representation prevailing in a community
is poor, then the expectations set by the Strickland standard will be
correspondingly low.2 74 The Court's invocation of a standard that fluctu-
ates with the quality of prevailing practices was calculated to promote a
variety of administrative interests wholly separate from the defendant's
immediate interest in undoing a conviction or sentence attributable to
267. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
268. Id. at 688.
269. Id. at 694.
270. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (citing cases).
271. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.
272. See ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at 53, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at
66-67 ("Even in cases in which the performances of counsel have passed constitutional muster
under the test of Strickland v. Washington and executions have been carried out, the
representation provided has nevertheless been of very poor quality.").
The inadequacy of the Strickland standard, particularly as it applies in capital cases, has been
discussed at length by other commentators, and therefore is only sketched out in this Article.
For earlier commentary critical of the standard governing ineffectiveness of counsel claims in
capital cases, see Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 486-87; Tabak, supra note 9, at 409; Tabak &
Lane, supra note 233, at 69-75; Fong, supra note 9; Gredd, supra note 9; James W. Hitzeman,
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987
U. Ill. L. Rev. 131.
Also, it should be noted that, in some cases, capital defendants who may have been denied
effective representation will be procedurally barred from raising a claim under Strickland. See,
e.g., Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1188-93 (10th Cir. 1991) (ineffective assistance claim
barred by failure to raise it in first state postconviction hearing).
273. 466 U.S. at 688.
274. See id. at 689 ("the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation"); cf. Vivian 0. Berger, The
Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 9, 61 (1986) ("plainly the caliber of representation cannot exceed the caliber of counsel").
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incompetent representation. 275 Thus, while the standard for assessing
attorney conduct is ostensibly intended to ensure "the proper functioning
of the adversary process" '276 and "that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial, ' '277 it does not necessarily require defense representation of sufficient
quality to achieve those ends.2 78 Therefore, in locales where indigent
capital defendants are routinely assigned lawyers who are unqualified to
defend criminal cases, a death sentence attributable to the defense lawyer's
poor performance often must be upheld because of the laxity of the"prevailing professional norms."27 9
To bring the inadequacy of the Strickland standard into sharper relief,
one need only extend Chief Justice Burger's analogy between lawyers and
doctors. 28 Suppose that in a community with few surgeons (because the
compensation was too low to encourage doctors to specialize in surgery),
patients in need of surgery were not referred exclusively to doctors who
were trained and certified to perform surgical procedures but were
assigned to doctors at random. Suppose further that under the law
governing medical malpractice claims, the reasonableness of a doctor's
treatment was based on the prevailing norm, rather than on the norm set
by trained surgeons.281 Many mistakes that would be intolerable by the
standard of surgeons would fall within the range of "prevailing professional
norms," and therefore would not be remediable through a malpractice
action. So it is under the Strickland standard. Many errors that would not be
made by a qualified criminal defense attorney-one versed in criminal law
and procedure and familiar with trial practice-are "reasonable" under
prevailing norms because unqualified lawyers set those norms.
Strickland imposes an additional barrier because it calls for "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance."282 The rationale for the presumption is that
there are "countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case." 28 3 In areas of criminal defense practice where the range of strategic
275. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
276. Id. at 686.
277. Id. at 689.
278. See Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 341.
279. See Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
280. See Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy, supra note 205, at 230-31 (quoted at supra
text accompanying note 205). The analogy has been extended before to underscore the
inadequacy of representation in capital cases. See Minority Report of Stephen B. Bright, in
ABA Background Report, supra note 11, at A-46, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 219 ("There
are many communities that do not have surgeons. But that does not mean that we allow
chiropracters to do brain surgery in those communities."); see also Berger, supra note 230, at
254; cf. Brown v. McGerr, 774 F.2d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Young attorneys, like young
physicians, must be trained by experienced practitioners."); Irving R. Kaufman, The Court
Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A. J. 175, 177 (1974).
281. Cf Gian-Cursio v. State, 180 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (chiropractors found
criminally negligent in their treatment of a patient with tuberculosis were properly held to the
standard of skilled physicians who are familiar with accepted methods for treatment, rather
than the standard accepted among "drugless healers").
282. 466 U.S. at 689.
283. Id.
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options is narrow, the presumption will be less difficult to overcome;
conversely, the wider the range of available strategic options, the stronger
the presumption.28 4
Because the range of options is particularly wide in a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding, Strickland calls for courts to review the defense lawyer's
conduct at that stage with particular deference. For example, experienced
practitioners believe that it is almost invariably a mistake to present no
evidence at the sentencing proceeding. 28 5 But, as a matter of law, reviewing
courts indulge a strong presumption that defense counsel's failure to
present evidence is a matter of reasonable defense strategy, since that is one
of the many available strategic options. Relying on the factually unwar-
ranted but legally mandated presumption, courts frequently reject ineffec-
tive assistance claims premised on defense counsel's failure to present a case
at the sentencing proceeding or even to investigate the possibility of a
defense.286
284. It is hard to imagine a strategic justification for counseling a client to confess to the
crime charged, and thus, such advice would inot enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moreau, 572 N.E.2d 1382 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). On the other
hand, decisions about the content of opening statements and summations, about what
evidence to introduce, about what objections to make, and about how to conduct cross-
examination, are presumed to be strategic. For example, in Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F. Supp.
788 (W.D. Mo. 1990), affd, 935 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1991), the defense attorney failed to make
an opening statement or to object to the prosecution's introduction of damaging proof about
the defendant's prior criminal conduct. Although the defense lawyer was suffering from
Alzheimer's disease at the time of the trial, the district court nevertheless held both lapses tobe a "tactical decision" within the bounds of a lawyer's "trial strategy." Id. at 792-93.
To overcome the presumption that a trial lawyer's conduct reflected sound strategy, and not
inattention or ignorance, a defendant generally must call the trial lawyer as a witness in a
collateral proceeding and elicit his reasons for the challenged conduct. Because lawyers are
jealous of their professional reputation, they have an interest in placing their prior acts or
omissions in the best possible light. On rare occasion, a court will decline to credit a lawyer's
testimony that he acted reasonably. See, e.g., id. at 794 (defense lawyer's assertion that he
conducted pretrial discovery "lacked credibility"). In most cases, however, a court will accept
an explanation that accords with the presumption that trial lawyers act reasonably. As a
consequence, on top of everything else, Strickland imposes a difficult evidentiary hurdle.
285. See supra note 231.
286. See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992); Schlup v. Armontrout,
941 F.2d 631, 639, 643 (8th Cir. 1991); Schneider v. State, 787 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Mo. 1990)
(en banc); Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); ABA Background
Report, supra note 11, at 53 (citing Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026-31 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (attorney presented no case in mitigation
after failing to contact any mitigating witnesses and failing to investigate defendant's history);
Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1093-97 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (Johnson,J., dissenting), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1088 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)); Fong, supra note 9, at 476 n.103 (citing cases). In Messer, defense counsel at the
guilt phase made no opening statement, offered no defense case, performed a limited
cross-examination, never objected, and emphasized the gruesome nature of the crime in a
brief closing argument. During the sentencing trial, counsel offered no mitigating evidence of
defendant's steady employment, military service, church attendance, or cooperation with
police; additionally, counsel "repeatedly hinted that death was the most appropriate sentence."
Messer, 474 U.S. at 1089-91; see also Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(in addition to failing to present available evidence, counsel during closing argument in effect
apologized to the jury for having served as defense attorney). But see Deutscher v. Whitley, 946
F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (1lth Cir. 1991)
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Furthermore, to prevail under Strickland the defendant must point to"specific errors made by trial counsel. ' 287 This standard imposes a partic-
ular burden for defendants whose trial attorneys were unqualified. In such
cases, the attorney's unfamiliarity with trial practice generally, or with
criminal law and procedure in particular, is an impediment that will
pervade the attorney's performance, often to the detriment of the
accused.2 8 Yet the Strickland standard affords no relief in cases where
unqualified defense counsel provides poor representation in every respect,
but commits no single egregious error that, standing alone, cannot be
explained away as a reasonable strategic option. 289
The second component of the Strickland standard-the need to show"a reasonable probability" that counsel's poor performance affected the
outcome-creates yet one more hurdle for defendants with unqualified
trial lawyers. Read literally, this requirement is especially imposing when
trial counsel was incompetent at the sentencing phase of a capital case.
Precisely because so little is understood about how juries exercise their
discretion, it will be difficult to prove convincingly that the lawyer's poor
performance made a difference, even if it did.29°
For these reasons, convictions will often be upheld under Strickland
even though, had the defendant been represented by a qualified lawyer, the
outcome of the trial would have been more favorable. In most cases, one
can expect the unqualified lawyer's performance to fall below the standard
("To save the difficult and time-consuming task of assembling mitigation witnesses until after
the jury's verdict in the guilt phase almost assures that witnesses will not be available."); Harris
v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 763 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 573 (1989); Blake v. Kemp, 758
F.2d 523, 533 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985).
287. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 647, 666 (1984).
288. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text (describing survey of judges).
289. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 & n.31. Thus, Strickland rejects
the approach taken in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980), which called for a
presumption that the defendant was prejudiced when trial counsel's performance was
adversely affected by a conflict of interest. In Strickland, the Court explained that this
presumption is justified in conflict-of-interest cases because "it is difficult to measure the
precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests." 466 U.S. at
692. The same might be said of the trial counsel's lack of relevant skill and knowledge: it is
impossible precisely to measure its effect, although its impact on counsel's performance is
likely to be pervasive.
290. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Collings, 950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5th Cir. 1992) (failure to
investigate and present evidence of background and mental capacity summarily determined
insufficiently prejudicial); Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding
that inexperienced defense attorney's failure to offer expert psychiatric or psychological
testimony as mitigating evidence did not prejudice the case, because "the undeveloped
testimony would not have been of sufficient weight to have changed the outcome ... [i]n light
of the numerous aggravating circumstances). See generally State v. Davis, 561 A.2d 1082, 1116
(N.J. 1989) (Handler, J., dissenting) ("In determining the propriety of life or death, the jury's
function is essentially normative rather than evaluative .... [A]s a judgment becomes more
subjective, the task of assessing the extent to which that judgment might have been influenced
by more competent representation becomes more difficult."). But see Blodgett v. Mak, 970 F.2d
614, 619-21 (9th Cir. 1991); Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1445-47 (9th Cir. 1991);
Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d at 643-44 (Heaney, J., dissenting); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937
F.2d 1298, 1304-07 (8th Cir. 1991); Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 653-55 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988).
78 IOWA LAW REVIEW
set by attorneys with skill and experience in the defense of criminal cases.
But the defendant cannot prevail under Strickland merely by showing that
counsel's performance was incompetent in this ordinary, nontechnical
sense, and that the case might have been defended successfully by an
attorney who had performed competently. Because of Stricdand's forgiving
standard for reviewing counsel's performance and the various evidentiary
obstacles established by that decision, the class of cases in which relief will
be afforded to defendants who suffer at the hands of unqualified lawyers is
bound to be fairly small.
This is a result that ought to be troubling in all cases, although perhaps
less so in noncapital cases. While some convicted defendants, capital and
noncapital alike, might complain that qualified lawyers would have won an
acquittal, most of those defendants are in fact guilty of the crimes they were
accused of committing.2 9' By some measures, the favorable verdict they
might have secured would be undeserved. For those critics who are
principally concerned with the reliability of the outcome of the trial, as well
as for those who believe that a trial is fundamentally fair as long as the
quality of defense counsel's performance satisfies the Strickland standard,
the conviction of defendants who are in fact guilty but who would have
established a reasonable doubt if better defended may seem acceptable.
There is no excuse, however, for executing capital defendants for
whom the poor quality of trial counsel meant the difference between life
and death. This is true, in part, because "death is different" from other
forms of punishment, 292 and there is therefore a need for greater reliability
in the jury's factual determinations that go into the decision to impose the
sentence. More importantly, however, this is true because there is no
objective standard for determining when, in Justice Stevens's words, "an
individual has lost his moral entitlement to live. '293 Although some mighi
think otherwise,294 the legal expectation or baseline for defendants con-
victed of capital crimes is not death but life.295 No particular set of
circumstances establishes that a given case is an exceptional one warranting
291. Even the most vociferous critics of the criminal justice system concede this point. See,
e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Best Defense at xviii (1982) ("The American criminal justice
system.., is not grossly inaccurate: large numbers of innocent defendants do not populate our
prisons.").
292. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 499 U.S. 584, 592 (1991) ("The penalty of death differs
from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.") (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983) (there is "a
qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment" that
warrants a greater need for reliability in the death penalty determination) (quoting Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.)),
.293, Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984).
294. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 258, at 41-47 (survey ofjurors who imposed the
death sentence revealed that they generally began with presumption that a death sentence
would be returned unless they could be convinced it was inappropriate).
295. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (death penalty process must separate
"the few cases in which [the death penalty is appropriate] from the many cases in which it is
not"); accord Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980).
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a sentence of death.29 6 The decision to impose a death sentence must be an
individual, subjective one that takes All relevant mitigating circumstances
into account.297 If trial counsel is incapable of adequately presenting a case
for mercy, one cannot have confidence that the defendant deserves the
resulting death sentence. Thus, one cannot take refuge in the notion that
those death-sentenced defendants who would have received a life sentence
with a better defense nevertheless deserve the death penalty.
One might ask, of course, why the inadequacies of the Strickland
standard should not be redressed simply by improving the standard for
reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Why not adopt a more
demanding standard for reviewing defense counsel's performance, either
in capital cases or in all criminal cases, rather than focusing on the defense
attorney's qualifications? There are two answers to this question.
First, it would be extremely difficult to devise a standard for evaluating
defense counsel's performance that captured all the cases in which one
would conclude that the attorney performed inadequately. Efforts to
establish that an attorney failed to meet a given standard of competent
representation are necessarily susceptible to problems of proof in many
cases. A defendant may not know, or may be unable to prove, that the
defense attorney acted outside the courtroom in a manner which was either
itself incompetent or which demonstrates the incompetence of the attor-
ney's performance in court.
More importantly, an ineffective assistance standard which in fact
captured all the cases in which the defense lawyer performed incompe-
tently would create significant institutional problems which cannot fairly be
discounted. If the attorney's conduct were judged by the standard of a
296. There is no benchmark at the sentencing phase equivalent to the relationship between
factual and legal guilt. One might reasonably take the view that factually guilty defendants
deserve to be convicted, and that an acquittal is in some sense undeserved. Therefore,
convicted defendants who might have fared better with better lawyers are not particularly
entitled to consideration. The same cannot be said of those who receive a death sentence
because of inadequate representation.
To be sure, courts speak at times of the need for "reliability" or "accuracy" in the imposition
of a death sentence. See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989); Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (there is "a special 'need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment' in any capital case") (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (White, J., concurring)); Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986). But courts do not and cannot measure reliability or
accuracy by reference to an objective standard of moral deservedness. For example, in the
context of decisions raising the question of whether a death sentence should be overturned
because attorney incompetence or some other deficiency at the sentencing proceeding
amounted to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" which excuses a procedural default, the
death sentence has been deemed sufficiently "reliable" or "accurate" as long as it might have
been imposed in the absence of the error. See, e.g., Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443,
1444-45 (9th Cir. 1991); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1990); cf. Johnson
v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("The sentenced defendant must
demonstrate... that the error resulted in a sentencing outcome for which the defendant is not
eligible by virtue of his conduct.").
297. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("fundamental respect for
humanity.., requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death").
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skilled criminal defense practitioner, a large number of convictions would
have to be overturned. Indeed, convictions would be overturned in all those
cases in which, as one would have expected, an unskilled attorney per-
formed below the more demanding standard. This would be an enormously
unfair result from the perspective of courts and prosecutors because, at
least in cases in which the defendant retained counsel, they would have had
little ability to protect against the reversal. 298 When the defendant retained
a duly licensed attorney, the court could not disqualify that attorney at the
outset of a criminal case simply because the court anticipated that counsel's
performance would not satisfy the higher standard that replaced Strickland.
Because the attorney would be "counsel" for Sixth Amendment purposes,
the defendant would have the right to retain the attorney. 299 Except
perhaps in the rare cases in which the court witnessed the attorney's poor
performance at trial and could determine based on the performance alone
that the attorney was acting incompetently, the court could not attempt to
remove the attorney from the case.3 00 By the middle of trial, of course,
298. In cases of indigent defendants, courts could make some effort to assign only skilled
practitioners. However, courts would have no control over the defendants' decisions about
whom to retain. If a more demanding standard for judging ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were adopted, it would apply equally to retained and appointed lawyers. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) ("we see no basis for drawing a distinction between retained
and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who choose their own
lawyers").
299. Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1968). But see Lynd v. State, 414 S.E.2d 5
(Ga. 1992). In Lynd, a capital defendant retained an attorney who had been admitted to
practice for one-and-a-half years, during which he had tried only one felony case before ajury.
In addition, he had been assigned a lawyer who had been admitted to practice for little more
than half a year and had never conducted a jury trial. The trial court, after ascertaining the
attorneys' inexperience, relieved the assigned lawyer and directed the defendant either to
retain a more experienced laywer or to accept the appointment of a more experienced lawyer
to act as lead counsel. When the defendant failed to retain another lawyer, the trial judge
appointed one over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the defendant had not been denied his right to counsel of choice. It explained:
While the defendant's retained attorney was not presumptively incompetent to
represent a defendant in a death penaltyjury trial .... his inexperience wasjustifiably
a matter of concern in a case sufficiently more complicated than the run-of-the-mill
criminal trial to give pause even to far more experienced attorneys. Claims of
ineffectiveness are routine in death-penalty cases, and not the less so in cases in which
the trial counsel was retained rather than appointed .... Given the serious potential
of a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness resulting from retained counsel's almost total
lack of criminal trial experience, the trial court acted within its discretion to require
the defendant either to retain a more experienced attorney or accept the appoint-
ment of one.
Id. at 10 (citations omitted). In light of the chosen attorney's inexperience, the court concluded
that the defendant's right to counsel of choice was outweighed by the interests in preserving
high professional standards, in preserving public confidence in the judicial process, and in
promoting orderly judicial administration. Id; cf. United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 848
(1st Cir. 1989) (trial court properly denied defendant's request to admit lawyerpro hlc vice and
appoint him as stand-by counsel when the lawyer had not practiced law for twenty-five years).
300. Cf. Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility When
Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 323, 341-42 & n.79
(1989) (the extent of a prosecutor's responsibility to call the defense lawyer's incompetent
representation to the court's attention is unsettled and, in any event, "[i]t is often hard for a
prosecutor to identify ineffective assistance of counsel with any degree of certainty in the
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considerable resources would have been expended. Indeed, one can
imagine that some defendants would deliberately select unqualified attor-
neys in order to win two bites at the apple: if the attorney failed to secure
an acquittal, the defendant could challenge successfully the attorney's
performance on the ground that it was ineffective. It is thus understandable
why the Court in Strickland would not draw the line between constitution-
ally competent and incompetent representation at the same point at which
the legal profession and judges might draw it for other purposes.
In light of the danger of an unacceptably high reversal rate, the only
institutionally acceptable way to raise the standard for judging trial coun-
sel's performance to the standard expected of skilled practitioners would
be, initially, to redefine "counsel". to include only skilled practitioners. Only
then could courts protect against the predictable prospect that an incapable
lawyer will render a substandard performance. Until the right to "counsel"
means a. right to a qualified advocate, rather than a right to any duly
licensed attorney, it will be unreasonable to establish a far higher standard
of defense representation.
V. WHAT A REDEFINITION OF "COUNSEL" SHOULD MEAN
A. The Right to a Qualified Lawyer
Suppose that courts accept that "counsel" means a qualified advocate
and abandon the fiction that all duly licensed attorneys are qualified to
defend criminal cases. What would follow?
To begin with, the number of individuals who qualify as "counsel"
would be considerably reduced from the set of all duly licensed attorneys to
the comparatively smaller subset of qualified practitioners-those licensed
attorneys who possess the requisite skills and professional values that are
generally necessary to provide a competent criminal defense. The right to"counsel" would therefore mean the right to retain a qualified attorney or,
in the case of indigent defendants, to have a qualified attorney provided by
the state.
While decreasing the number of lawyers who might be assigned. to
represent criminal defendants, the requirement of special certification for
criminal defense lawyers would not necessarily reduce the pool of lawyers
who might be retained. Courts would be free to permit defendants to waive
the right to counsel in order to secure the representation of an unqualified
lawyer. The trial judge would be required to question the defendant,
however, to ensure that the decision was a voluntary and informed one, just
as trial judges now do when defendants seek to be represented by a lawyer
with a potential conflict of interest 301 or when defendants seek to represent
course of a trial").
301. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
See generally Green, supra note 300, at 331 ("Although trial judges engage in varying types of
inquiries, the court must ensure at minimum that the accused understands the general risks
created by counsel's potential conflict and voluntarily accepts them.").
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themselves.30 2 In cases where the waiver was not knowing or voluntary, or
where the defendant was never apprised that the defense lawyer was
unqualified, a convicted defendant could justly assert a denial of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 303
If a right to a qualified advocate were recognized, courts would have
to devise a mechanism to ensure that attorneys whom they authorize to
defend criminal cases are qualified. While it would be possible to raise' the
standards for membership in the bar to ensure that all lawyers were
qualified, this approach would make little sense, since the vast majority of
lawyers will never engage in criminal practice. The preferable course would
be for courts or their surrogates to establish processes for ascertaining
which particular attorneys are qualified to represent individuals accused of
a crime. If the processes were reasonably calculated to identify qualified
attorneys, then those attorneys categorically could be regarded as "coun-
sel," even if other licensed practitioners were in fact unqualified.30 4
One possible means of distinguishing between qualified and unquali-
fied attorneys would be for trial judges to make ad hoc determinations
about the fitness of individual attorneys who seek to appear before them in
criminal cases. This approach would raise a variety of practical problems,
however. It would be administratively cumbersome for trial judges to assess
every defense attorney's qualifications at the threshold of every individual
302. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d
1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) ("a criminal defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges
against him, the possible penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation").
For a model of the inquiry that judges should undertake when defendants wish to represent
themselves, see 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges 1.02-2 to -5 (3d ed. 1986).
303. If a court were someday to define "counsel" to mean a qualified advocate, it would
undoubtedly apply its decision prospectively only. Defendants whose appeals had already been
decided certainly would not be allowed to benefit from the new interpretation. Cf Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (rule against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
applied to cases pending on direct review when decision was announced, but not to cases in
which review was concluded).
This is not to say that, under existing habeas corpus law, as restrictive as it has become, a
retrospective application would be wholly unwarranted. Although the Supreme Court recently
ruled in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that newly announced rules of criminal
procedure are generally inapplicable in federal habeas corpus proceedings, it recognized an
exception for "new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished." Id. at 313 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); see also id. ("Because we
operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determi-
nation of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due
process have yet to emerge."). The right to a qualified lawyer, if it were to be recognized by a
court, might fairly be characterized as a right "without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished." Id. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to think that a court would
announce a constitutional standard for attorney qualification if the consequence of its ruling
was to place in jeopardy the many convictions that had previously been obtained in cases
where defense counsel was unqualified. Cf People v. Mitchell, No. 289, 535 N.Y.S. 2d 286,
(Dec. 17, 1991) (rule requiring defendant's presence when judge questions prospective jurors
at sidebar held prospective in application; possibility of prospective application allows the
court "to expand the protection accorded defendants when [the court] might otherwise
hesitate to do so because retroactive application threatens to wreck more havoc in society than
society's interest in stability will tolerate").
304. See supra Part Ill(A).
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case.305 Moreover, this approach would create both uncertainty and a risk
of inconsistent determinations among judges. Whether the determinations
were made on the basis of an individual judge's own criteria or on the basis
of the judge's subjective application of general standards, lawyers would not
know in advance of a proceeding whether they qualified as "counsel," and
defendants would not know when they retained lawyers whether the chosen
representative would ultimately be deemed qualified. Defendants would
expend resources and proceedings would be delayed in cases in which the
retained trial attorneys had to be replaced because of inadequate qualifi-
cations.
Additionally, it would be difficult to develop general criteria on which
ad hoc determinations could satisfactorily be based. This is true for two
reasons. First, there are many alternative means by which attorneys could
develop and demonstrate their ability to try criminal cases competently, and
it would be hard to develop equivalences between various types of training
and experience. Second, ad hoc decisions about whether individual attor-
neys were qualified to represent criminal defendants would rest on neces-
sarily subjective and imprecise judgments.306 Especially at the margins,
courts would struggle to distinguish qualified from unqualified attorneys.
The far preferable course would be for courts to develop an institu-
tional process, like the current licensing process, to identify those attorneys
who possess the qualifications to defend criminal defendants. Courts would
have broad discretion both to determine what it means to be "qualified" and
to decide how to guarantee the qualifications of attorneys. However, a
reasonable process would have to do two things: certify lawyers who
demonstrate they are fit, and decertify lawyers who later prove unfit.
Although no court has yet established minimal qualifications, beyond
the possession of a law license, for all attorneys defending criminal cases,
some courts have already established qualification standards for defense
attorneys who seek to hold themselves out as specialists.30 7 Others have
305. See supra text accompanying note 143.
306. A decision about whether a particular attorney is qualified to defend criminal cases
requires, first, a sense of what constitutes a competent criminal defense. That judgment is
inherendy subjective. The decision then requires an identification of the skills, knowledge and
values which an attorney must possess in order to provide such a defense. This requires a
necessarily imprecise assessment about the relationship between particular traits and the
quality of a lawyer's performance. Finally, the decision requires a necessarily subjective
determination about whether a given lawyer possesses the requisite traits. That determination
can only be made inferentially based on the lawyer's training and experience or from other
relevant achievements.
307. See, e.g., California Rules of Court, Standards for Certification and Decertification,
Criminal Law Specialists (1985); Florida Rules of Court, Standards for Certification of a Board
Certified Criminal Lawyer, Rule 6-8.3. For example, the requirements to be certified as a
Criminal Law Specialist in California include, among other things: (1) that an applicant have
a specified level of experience which ordinarily includes having served as counsel of record in
at least five felony jury trials, in five additional jury trials, and in forty additional criminal
matters; (2) that an applicant have received a specified amount of advanced instruction in such
areas as criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence within the previous three years; (3)
that an applicant demonstrate a specified level of knowledge of criminal law and related fields
either by passing a written examination given for that purpose or by other specified means;
and (4) that an applicant demonstrate to the satisfaction of a committee that he or she is
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established qualification standards for defense attorneys who seek assign-
ments to represent indigent criminal defendants.3 08 Still others have special
requirements for trial lawyers in general.3 09
The various standards currently in use illustrate that courts have a
broad range of options in devising a mechanism for certifying criminal
defense lawyers. For example, courts might test lawyers to determine
whether they possess the requisite skill and knowledge, just as candidates
are now examined to receive a general license to practice law.310 They
might require candidates to receive particular training, such as postgradu-
proficient in criminal practice. California Rules of Court, Standards for Certification and
Decertification, Criminal Law Specialists, Section II (1985). Although providing for certifica-
tion of criminal law specialists, states such as California do not presently require such
certification to defend a criminal case.
308. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Revised Plan for Furnishing
Representation Pursuant to the CriminalJustice Act (18 U.S.G. § 3006A) (1985); Committee
on Crim. Just., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, The Criminal 18-B Panels 5-8, 11-12
(1992) (reviewing processes for assignment in state criminal cases within the five boroughs of
New York City); see also Criminal Just. Act Review Comm., Interim Report (1992), reprinted in
51 Crim. L. Rep. 2335, 2343-44 (1992) (proposing development of qualification standards for
appointment of counsel in federal criminal cases pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act).
Under the Southern District of New York plan, indigent criminal defendants are assigned
either an attorney from the Federal Defender Services Unit of the Legal Aid Society of the City
of New York, or a private attorney from the "CJA Panel." Membership on the CJA Panel is
limited to private attorneys who "have demonstrated experience in, and knowledge of, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence." U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
S. Dist. of N.Y., Revised Plan for Furnishing Representation Pursuant to the Criminal Justice
Act (18 U.S.C. § 3006A) III(A) (1985). Attorneys who apply for appointment to the panel
must provide information about their educational background, professional qualifications and
previous experience. To be appointed, the attorney must be recommended by a review
committee whose purpose is to "promote the furnishing of quality representation," and be
approved by both a committee of the Board of Judges and by the Board of Judges itself. Id.
at III(C) & IV(A). Members of the panel participate in continuing legal education programs
relating to federal criminal defense practice organized and sponsored by the review commit-
tee, id. at IV(B)(3), and are subject to removal for failing to fulfill their obligations or for
engaging in such other conduct that renders their continued membership inappropriate. Id.
at III(F).
Similarly, attorneys seeking assignments to defend criminal cases in the New York State
Supreme Court in Manhattan or the Bronx must apply for membership on an "18-B criminal
panel." The applicant generally must show that he has had "[a]ctual court experience in at
least thirty criminal cases within [the] past five years," including participating on a specified
number of occasions in various different proceedings, including negotiated pleas, preliminary
hearings, motions, and jury trials. Moreover, the applicant must submit the names of various
references, including judges, adversaries and co-counsel, and must undergo an interview.
Members of the panel are subject to suspension or removal by a screening committee that has
been established to investigate complaints by judges and others, including disgruntled clients.
See Committee on Crim. Just., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Criminal 18-B Panels
5-8, 11-12 (1992).
309. In both the Southern District of Florida and the Northern District of Illinois, an
attorney admitted to th general bar must have a designated amount of trial experience to be
admitted to the trial bar. See Special Rules Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys,
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Fla., Rules I(B) & 2(C) (1982); General Rules, U.S. Dist. Ct. for
the N. Dist. of Ill., Rule 3.00 (1982); see also Brown v. McGarr, 774 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1985)
(upholding trial bar rules of Northern District of Illinois).
310. Cf California Rules of Court, Standards for Certification and Decertification, Criminal
Law Specialists, Section 11 (1985) (discussed supra note 307).
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ate instruction in lawyering skills and criminal law and procedure.311 Or,
they might require experience in defending criminal cases either as an
assistant to a qualified advocate or under the supervision of a qualified
advocate.312
Under a more rigorous licensing process, courts would have the option
of establishing a higher standard of qualification for the defense of more
serious or more complex criminal cases.313 Thus, practitioners might be
required to acquire experience in defending misdemeanor cases before
representing felony defendants, experience in defending felony cases
before representing defendants in homicide cases, and experience in
noncapital homicide cases before representing capital defendants. The
creation of a "tiered" or "graded" criminal defense bar, which has some
antecedents in colonial practice,314 would address the problem that all
criminal.defense lawyers "must have their first cases. 313 Attorneys who
have never defended a criminal case without supervision should neverthe-
less be considered qualified to defend a criminal case that is relatively
simple, as misdemeanor cases tend to be, if they have received adequate
training and experience. For example, to be deemed qualified to represent
misdemeanor defendants, lawyers might first be required to receive train-ing in evidence, criminal law, and criminal procedure, to observe some
number of criminal trials, and to defend some number of criminal cases
either in a simulated setting or together with more experienced lawyers -all
of which go beyond what is currently required to acquire a license to
practice law.
Courts would have similar leeway in establishing a decertification
process for criminal defense lawyers.3 16 Ideally, a system of review by
judges and peers would be established to determine whether lawyers should
311. Cf id.
312. Cf Criminal Just. Act Review Comm., Interim Report (1992), reprinted in 51 Crim. L.Rep. 2335, 2344 (1992) ("One way to develop more experienced criminal defense practitioners
in federal court is a 'second chair' program. Under this method, a more experienced criminaldefense lawyer could be matched with a less experienced, but otherwise qualified, court-appointed counsel .... ); Basic Training for Civil Recruits, Am. Law., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 79
(describing program in Atlanta for training and providing mentors for civil attorneys who
represent indigent defendants in less serious cases).
313. Cf Committee on Crim. Just., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Criminal 18-B
Panels 6 (1992) (in Bronx and New York Counties, courts have assigned trial lawyers torepresent indigent defendants from three different panels-a Criminal Court, a Supreme
Court and a Homicide panel); Criminal Just. Act Review Comm., Interim Report (1992),
reprinted in 51 Crim. L. Rep. 2335, 2344 (1992) ("because of the wide range of complexity in
federal criminal cases, a 'tiering' of the CJA panel is advisable to qualify attorneys forappointment for different levels of types of cases, depending on their experience and
training").
314. See supra note 100.
315. Schtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941).
316. A system for decertifying lawyers is essential, in part, because lawyers who are at one
time qualified may later cease to be capable practitioners. More importantly, some lawyers who
satisfy the qualification standards will be "false positives," that is, they will not in fact bequalified to defend criminal cases. For example, lawyers who possess adequate skill and
training may be uncommitted to the duty of zealous representation, and may therefore
perform inadequately.
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remain certified. At the very least, trial judges should have a responsibility
under such a process to report lawyers who appear to be incompetent or
unethical.317 Moreover, authorities overseeing the decertification process
should have a responsibility to investigate all colorable complaints of
attorney wrongdoing, and should not limit their attention to the most
egregious complaints, as underfinanced licensing authorities typically
do.318
Recognition of a right to a qualified advocate would, of course, create
practical problems in jurisdictions where there were too few skilled criminal
defense lawyers to serve the entire population of criminal defendants.
Additional public defenders might have to be hired and trained or, in
jurisdictions where lawyers are appointed from the general bar, compen-
sation would have to be increased to induce a portion of the bar to specialize
in criminal defense representation. Moreover, special efforts would have to
be made to develop a pool of lawyers with expertise in capital cases. To
overcome the understandable reluctance of lawyers to represent indigent
defendants who are on trial for their lives, states would have to increase
considerably the amount of compensation provided for such work.3 19
The certification of criminal defense lawyers would have the obvious
benefit of improving the quality of defense representation, and thereby
reducing the number of cases in which defendants are convicted or
punished more harshly because of the failings of their attorneys. Of course,
no certification process could be fool-proof. Some lawyers who were
certified to defend criminal cases would nevertheless be unqualified.
Defendants who received substandard representation from those lawyers,
as well as defendants whose generally qualified lawyers committed unchar-
acteristic blunders, could attempt to take advantage of the existing consti-
tutional remedy for defendants who receive inadequate legal assistance.
Redefining "counsel" to mean a qualified advocate would also benefit
the standard governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To begin,
the narrower definition would make the current doctrine more rational. As
noted in Part IV(C), the Strickland standard is difficult to meet, in part,
because it calls for a presumption that the defense lawyer's conduct was
reasonable. 320 This presumption, in turn, rests on a fiction that lawyers in
criminal cases are generally qualified to exercise reasonable judgment
about the conduct of their cases.321 If lawyers in criminal cases were
qualified, this premise would no longer be false.
Moreover, the standard of performance that an attorney must meet
under Strickland would be raised. Strickland calls for evaluating the reason-
ableness of the lawyer's performance in accordance with "prevailing
professional norms." Consequently, by excluding unqualified lawyers from
the group of lawyers who establish the professional norms for criminal
317. See supra text accompanying note 185-88.
318. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part IV(A).
320. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 151.
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defense representation, the redefinition of "counsel" would have the effect
of upgrading the expectations for a reasonable performance.3 22 Finally, as
noted in Part IV, recognition of a right to a qualified advocate would
remove institutibnal barriers to the courts' adoption of a more exacting
standard than the one established in Strickland.
B. A First Step: The Right to a Qualified Attorney in Capital Cases
It is unlikely that courts will soon recognize a constitutional right to a
qualified advocate in all criminal cases. This is true, in part, because of the
unreceptivity of the current judicial climate. Whereas the judicial decisions
leading up to Gideon v. Wainwright had gradually eroded the fiction that
criminal defendants are qualified to represent themselves,3 23 the contem-
porary decisions on the meaning of "counsel" widely adhere to the fiction
that lawyers are qualified to do anything.3 24 Thus, this fiction is firmly
rooted in ourjurisprudence, even if, off the bench,judges almost uniformly
disavow it.
Moreover, various practical and administrative considerations discour-
age courts from examining the qualifications of defense advocates. A
requirement of special certification would burden the judiciary, which
would have to devise methods for ensuring that defense lawyers were fit; it
would impose financially on states and counties that do not have a public
defenders system; 3 25 it would undermine the perceived interests of the
organized bar by exposing the frailty of the notion that attorneys are
qualified to provide all legal services; it would burden individual lawyers
who would have to undergo additional training in order to serve in criminal
cases; and it would invite public outrage whenever convictions were
overturned for the failure to provide a qualified advocate. These consider-
ations explain why, although it is feasible to design and implement a
process for providing all criminal defendants access to qualified defense
lawyers, there may be little enthusiasm for doing so in the near future.
If, as appears obvious, the provision of defense representation cannot
be completely overhauled in the short term, then the current process
should be reformed in capital cases, where its inadequacy is most keenly
felt. Courts should recognize, at least in capital cases, that "counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment means more than simply a licensed practitioner. More-
over, until such recognition is forthcoming, legislation and court rules
should be adopted to ensure that criminal defense lawyers are qualified in
capital cases.
Recognition of a constitutional right to qualified counsel in capital but
not in noncapital cases may seem unprincipled at first glance. The Supreme
Court has, after all, rejected a distinction between capital and noncapital
322. See supra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
323. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 211.
324. See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 86.
325. Those jurisdictions would have to subsidize the training of defense attorneys and
provide sufficient financial incentives to attract attorneys to defense practice.
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cases when deciding whether indigent defendants have a right to appointed
counsel.3 26 Nevertheless, a principled rationale can be advanced to justify
recognizing that a law license, although it may be enough to qualify one as"counsel" in other criminal cases, is not enough in capital cases.
The reasoning starts with the premise that "counsel" means a qualified
advocate, but adheres to the traditional view that a license to practice law is
generally a sufficient qualification for the defense of criminal cases. To
defend capital cases, however, the level of skill and training that must be
demonstrated to acquire a law license does not suffice. Because capital
proceedings are uniquely complex, and law schools and licensing authori-
ties require little if any familiarity with such proceedings, considerably
more than a law license should be demanded in death penalty cases, even
if a law license is enough in other serious felony cases. Of course, the
overwhelming weight of professional literature takes the view that the
licensing process fails to ensure a lawyer's ability to defend any criminal
case. Nevertheless, it is certainly well recognized that capital cases are more
difficult to defend than most other criminal cases. Therefore, if the
inadequacy of the law license is largely attributable to the increasing
complexity of law practice in recent decades, then courts should begin by
requiring qualifications beyond the law license for criminal cases conven-
tionally deemed most complex-capital cases.3 27
The practical and administrative considerations that impede recogni-
tion of the right to a qualified advocate in all criminal cases are not nearly
as pressing in capital cases, which are comparatively infrequent. Neverthe-
less, in the current judicial climate, courts are unlikely to adopt even the
more modest redefinition of "counsel," which would apply only in capital
326. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Francis A. Allen, The Supreme
Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DePaul L. Rev. 213, 230-31 (1959)
(criticizing distinction between capital and noncapital cases in Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence prior to Gideon). For purposes of the indigent defendant's right to appointed
counsel, the Court has, instead, drawn the line between misdemeanor cases in which a prison
sentence is imposed and those in which imprisonment, although it may be a potential
sentence, is not imposed. The right applies only in the former cases. See Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367,373 (1979) (the premise "that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment... is eminently sound and warrants adoption of
actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel").
327. This argument might be bolstered by reference to the unique nature of both the death
sentence and of the defense lawyer's role in the capital sentencing process. Because of the
finality and qualitatively greater severity of a death sentence, greater reliability is needed in the
adjudicative process in death penalty cases. Requiring defense lawyers to possess qualifications
beyond those denoted by the simple acquisition of a law license would import a higher level of
reliability into the process.
Moreover, defense counsel plays a unique role under the capital sentencing processes that
have been developed in response to the Supreme Court's decisions under the "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause. A capital defendant's worthiness of the ultimate sanction is not
measurable by any objective standard. Without confidence in the adequacy of the sentencing
process, therefore, society cannot have confidence in the moral justness of the sentence.
Adequate defense representation is essential to ensure that the sentencing process appropri-
ately distinguishes between those who do and do not deserve to be put to death. Therefore,
there is a need in capital cases, not present to the same degree in other criminal cases, to
ensure that defense attorneys are qualified to play the role that is constitutionally entrusted to
them.
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cases. In the short term, there is, therefore, a need for law reform, both to
create the appropriate climate for eventual judicial recognition of the right
to a qualified advocate in capital cases, and to fill the gap created by the
absence of such a right.
One possible source of reform is Congress. The ABA has urged
Congress to revise federal habeas corpus provisions to encourage states to
appoint qualified trial lawyers, as well as appellate lawyers, to defendants
facing a death sentence.3 28 Under the ABA proposal, assigned counsel
would have to meet a mimimal standard of competency.3 29 States that failed
to provide qualified attorneys would be barred from raising procedural
defenses on federal habeas review.330 Moreover, the ABA urges death
penalty states to "recruit, select, train, monitor, support and assist attor-
neys" who represent capital defendants.33' Legislation proposed in 1991 by
Senator Biden contained some, although not all, of these provisions.3 32
State legislatures and courts are another possible source of reform.
Legislatures in states with death penalty provisions might establish state-
wide public defenders offices for the defense of capital cases. 333 Where the
state legislatures failed to do so, the state courts could adopt rules of court
which establish qualifications for lawyers appointed to represent capital
defendants.334
CONCLUSION
The view that the Sixth Amendment right to "counsel" should
encompass the guarantee of an attorney who is qualified to defend criminal
cases is not a new one. One federal appellate court expressed it more than
a half-century ago.33 5 It is justified by both the origins and the purposes of
the constitutional guarantee.
328. See ABA Report, supra note 11. For commentary on the American Bar Association's
recommendations, see Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1665 (1990).
329. ABA Report, supra note 11, at 1, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 9. The ABA's
guidelines propose that, to be appointed as lead trial counsel in a capital case, an attorney
should have the following qualifications: the attorney should be a member of the bar admitted
to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted pro hac vice; the attorney should be an "experienced
and active trial practitioner" with at least five years experience in litigating criminal cases; the
attorney should have experience as lead counsel in at least nine "serious and complex" cases
that were tried to completion before ajury, including among them at least three murder cases
or one murder and five other felony cases, and should have experience as lead counsel or
co-counsel in at least one capital case; the attorney should be familiar with the practice and
procedure in criminal cases in the jurisdiction; the attorney should be experienced in using
expert witnesses and evidence; and, within the past year, the attorney should have completed
a training or educational program focusing on the defense of capital cases. American Bar
Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
55-56 (1989)..
330. ABA Report, supra note 11, at 2, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 10.
331. Id. at 1, reprinted in 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 9.
332. See sdpra note 11.
333. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1355.10 (1991) (discussed in supra note 225).
334. See, e.g., Ohio C.P. Sup. Rule 65(I)(A) (discussed in supra note 224).
335. See Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941) (quoted in supra note 86).
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Of comparable vintage is the presumption that duly licensed attorneys
are qualified. It, too, predates the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Gideon
v. Wainwright by at least two decades.3 -6 Had Gideon not extended the Sixth
Amendment right to state court proceedings, courts might eventually have
abandoned the fiction that possessing a license to practice law means being
able to represent criminal defendants competently. After Gideon, however,
no court will soon hold that the pool of attorneys from which a criminal
accused is constitutionally entitled to retain or be assigned "counsel" should
be limited to those few who possess adequate lawyering sldlls and sufficient
familiarity with trial practice and criminal law and procedure.
At least in capital cases, where the consequences of the fiction are
harshest, the need for qualified lawyers should be recognized by courts and
legislatures. Court rules and statutes should ensure that competent repre-
sentation is afforded to defendants who face the death penalty. Defendants
do not deserve a death sentence if it is the result of the inadequate legal
assistance provided by an unqualified lawyer.
336. See id.
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